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Introduction
As an academic discipline, politics is an exceptionally self-reflexive activity. Much political
reflection has been devoted to defining its object, so much so that it is customary to cite
definitions of politics that date as far back as Plato and Aristotle. References to Aristotle’s
definition of the human being as a “political animal” are not uncommon to this day, even
though Aristotle intended for it to be a definition of the human being rather than of politics.
Similarly, Max Weber’s definition of the state as claiming “the monopoly of the legitimate
use of the physical force within a given territory” is often accepted as a working hypothesis
to circumscribe the political domain, even though this definition was meant to character-
ize the relation between modern states and violence, and not politics. In fact, despite its
ubiquitousness the abstract concept of “politics” remains rather vague and liberally defined,
even though it is meant to capture very mundane aspects of social living. Indeed, debate
in political theory has often hinged on disagreement about the nature and boundaries of
politics: for some time before the full academization of the discipline, political science was
largely identified with political theory, and self-reflection on the scope of political science has
been centre stage for decades. The fundamental essence of “politics” still remains an open
question and a point of departure both for empirical investigation of political phenomena
and for theorizing about the nature of the social world we live in.
Generally speaking, any definition of politics attempts at describing a sphere of human
interaction. The problem, of course, lies in convincingly identifying the boundaries of such
sphere. Prima facie, such indefiniteness might appear surprising: after all, the sphere of
politics cannot describe but concrete activities that take place in the social world, and
therefore no ambiguities should arise from ostensively pointing to the phenomena that the
word refers to. Yet the meaning of the word is not co-extensive with any one of the families
of phenomena it designates; “politics” is a common noun, and therefore it denotes a class
of objects rather than a particular phenomenon. The vagueness of the concept of politics
results from the different ways in which social phenomena can be grouped together into a
more or less homogeneous class. If we believe that hostile confrontations between fighting
factions are a recurring and striking enough feature of social interactions, for instance, we
may agree with Carl Schmitt’s definition of “the political” as “the most intense and extreme
antagonism” (Schmitt, [1932] 2007; 29). If, on the other hand, we consider state politics to
be separate enough from any other social activities, we may agree with the more traditional
equation between politics and ruling (or influencing the decisions of those who rule). Why,
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vthen, is the theoretical concept of politics necessary? After all, our vocabulary is rich enough
that we might as well rest content with the common names that are used to define the concept
of politics or, in more complex cases, the expressions that we use as definitions. To refer to
the two examples cited above, if “state” and “intense antagonism” are believed to be clear
enough notions that can be used to clarify the meaning of an abstract concept like “politics”,
the latter seems to be unnecessary addition to our vocabulary.
Implicit in any definition of politics seems to be the idea that the sphere of human
activity that politics refers to is an object in its own right rather than a mere collection of
heterogeneous social objects. I believe that the best way to make sense of this aspect is to
consider politics as a scientific object. There is an immediate link between the concept of
politics and the activity of science. As a descriptive concept, “politics” refers to an ensemble
of empirical phenomena—however they are conceptually assembled—the causal explanation
of which is a primary concern of political science. Moreover, as a theoretical abstraction the
political sphere points to the more or less recurrent way in which those phenomena present
themselves in their general structure, and it is a widely praised feature of science that it is
able to identify such generalities. Much of the recognized authority of science in fact lies in
its capacity to explain not just individual occurrences of phenomena, but the semi-general
causal processes that generate them. As a common noun, politics also refers to a class of
objects, and classificatory activity is the bread and butter of the descriptive task of empirical
sciences, from biological taxonomies to concept formation in comparative political analysis.
Finally, politics in general defines the scope of political science, and therefore to specify the
object of “politics” is to define the object of political science. It is in virtue of all this that the
political sphere can be seen as a scientific object.
Yet not all such theoretical concepts can be straightforwardly considered to be scientific
objects. We consider different animals to be all instances of the category of “pets” in just the
same way as we consider different social activities to be instances of politics, yet it would be
counterintuitive, to say the least, to consider the category of “pets” as a scientific term, and
the class of objects it designates as a scientific object. The fact that class-concepts refer to
empirical objects that are also studied by the empirical sciences seems to be an insufficient
condition for the class of those objects to qualify as a scientific object in its own right.
Scientific objects are such because they are constructed for specifically scientific purposes.
I have mentioned earlier that whatever the concept of “politics” may mean, anything that
falls under this rubric also falls within the scope of political science: the concept of politics
defines the scope of political science. It is for this reason that the theoretical notion of a
“political sphere” can be considered to be a scientific object. In fact, on closer inspection the
relationship between the identification of a political sphere and the demarcation of the scope
of the science that studies it must be reversed. It is political science that defines the concept
of politics, and not the other way round. The reason for this will be clear in a moment.
Instead of providing a general theory of scientific objects, I will take a different route.
In the next chapter, I will argue that the idea of politics as a separate sphere of societal
interaction emerged as a consequence of the rise of political science as an institutionalized
vi
discipline. In its pre-disciplinary stage, social science still conceived of its field of investigation
as a unified domain of phenomena which allowed for no distinctions between the political
sphere and other spheres of human activity. At that stage, politics had no identity as a thing
in its own right, and the word was loosely employed to identify the whole and indistinct
body of society in its current ordering. The emergence of politics proper began in the middle
of the eighteenth century, and it was historically and sociologically determined by the need
to differentiate political science from the other social sciences. In the aftermath of the French
Revolution, the rise of sociology as a scientific discipline gave rise to the idea that “society”
identifies a class of sui generis phenomena characterized by an autonomous functioning quite
independent of state regulation. Contextually, the development of economics determined the
identification of the economy as governed by its own laws of motion that could be studied
by means of specifically economic methods. For a relatively long time, politics remained
an inchoate disciplinary field whose object of study was determined ex negativo by the
object of sociology and the object of economics. The institutionalization of U.S. political
science after WWII gradually led to a clearer definition of its scope and, consequently, of
politics as a scientific object. The expansion of comparative research that accompanied the
“behavioural turn” in political science in the 1950s laid the groundwork for identifying
distinctively political phenomena across different national and temporal settings; it is at
this stage that the concept of “the political system”was developed to denote the ensemble
of such phenomena. The idea of politics as a separate sphere of society thus emerged as a
consequence of the methodological development of political science, and it was characterized
since its inception as the distinctive scientific field that political science sought to investigate.
It is in this sense that politics can be thought of as a quintessentially scientific object.
The relationship between the development of academic political science and the construc-
tion of “politics” as a scientific object is, in fact, common knowledge in political theory. In an
influential article, aptly titledWhat is “Politics” (1973), Giovanni Sartori explicitly related
the autonomy of politics to the “discovery of society” on the part of eighteenth-century
economists. While it was once common to see Machiavelli has having posited such autonomy,
Sartori argues that his thought implies the independence of politics frommorality and religion,
but not the establishment of politics as a thing—i.e. an object—in its own right. Machiavelli
may well have shown that ethics is different from politics (although it is instrumental to it);
yet this does not make politics a separate sphere within the social landscape.1 This separation
is instead the product of the conceptual separation between the hierarchical and coercive
elements of coexistence on the one hand, and the spontaneous organization of all other
human transactions on the other. This view of society as regulated not by political coercion
but by a spontaneous automatism was, of course, an intellectual product of the laissez-faire
orientation of classical economics, and therefore the construction of the political object can
be traced to the development of the social sciences. Despite recognizing the dependence
1. This “a-moral” reading of Machiavelli’s political theory, spearheaded by Benedetto Croce ([1925] 1945)
and Leo Strauss (1958), has been contested by Isaiah Berlin ([1972] 2013) as well as by “Republican” interpreters
of Machiavelli’s thought (Skinner, 1978; Viroli, 1990; Pettit, 1997).
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of the identity of politics from the historical dimension through which the different social
science disciplines have differentiated themselves from one another, however, Sartori does
not give up on the possibility of a purely theoretical definition of politics. As he writes in the
conclusion of his article: “Political decisions do deal with the most diverse matters: political
economy, social policy, the politics of law, of religion, of education, and so forth. If all these
decisions are essentially political, it is because they are made by personnel located in political
sites. This is their political ‘nature’” (Sartori, 1973; 21).
On the other hand, the existence of competing conceptions of what politics is an estab-
lished fact in political science. Adrian Leftwich ([1984a] 2004), for instance, writes that
“any experienced academic in this field will know that the conception of politics one adopts
directly influences not only the questions one asks but also the framework of analysis one
uses” (Leftwich, [1984a] 2004; vii). He thus provides a survey of the different meanings
that practising political scientists attach to the “word” politics understood as the subject
matter of political science. For Leftwich ([1984b] 2004), the debate on the definition and
conceptualization of politics is dominated by two approaches, which he calls the “arena”
or “site” approach and the “process” approach: the basic distinction is between politics as
an activity found only in the institutional sites or processes within certain kinds of societies
(normally, those with states), and politics as an intrinsic activity of the human species in
all social settings (including stateless societies: Leftwich, [1984b] 2004). More recently,
Bartolini (2016) has argued that the “dismembering” of political societies into different
sub-fields of activity has led political scientists to recompose those sub-fields into unified
conceptions of politics according to their own schools and traditions of research. He thus
proceeds to regroup those conceptions into six “families” on the basis of the themes that
different scholars emphasize as the quintessence of politics. These are: politics as activity,
politics as institutional locus, politics as conflict, politics as a (coercive) means to an end,
politics as allocation, and politics as aggregation.
Bartolini acknowledges the importance of such theoretical frameworks for political anal-
ysis; in uncovering their scientific roots, he even attributes their construction to the intrinsic
tendency towards generalization that pervades the methodology of empirical research. Yet
the plurality of definitions of politics is seldom acknowledged by political scientists to be
an inherent feature of their object of study qua a scientific object. Most political scientists
seem to imply that the conceptualization of politics as a scientific object must be unequivocal
and not open to a pluralism of definitions. Those who have defended the concept of “the
political system”, for instance, sought to discard other definitions of politics—most notably
the identification of politics with the state—as based on a flawed conceptual approach.
Gabriel Almond ([1960] 2015) wrote for instance that the dichotomy between state and
non-state is to be rejected in political science because it unduly restricts the scope of com-
parative research solely to those social structures that visibly perform a political function,
while Easton (1953) advocated banning the term “state” altogether in that its meaning is
open to exceeding vagueness. Albeit recognizing the interdependence between the variety
of definitions of “politics” and the different directions of political science research, even
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Leftwich ([1984b] 2004) concludes that the disciplinary unity of political science is secured
by the convergence of the competing approaches to the understanding of politics on a unified
focus of research—which he equates with the analysis of the provenance, forms, distribution,
use, control, and consequences of power.
I will argue instead that taking seriously the idea of politics as a scientific object implies
accounting for the scientific function that the variety of definitions of the scope of political
science fulfils. Rather than attempting at reducing the complexity of conceptual approaches
to the object of politics, I will argue that its “essentially contested”nature is the necessary out-
come of the construction of scientific objects on the basis of the methodological assumptions
of political science. To show this, I will resort to the notion of scientific model that refers
to the theoretical devices commonly used in the empirical sciences to represent real-world
objects. In particular, I will argue that the different conceptions of politics are best seen as
representational models of the aspects of the social world that are considered to fall within
the scope of political science, and that doing so can provide us with the tools for making sense
of the apparent vagueness of the concept of politics. In the empirical sciences, models are
theoretical objects that are defined in such a way as to selectively represent some aspects of
reality; the salient characteristics of reality that a model represents are selected and isolated in
order for the model to be applicable in forthcoming contexts. The main thesis of this work is
that the political sphere is a representational object similar to the empirical models of science.
As a concept that denotes the entire field of political science, “politics” can be defined on the
basis of some widespread but local characteristics of social reality so that the phenomena
that possess those characteristics can be included in a unified domain of investigation. The
fact that reality can be scientifically modelled in potentially innumerable ways, which results
in the indefiniteness of the concept of politics, is an inherent feature of the modelling activity
of science, and one that has distinctively scientific grounds at that. All scientific models are
necessarily purpose-relative, and therefore they involve a stipulation about the purpose of
the model on the part of the inquirer. The different conceptualizations of politics cannot
result but from disagreement about their explanatory purposes and, ultimately, about the
nature of explanation.
By pointing to the purpose-relative nature of representational models, I will argue that
the seemingly competing views on what politics is in fact correspond to the different concep-
tualizations of the scope of political science that necessarily result from different approaches
to political explanation, and indeed to different views of the nature of scientific explanation
altogether. Since the object of politics is defined by its role in demarcating the boundaries
of what political science can explain, its “purpose” ought be related to the explanatory
outreach of political science methodology. The model of explanation implicit in any defi-
nition of politics thus provides the testing ground for assessing its adequacy to explaining
political phenomena. In a sense, the present work can thus be seen as an exercise in applied
philosophy of science. By considering the political sphere as a scientific object, I will use
the tools of the philosophy of science to impose some conceptual order on a debate that
traditionally belonged in the province of political theory. Specifically, I will contend that
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the one-sidedness through which many existing conceptualizations of politics purport to
exhaustively and unequivocally model the object of political science does not adequately
capture the model-based nature of scientific objects. This is because, as I shall argue, they
rely on a highly controversial model of explanation.
Traditional political science was based on the equation between explanation and the
search for “covering laws”. This now rather outdated model of explanation adopted the view
that the “science” part of political science can only by defined by logical criteria of inferential
validity, and therefore explanation can be described in terms of the logical deduction from
general statements which express some uniform regularities in the empirical world and can
thus serve as “covering laws” under which particular phenomena can be subsumed. For some
time after the publication of Hempel andOppenheim’s (1948) extremely influential account of
explanation in terms of deduction from covering laws, this view has qualified as the received
view of explanation, and political science was no exception. The comparative expansion of
political science in the 1950s was premised on the idea that covering laws are necessary to
infer empirical explanations, and therefore cross-area comparison required to identify the
invariant features of social systems that could feature in general laws that are valid across
time and space. This is not to say that the development of modern political science can be
straightforwardly seen as the mere application of the logical-empiricist view of explanation—
as codified e.g. by Hempel in his “deductive-nomological” (D-N) model (Hempel, 1942; see
below, section 2.1). After all, some prime instances of covering-law political science like
Almond’s ([1960] 2015) “functionalism” or the “structuralism” implicit in Easton’s (1953)
“systemic” approach would be anathema to many logical empiricists—including Hempel
([1959] 1965, 1969)—and hardly be amenable to a strictly deductive-nomological form.
In fact, Hempel’s D-N model, like his “inductive-statistical” (I-N) model (Hempel, 1965a)
are but instances of the overall notion that scientific explanation ought be conceived in
inferential terms as the subsumption of explanation-statements under statements that express
empirical regularities.
It is this inferential rather than causal view of explanation—of which the covering-law
model is a corollary—that underwrites the search for regularities in empirical political
science and that will be the target of the present work. The very idea of “the political
system” as overcoming the traditional dichotomy between state and non-state was seen
by its proponents as a necessary condition in order for political science to be oriented to
finding regularities, since the identification of politics and state would limit the scope of
research to the institutional arena of state societies. On the contrary, identifying the subject
matter of political science with the abstract concept of “the political system” opened up
the possibility of identifying similar functions in institutional as well as non-institutional
settings, including stateless societies and the traditionally non-political structures of state
societies such as kinship networks.
In the first part of this work I will argue that the covering-law model of explanation
is inadequate. I will defend a causal instead of an inferential understanding of scientific
explanation, and I will show how this view is implicit in much empirical social science, and
xmore explicit (if unacknowledged) in recent proposals for a “mechanism-based” approach
to social explanation. In light of the fact that this position stands opposed to the model
of explanation on which some influential conceptions of politics as a scientific object have
been based, in the second part of this work I will show how the causal approach to scientific
explanation also provides the criteria for assessing the explanatory adequacy of those
definitions as representational models. Specifically, chapter 1 will reconstruct the emergence
of politics as a scientific object out of the methodological development of political science in
the twentieth century. I will show how existing conceptualizations of the scope of political
science depend on the adoption of a covering-law model of explanation, which I will criticize
in chapter 2. I consider a realist tradition in political science that has recently been formulated
in the form of the “mechanism-based” approach to political explanation. The link between
mechanism-based explanation and realism about causal explanation is a well-established
topic in the philosophy of physics, biology, and cognitive science, where the concept of
explanatory mechanism is a well-established notion, but its discussion in the social sciences
has essentially reproduced the existing tropes of debate in general philosophy of science. More
often than not, disputes concerning causal explanation in the social sciences are internal to
the debate among theoretically-minded practitioners of the various social science disciplines,
and therefore their philosophical implications remain inevitably underappreciated. Even
though proponents of the mechanism-based approach in the social and political sciences have
self-consciously drawn on the life sciences as mechanism-based disciplines, mechanisms are
often presented by its advocates in quite prescriptive terms, e.g. as models for constructing
“middle-range” explanatory theories as an alternative to mere correlational analysis. I will
argue instead that that the idea of mechanism-based explanation did not emerge with the
purpose of remedying the inadequacies of the covering-law model of explanations that
correlational analysis instantiates. The contrast between mechanisms and covering laws in
fact mirrors the fundamental opposition between causal realism and causal eliminativism.
The increasing favour for mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences, therefore, will
be understood as a case for causal realism in social explanation.
Having linked rival methodologies for social science explanation to their different assump-
tions regarding the nature of causation, I will then consider the literature on the metaphysics
of causality. Different theories will be examined and assessed on the basis of their compatibil-
ity with the perspective of causal realism. In order to impose some order on the varieties of
causal theories, I will introduce a distinction between “passivist” and “productive” theories
of causation. Some of the most prominent theories of causation—INUS theory, manipulative
interventionism, nomological realism, and the counterfactual approach—will be shown to
be inherently passivist insofar as they are taken to be theories about the nature of causation.
For this reason, I shall argue, they are unable to substantiate causal realism. The mechanism-
based model of explanation, on the other hand, demands that causality be understood as an
inherently productive process. In chapter 3 I will thus focus on dispositionalism as a meta-
physical theory that fulfils the realist demand for a productive account of social causation.
As I characterize it, dispositionalism is a metaphysical approach associated with the “causal
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powers” discussed in some realist strands in the philosophy of science. The idea of “causal
powers” was a staple of classical Aristotelian metaphysics, yet anti-metaphysical approaches
to the philosophy of science—particularly the received view—have cast a veil of suspicion
on the meaningfulness of such concept, let alone its explanatory relevance. Contemporary
social ontology, on the other hand, has focused almost exclusively on questions concerning
the role of language in constructing the different “levels” of reality, without relating them to
the metaphysical standing of individual social objects.
Beginning in the 1970s, talk about “powers” and “dispositions” has gradually garnered
new respectability in analytic metaphysics. For the present purposes, I will focus on the
way different metaphysical theories of properties underpinning dispositionalism can lead
to a theory of objects. Specifically, I will take into account those theories of properties that
are not conducive to causal eliminativism, and briefly consider their implications for the
fundamental nature of objects. I take dispositionalism to be a theory about the causal powers
that entities have in virtue of the dispositional character of the properties of which they are
endowed, and therefore I take dispositionalism to be an approach that requires for causation
to be analysed in terms of the fundamental properties of entities. For the sake of the present
work, dispositionalism allows us to recast scientific realism as a theory about objects, and
therefore it lays the groundwork for analyzing the nature of scientific objects from a realist
point of view. Dispositionalism, I will argue, entails a theory of entities as individual objects,
and therefore it provides no metaphysical foundation to the construction of scientific objects
as classes of objects.
For this reason, in chapter 4 I will move from metaphysics to the philosophy of clas-
sification in order to clarify the place that scientific objects have in the actual practice of
science. The philosophy of classification is one of the most recurring topics in the philosophy
of biology, but it is an exceptionally underappreciated issue in the social sciences in spite
of the fact that typology-building is part and parcel of much social science, and political
science in particular. The main alternative approaches to understanding the nature of natural
science classifications are essentialism and nominalism; I will argue that concept formation
in traditional political science tacitly relied on an essentialist approach—i.e. the idea that
classifications of objects into classes mirror real-world differences among different kinds
of objects. In the light of dispositionalism, I take essentialism to be conflicting with the
principles of scientific realism, and therefore I contend that conceptual analysis in political
science must necessarily rely on a nominalist approach. Class-concepts, I will argue, are
the products of stipulations about the “family resemblances” between the properties of
individual objects.
While this results in a metaphysically arbitrary account of the way social objects are
constructed through the classification of individual entities into typologies, in chapter 5
I will attempt at a rationalization of such arbitrariness by exploring its function for the
purpose of providing scientific explanation. As mentioned, the concept of a “scientific model”
can explain this function by pointing to the representational aspect of scientific practice.
Empirical models can be considered to be scientific objects that are constructed in order to
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represent some partial aspects of the world; the way those aspects are selected corresponds
to the purpose for which the model has been designed, and therefore different purposes can
produce different models that represent a portion of reality in equally adequate ways. I will
compare the idea of the political sphere, qua a scientific object, to an empirical model: the
concept of politics has been developed in order to define the scope of political science, and
therefore the scientific object it refers to is constructed for the purpose of explaining political
phenomena. In this way, the adequacy of the model can be judged by assessing the adequacy
of the model of explanation that it implies. As a theory about the nature of explanation,
scientific realism can thus provide the criteria for an adequate model of explanation, thereby
reducing the arbitrariness of model-building.
Chapter 1
The object of politics
The definition of a science has almost invariably not
preceded, but followed, the creation of the science
itself. Like the wall of a city, it has usually been
erected, not to be a receptacle for such edifices as
might afterwards spring up, but to circumscribe an
aggregation already in existence. Mankind did not
measure out the ground for intellectual cultivation
before they began to plant it; they did not divide
the field of human investigation into regular com-
partments first, and then begin to collect truths for
the purpose of being therein deposited; they pro-
ceeded in a less systematic manner. As discoveries
were gathered in, either one by one, or in groups
resulting from the continued prosecution of some
uniform course of inquiry, the truths which were
successively brought into store cohered and became
agglomerated according to their individual affini-
ties. Without any intentional classification, the facts
classed themselves. They became associated in the
mind, according to their general and obvious resem-
blances; and the aggregates thus formed, having to
be frequently spoken of as aggregates, came to be
denoted by a common name. Any body of truths
which had thus acquired a collective denomination,
was called a science.
John Stuart Mill (1844)
Introduction
In this chapter I shall address the age-old question, “What is politics?”, from a scientific
point of view, i.e. as a question about the boundaries of politics as a field of scientific
1
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investigation. The reasons for making this move derive first and foremost from historical
considerations about the development of the political field within the larger framework of
the rise of the social sciences in their modern disciplinary arrangement. With the increasing
institutionalization and professionalization of social science knowledge, what was once
conceived of as a unitary world became apportioned into sectoral areas of competence. The
identification of a “political sphere” with its own specificities, it will be argued, followed
the previous emergence of “society” and “economy” as distinctive scientific objects: the
definition of politics as an autonomous system of relations within the broader social order
was determined by the quest for the disciplinary autonomy of political science from sociology
and economics.
Thus, although the emergence of the idea of the autonomy of politics is traced back to
various stages in the intellectual history of the West, its shaping as a distinctive scientific
object followed rather than set the conditions for its scientific investigation. Definitions of the
scope of a science, wrote Mill, are like the walls of a city: they are built to delimit the borders
of an aggregation that has already been erected rather than to carve out a construction
area on a virgin soil. The purportedly unitary character of such aggregations, thus, is not
pre-determined: on the contrary, it is determined exogenously by the characteristics of science
itself. In the following sections, the emergence of politics as a field of scientific investigation
will be traced to the construction of politics as a scientific object in the foundational stage of
modern political science. Post-WWII generations of political scientists came to define their
object of study in formal terms as constituted by specific “functions”—typically associated
with authoritative decision-making—which different social structures perform across time
and space.
Not surprisingly, this notion was based on a particular understanding of political science
explanation. The “behavioural turn” that accompanied the rise of contemporary political
science and the consequent definition of its scope was grounded in a “covering-law” under-
standing of political explanation. The purpose of political science, it was generally argued,
was to discover regularities in political processes that could serve as causal laws under which
individual events could be subsumed. Political explanation was thus conceived in terms of
the deduction of particular phenomena from correlations between recurring events whose
well-established empirical confirmation could warrant causal inferences. The expansion of
the field of comparative politics in the post-WWII was motivated precisely by the search
of such regularities, and the assumption that their identification is an exhaustive goal for
political explanation determined the definition of the scope of science in terms of certain
“functions” that are operative in different national contexts irrespective of their specificities.
Modern-day answers to the question about the distinctiveness of the political sphere as a
scientific domain will thus be shown to be dependent on a covering-law approach to political
science. The next chapters will then examine critically the epistemological presuppositions
of covering-law explanation and explore the alternative models of explanation that have
been proposed in order to bring them to bear on the status of politics as a scientific objects.
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1. A pre-disciplinary history
The idea that politics can be thought of as a distinct sphere of social life has a history of its
own. Like that of all concepts, the meaning of the word “politics” has shifted considerably
over time. Those who have pointed to the etymology of the word typically emphasize that
the Greek term from which it derives (polis) had a variety of meanings, and although this
word is most distinctively used to the refer to the city-state as the basic territorial entity of
Ancient Greece, in the Archaic and Classical Ages it could also be used in a much broader
sense including as synonymous with politai, the collection of citizens (see e.g. Aristotle, Pol.
III, 1274b41; see also Hansen, 1998).
The indistinctiveness of the Ancient Greek conception of politics is expressed in Aristotle’s
characterization of man as “politikón zoon”, which Thomas Aquinas authoritatively ren-
dered with the Latin phrase “animal sociale et politicum” as if to attach a broader meaning
to Aristotle’s definition than the Latin adjective politicum alone would allow. The speci-
ficity of politics in the European culture of the late Middle Ages, however, should not be
overemphasized. As Rubinstein (1987) has noted, the word politicus has been introduced
into the language of Western political thought through William of Moerbeke’s translation of
Aristotle’s Politics, where it is used as synonymous with the pre-existing Latin word civilis
and where “politikón zoon” is translated as “animal civile”. It would seem, therefore, that
the civil conception of the Romans translated the political conception of the Greeks rather
straightforwardly, at least linguistically.
Sheldon Wolin (2004; 118) tempered this view by pointing out that in the thought of
the Church Fathers “the belief persisted that society represented a spontaneous and natural
grouping, while the political stood for the coercive, the involuntary”. Augustine of Hippo’s
concept of a “City of God” (civitas dei), he observes, is a more perfectly political order than
the “Earthly City” (civitas terrena) primarily because it is more perfectly “social” in binding
together its members into a harmonious fellowship, while the Earthly City is internally
divided by the multiplicity of private goods and interests. This, in Wolin’s view, implies
the superiority of the social dimension over the political in Late Medieval thought and, a
fortiori, the discernibility of the two. This does not exclude, however, that the Latin idea
of civitas was one of “a diluted body politic”, as Sartori (1973) put it. For Sartori, this
is the case not because of the similarities between the Greek polis and the Roman civitas,
but rather because of their differences: the Romans, he argues, “were absorbing Greek
culture at a time when their city had long since surpassed the dimensions that permitted
a ‘political’ life as understood by the Greeks” (Sartori, 1973; 8). This made the civitas a
large ensemble of citizens whose only political organization is that of the juridical order:
rather than contrasting the social with the political dimension, the idea of civitas depoliticizes
altogether the ordering of the community by substituting the juridical for the political.
Be this as it may, it is true that the word civitas indicated the well-ordered community of
men living together under the rule of law and therefore left no room for further political
qualification of sparse aspects of the social order. A decoupling of politics from society on
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the whole, therefore, seems to be absent from Western intellectual history since Ancient
Greece and throughout the entire Latin-speaking culture of the Late Middle Ages. Even
where the conflict between a “social animal” and a “political animal” is most explicit, Sartori
argues, it ought not be interpreted as a conflict between two distinct dimensions of the social
life of human beings: when early authors such as Seneca wrote about man as a sociale
animal in Stoic terms—i.e. as a citizen who has withdrawn from the polis to live in a virtual
cosmopolis—they did not present it as a mode of social life that coexisted alongside life
within the polis; rather, the sociale animal is one who has lost the polis—which in the
Hellenistic period had largely become dominated by other city-states or by the kingdom
of Persia or had become part of a federal state—and has replaced the erstwhile politicum
animal as the new anthropological model of life in the community.
For Sartori, the autonomy of politics from the overall social realm is associated with a
“hierarchic” or “vertical” perception of politics, i.e.“an altimetric projection which associates
the idea of politics with the idea of power, of command, and, in the final analysis, with a
state superimposed upon society” (Sartori, 1973; 8). As he notes, the autonomy of politics
has less to do with its independence from ethics than it has to do with its separation from
society. The identity of politics as a thing in its own right, in other words, is premissed on
“the discovery of society” as an autonomous reality and on the subsequent differentiation of
the political sphere from it. Correctly, Sartori points out that this separation of society and
politics occurred through a prior outgrowth of the economic sphere from the body politic. It
is liberal-constitutional political theorists, he observes, who first postulated that economic
transactions could better prosper in the absence of state intervention, and it is on this idea
that the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conception of society as an independent reality
with a self-regulating functioning was based. Eventually, the notion of a self-sustaining
social arrangement would lead in the nineteenth-century to a form of “pan-sociologism”
that conceived of the social body as encompassing even the juridical, thereby severing the
links between society and the political system. As a result, the modern notion of the political
system came about as associated with—and in the last instance confined to—what Sartori
calls the “vertical dimension” of social life, i.e. the hierarchical structure implied in the
exercise of power and command, typically—though by no means exclusively—on the part of
governmental institutions such as the state.
2. The object(s) of social science
It is worth stressing that these independent spheres of the social world—the economy, society,
and the political system—emerged in intellectual discourse first and foremost as objects of
inquiry. To be sure, “political economy” had already distanced itself from statecraft with
the rise of physiocracy, mainly out of liberal political preoccupations against protectionism,
and in the writings of Cantillon and Quesnay, the idea of the market as a “natural” order
independent of that of the state served as a warning against intrusive regulation on the part
of governments. However, this contention was based on the idea that the market as a societal
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object had its own independent “laws of motion” that could be investigated and detailed. A
physicist by training, Quesnay based his economic theory on knowledge of the laws of the
“natural order” of associative life:
In order to understand the order of time and space, and to control navigation and safeguard trade,
it has been necessary to observe and calculate precisely the laws of the movement of celestial bodies.
Similarly, in order to understand the extent of the natural right of men joined together in society, it
is necessary to settle upon the natural laws which form the basis of the best government possible
… For without an understanding of the natural laws which ought to serve as the foundation
of man-made legislation and as sovereign rules for the conduct of men, there is no self-evident
knowledge of just and unjust, natural right, and physical and moral order; there is no self-evident
knowledge of the essential distinction between general and individual interests, and of the real
nature of the causes of the prosperity and decline of nations; and there is no self-evident knowledge
of the essence of moral good and evil, and of the sacred rights of those who command and the
duties of those to whom the social order prescribes obedience. (Quesnay, [1768] 1962; 53–54)
The economic model of a commercial society and its use for liberal political prescriptions
also fit in the process that led to the emergence of the idea of society. The intellectual
development that accompanied the rise of physiocracy in France and the separation of
economics from state politics was in many respects paralleled in the Scottish Enlightenment,
which would act as a main driver of the process of “discovery of society”. For John Pocock,
the very birth of Scottish political economy is shaped by the emergence of a “transactional”
vision of the conduct of individuals within society. In particular, the newmodel of commercial
society replaced older political paradigms of community, and “the locus of virtue shifted
decisively from the civic to the civil, from the political and military to that blend of economic,
cultural and moral which we call the social for short” (Pocock, 1983; 240).
2.1. Society
Through Adam Smith’s influence on Say and on Auguste Comte, the “transactional” model
of society laid the foundations for the conceptualization of “society” as a separate domain
of inquiry for a “social science”. Condorcet, for instance, outlined the prospects of a “social
mathematics” concerned with “people and things”—i.e. individuals and resources—implying
that they could be thought of as relatively independent of state regulation and therefore as
the building blocks of the separate domain of “society” (Heilbron, [1990a] 1995; 170–171).
Indeed, it is within post-revolutionary groups of social reformers—particularly the Society of
1789, in which Condorcet played a prominent role—that the very idea of a “social science”
developed, and it is through Condorcet’s work that the term was introduced into the English
language.
Indeed, one may go so far as to view the apportioning of the overall social realm into
different domains of investigation as a by-product of the process of compartmentalization
of social knowledge that accompanied the rise of the different social sciences between the
nineteenth and twentieth century. With the increasing disciplinarization and institutionaliza-
tion of the social sciences, the boundaries between different domains of inquiry within the
broader landscape of social reality sharpened into qualitative differences between scientific
objects that constituted the subject matter of the various social science disciplines. Johan
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Heilbron ([1990a] 1995) indicated the period between around 1600 and the middle of the
nineteenth century as the “predisciplinary stage” in the development of the social sciences.
Crucially, what marked the organization of knowledge in this pre-disciplinary stage was that
“[i]deas were informed by general conceptions in which such terms as ‘reason’, ‘nature’, and
‘philosophy’ were key concepts” (Heilbron, [1990a] 1995; 3). One should have no difficulty
in locating the intellectual history of politics summarized in the opening pages of the present
chapter within this framework: as Heilbron argues elsewhere, before the “disciplinary stage”
and modern concepts of the social world became an established framework, human matters
were conceived of in an essentially unitary fashion, often under the banner of “practical
philosophy” inherited from the Aristotelian tradition (Heilbron, 1990b; [1990a] 1995; 76).
A number of factors contributed to a reshaping of this state of affairs; ultimately, the societal
changes that influenced the framing of intellectual discourse through the modern concepts of
the social world became institutionalized into distinct disciplines, each with a subject matter
of its own. The separation of “things political” from other aspects of the overall ordering
of society can be interpreted as a by-product of this compartmentalization of knowledge
characteristic of the disciplinary stage in the development of the social sciences.
For Heilbron, the disciplinary stage proper began under the reign of Louis XVI, when
Turgot was appointed minister of finances (1774). Turgot’s extensive reforms were imple-
mented with prominent Newtonian scientist Lavoisier acting as an advisor, and it was during
Turgot’s term as a minister that scientific experts acquired unprecedented social prestige and
the Newtonian sciences flourished in newly founded scholarly institutions. It is only through
the work of Condorcet, however, that the significance of the Newtonian model of science
was applied to moral reflections on the emerging idea of “society”. A disciple of Turgot’s,
Condorcet built on Laplace’s work in mathematics, particularly probability theory, as a
tool that could be utilized to explain empirical phenomena. What Laplace had envisioned
with respect to the natural sciences, Condorcet extended to the social world through the
development of the idea of a “social mathematics”.
By the breakout of the French Revolution, Condorcet had been already appointed
secretary of the Academy of Sciences. Actively involved in Turgot’s programme of reforms as
well as in the activities of the National Assembly during the Revolutionary period, Condorcet
advocated tackling social issues by means of mathematical tools, which could be used for the
statistical management of quantitative demographic data. Eventually the idea of a “social
science” developed by the Society of 1789 and shared by other idéologues of the era such as
Cabanis and Saint-Simon would be influentially employed by Charles Fourier in the early
decades of the nineteenth century and, more critically, by Auguste Comte in his foundational
writings on what would become the discipline of “sociology” (Baker, 1975; Head, 1982;
Shapiro, 1984).
Despite Comte’s foundational attempts at establishing a positive social science, however,
it is only in the last quarter of the century that sociology began to acquire its status as an
autonomous discipline. Unsurprisingly, this process occurred through scientific efforts at
differentiation from economics, and in some relevant sense classical sociological approaches
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as expressed in the writings of Durkheim, Pareto, and Weber originate from dissatisfaction
with the partial and one-sided way in which mainstream political economy was considered
to account for social phenomena in individualist-utilitarian terms (Therborn, 1976). Weber’s
position was more properly methodological in nature and more strictly situated within the
context of the Austro-German Methodenstreit concerning the possibility of a deductivist
science of economics, which Weber largely rejected. For Pareto, the tendency to deductive
approaches in political economy directly resulted in a self-limiting of its scope: specifically,
political economy proved inadequate as a comprehensive social science in that it could not
exhaustively account for “non-logical” social action and therefore left entire families of social
phenomena unaccounted for. Not too dissimilarly, Durkheim—whose approach to sociology
and to Comte’s work had been mediated by his knowledge of the German and English
literature in the field—notably defended the irreducibility of “social facts” vis-à-vis the
methodological individualism of political economy (Wagner, 1990). Durkheim ([1897] 1951,
[1895] 1964), in particular, conceived of society as causally autonomous from individuals,
and although he admitted that “social facts” ultimately emerge out of individual interactions,
they result in social structures that are autonomous and external to them so that society
becomes an independent object in its own right (Durkheim, [1893] 1984, [1895] 1964). This
idea, together with the corollary postulate that one can discover sui generis “sociological
laws”, was adapted by Talcott Parsons and his associates into the concept of “social system”
that would have an almost unrivalled impact on twentieth-century sociology (Wagner, 2000;
147).
2.2. Economy
Economics, too, did not become a separate science until the “marginal revolution” that
emerged in response to the 1860s–1870s crisis of classical political economy both in policy
and in theory. It is true that the liberal ideology of laissez-faire economists encapsulated in
the mainstream of classical economics had been to a great extent successful in establishing
economics as a separate science. Yet the Ricardo-Mill paradigm that dominated classical
economics until the late 1860s still served primarily as a guide for policy and blurred to a
certain extent the distinction between economics and policy. When the detrimental effects of
the repeal of the Corn Laws on British agriculture broke out, however, the crisis in intellectual
hegemony of the Ricardo-Mill paradigm—whose defenders had supported the repeal of the
Corn Laws—became irreversible (Hutchison, 1978). In the attempt to rescue economics
as a purely theoretical discipline, W.S. Jevons—like Walras in Lausanne and Menger in
Austria—advocated a restructuring of economics as a purely theoretical discipline and one
concerned almost exclusively with the value problem. Jevons and Walras, in particular,
conceived of economics as a strictly deductive and, ultimately, purely mathematical science
that ought to be kept distinguished from other applied social sciences (Winch, 1972).
The ultimate affirmation of neoclassical economics and the establishment of economic
science as an academic discipline occurred through the work and institutional role of Alfred
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Marshall in the 1880s and 1890s. Jevons had in fact already thought through the conditions
for public recognition of the autonomy of pure economics when he wrote: “Among minor
alterations, I may mention the substitution for the name political economy of the single
convenient term economics. I cannot help thinking that it would be well to discard, as
quickly as possible, the old troublesome double-worded name of our science” (Jevons, [1911]
2013; xxxv). Nonetheless, before Alfred Marshall no economist had systematically adopted
the term “Economics” instead of “Political Economy” in their major works, and although
Marshall was more concerned with defending the formal generality of economic science
than its circumscribed scope, he codified an “economic organon” based on the principle of
marginal utility and on mathematization of the science which would serve as the basis of
neoclassical economics teaching at Cambridge (Collini, Winch, and Burrow, 1983).
Revealingly, Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890) open with one of the best-known
definitions of economics:
Political Economy or Economics is the study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines
that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and
with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing. (Marshall, [1890] 2013; 1)
As for JohnNeville Keynes after him, the definition of economics is forMarshall of paramount
importance in defending the theoretical consistency of economics against empiricist ap-
proaches such as William Cunningham’s (Marshall, 1892; Whitaker, 2005; 250–252). In his
Politics and Economics (1885), Cunningham had written:
Economic science is wholly practical, it has no raison d’être except as directing conduct towards a
given end: it studies the means leading towards that end not merely for the sake of knowledge,
but in the hope of guiding men so that they may pursue that end in the most appropriate way: it
is not content to describe the principles that have actuated human conduct, but desires to look
at these principles in the light of after events, and thus to put forward the means that are best
adapted for attaining the end in view. (Cunningham, 1885; 12)
As an inherently practical discipline, Cunningham argued elsewhere, political economy is
not amenable to unifying laws like those that characterized the science of physics at the
time. Instead, political economy should seek to remain an entirely empirical science, and
to advance this cause its intellectual task should be not to explain but first and foremost
“to observe and classify and describe and name” (Cunningham, 1887; 8 emphasis in the
original).
Rejecting this idea, Keynes adopted what he deemed a useful distinction between “eco-
nomics” and “political economy”, favourably reporting the increasing popularity of the
former term over the latter. Even though he deliberately used both terms interchangeably
in that “the name political economy … is too firmly established to be altogether discarded”
(Keynes, [1890] 1955; 53 n.1, emphasis in the original), he condemned “the intrusion of
ethics into economics” as a source of undue controversy. Economics, he contended, is a
positive science, and conceptual clarity is helpful in maintaining its independence from
questions of justice: economics should be preferred over political economy in that it is
less subject to theoretical ambiguity. As a positive science, Keynes argued, economics is
characterized by a scope as well as by a method. Accordingly, he defines economics in a
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deliberately recursive fashion as “the science which treats of the phenomena arising out of
the economic activities of mankind in society”, whereby economic activities are those human
activities directed towards the production and appropriation of wealth understood as the
potentially exchangeable means of satisfying human needs (Keynes, [1890] 1955; 95–101).
2.3. Politics
With the scientization of social knowledge into different disciplines, therefore, came the need
for demarcating the scope of each particular social science. In this way, the subject matter of
the various social sciences became entrenched in the scientific development of the various
social science disciplines, so much so that scientific objects came to be defined in terms of
the very method of a science. So, for instance, the economy was identified with market
interactions characterized by general equilibrium as defined by the differential calculus of
neoclassical economics. Likewise, “statistical and demographic research was said to reveal
some solid and lawlike features in the characteristics and movements of a population and
thus to underpin the idea of the existence of ‘society’” (Wagner, 2000). Even when authors
as influential as Weber (or Simmel) tended to regard society less as an entity in its own right
than as a bundle of processes and relations, these are typically presented as analyzable only in
terms of a distinctively sociological method. As section 3. will try to show, the discovery—or,
more appropriately, the establishment—of the “autonomy of politics” is but one further step
along this path and, as Sartori has argued, one that is parasitic upon the former two.
Interestingly, Wallerstein et al. (1996) describe the disciplinarization of social science
as a process of professionalization that supervenes on the academic institutionalization
of knowledge in a compartmentalized fashion. So, for instance, Alfred Marshall’s 1885
appointment as professor of political economy at Cambridge provided the conditions for the
institutional recognition of the discipline he substantially contributed to reform. During his
Cambridge years,Marshall’s role was pivotal in constituting the British EconomicAssociation
(1890) as well as its organ, the Economic Journal (1891), which Marshall directed and which
provided an early vehicle for dissemination of neoclassical ideas in Britain (Coats, 1968). Yet
Marshall was first and foremost instrumental in recruiting new economists at Cambridge,
like his successor Pigou, and in introducing the first examination in economics in the form of
the traditional Cambridge tripos (1903). Favoured by the relative backwardness of Oxford
and the financial and political hardships of the newly founded London School of Economics,
the “Cambridge School” had thus initiated a process of academic professionalization of
economics as a distinct intellectual expertise (Coats, 1967).
Not too dissimilarly, sociology became an institutionalized discipline somewhat indepen-
dently of Comte’s effort at laying out its intellectual foundations. As Wallerstein et al. argue,
it is social reformers of the mid-nineteenth century who gave it a decisive impulse by moving
their work to a university setting, thus surrendering their role in active lobbying in favour
of a more reflexive endeavour (Wallerstein et al., 1996; 19). It is within this context that
the British Association for the Promotion of Social Science was organized in 1857, shortly
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followed by the creation of the American Social Science Association (ASSA, 1865). Members
of the ASSA published the Journal of Social Science and had important roles in numerous
political committees, all of which attests to the influence of early social science experts; yet
this also brings to attention the fact that these intellectuals still thought of themselves as
reformers, and that the comprehensive idea of social science that they had in mind was
still very much policy-oriented (Silva and Slaughter, 1984). As Wallerstein et al. remark,
for sociology to become an established discipline the break with its origins in lobbying
organizations had to be consummated through the cultivation of a broadly positivist thrust
(Wallerstein et al., 1996; 19).
Although early twentieth-century sociology continued to gain prestige from its practical
role in society, its professionalization was in fact perfected through the institutionalization
of its distinctively positivistic method. The University of Chicago acted as a key site for this
transition. In 1892, Albion Small founded the first department of sociology at the University
of Chicago; in 1894 he established and edited the American Journal of Sociology, the only
professional journal of sociology until 1921; finally, in 1905 he contributed to organize the
American Sociological Society (Silva and Slaughter, 1984; Manicas, 1990). When the conflict
between the traditional idea of an all-encompassing (and hence imperialistic) science of society
and the division of academic labour among different social science departments became a
pressing intellectual issue, the faculty at Small’s department in Chicago began to explore
the alternatives. Gradually, in textbooks and other influential publications the discipline of
sociology and its experts came to be characterized by their use of qualitative and quantitative
(demographic and statistical) methods to describe social groups (Manicas, 1990). Yet even
aside from the Chicago case, the model of an empirical-descriptive and neo-positivistically
guided social science developed across different countries—including European ones—as
a response to the intellectual crisis of the institutional legitimacy of classical sociological
paradigms that resulted from their failure to meet the organizational standards of the
academia (Wagner, 1990; 233–240). Eventually, this transformation was perfected through
a new methodological—mainly statistical—treatment of individual behaviour which led to a
reconceptualization of the relation between individual and society and, ultimately, of the
very concept of “society” as a scientific object (Wagner, 1990; 240–241).
Not surprisingly, the development of political science and the definition of its object as
a separate sphere of society would essentially reiterate this pattern of institutionalization,
which culminated with the definition of the “political system” in terms of the behavioural
model of explanation promoted by the post-WWII generation of political scientists at the
University of Chicago.
Interlude: The issue of scope as a philosophical problem
At this point, however, some clarification is in order. The proposed idea that social science
objects arose out of the methodological demarcation of the scope of the various social science
disciplines should not suggest that these became “normal sciences”—as per Kuhn’s ([1962]
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2012) famous phrase—upon reaching undisputed consensus regarding their method. Not
only would this presuppose a Whiggish interpretation of the rise of the social sciences that
provides a rational reconstruction of their development as teleologically oriented towards
the achievement of a “mature stage”. An exclusively “internalist” picture that focuses on
scientific rationality as the only interpretive criterion of scientific development would also
miss important institutional features that have nonetheless been crucial in shaping the modern
arrangement of the social science disciplines. This institutionalizing pattern, however, should
not be seen as a disruptive perversion of the otherwise autonomous development of the social
sciences. On the contrary, scientific development is in some sense inherently characterized
by “external” features as much as by the “internal” ones that respond to the criteria of
scientific rationality. This should not appear as mere historiographic pedantry. In fact, the
very separability of “internal” and “external” features of science is in itself a philosophical
issue, and an especially controversial one.
Much historiography and sociology of science in the twentieth century has been character-
ized by its relative position in the debate between external and internal approaches (see Kuhn,
[1968] 1977). The externalist pole of the debate was typically centered on the idea of “social
production of knowledge”: by emphasizing that scientific production is an utterly social
activity, externalist accounts stressed social and political factors as decisive—and, in the
strongest variants of the paradigm, exhaustive—factors for explaining scientific development.
One classic example in externalist historiography of science, for instance, situated Newton’s
work within the context of seventeenth-century societal development. In his long essay on
The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s “Principia” (1931), Soviet historian Boris
Hessen saw Newton as a self-conscious exponent of his social class, and interpreted his
scientific work as the purported solution to the technical problems of his time related to
ballistics, hydrostatics, magnetism, optics and mechanics (Hessen, [1931] 1971).
As Kuhn ([1968] 1977) remarks, utterly externalist approaches developed out of dis-
satisfaction with the supposed one-sidedness of more traditionally internalist ones. As a
consequence, the latter do not add up to a coherent intellectual movement nor do they share
any common programmatic assumptions. According to Kuhn, internalist historiographers
traditionally set as their goal the investigation of the actual thinking of the scientists involved
in the scientific debates under consideration, without relying on the science that they know.
This characterization, however, is partial at best, since it is entirely based on methodological
principles concerning the historiography of science rather than on theoretical considerations
on what is the driving force of knowledge production. Perhaps more accurately, what is
typically referred to as the “internal”—or “internalist”—approach to the historiography and
sociology of science seems to imply a commitment to the idea that non-intellectual—e.g.
social or economic—factors are entirely contingent and therefore rationally irrelevant to
making sense of scientific development. Contra externalism, science is taken to be a purely
intellectual and fundamentally rational enterprise whose development can be fully accounted
for in terms of the cogency (however defined) of the arguments provided in support of
the accepted scientific theses. According to internalists, the theoretical elements of knowl-
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edge production are, in the words of Karl Mannheim ([1929] 1936), “immanent” to the
intellectual history of science; by denying the theoretical importance of extra-intellectual
factors, internalists seem to imply that the process of scientific knowing is driven by an
“inner dialectic” and therefore follows only from the “nature of things” or from“pure logical
possibilities” (Mannheim, [1929] 1936; 240). Among internal historians of astronomy and
mechanics to Newton, Kuhn cites the work of Alexandre Koyré, presumably because of
his understanding of Newtonian physics as originating, among other things, from a purely
theoretical “synthesis” between the curpuscular philosophy of Boyle and the mathematical
and geometrical theory of Galileo and Descartes (Koyré, [1948] 1965; see Kuhn, [1968]
1977). The image of scientific development that results from internalism is thus one that sees
science as proceeding through progressive rectification of theories, and therefore as governed
by a purely internal “logic of discovery”. Accordingly, the appropriate methodology to
account for it is that of “rational reconstructions”—as Lakatos ([1970] 1978) termed them.
In the last decades of twentieth century, the externalism-internalism debate largely cooled
down, primarily because of the extinction of hard-line externalist programmes. As Shapin
(1992) reports, as early as 1963 “extreme” externalism could be pronounced dead, and
what could be seen by some as moderate externalist approaches in fact presented themselves
as explicitly eclectic with respect to the externalism-internalism dichotomy. In hindsight,
the very opposition between externalism and internalism could be seen as by and large
unwarranted. After all, Hessen himself had clairified with respect to his account of the
origins of Newton’s Principia:
The economic position is the foundation. But the development of theories and the individual
work of a scientist are affected by various superstructures, such as political forms of class war
and the results, the reflection of these wars on the minds of the participants—political, juridical,
philosophic theories, religious beliefs and their subsequent development into dogmatic systems.
(Hessen, [1931] 1971; 177)
At the other end of the spectrum, even Koyré’s work was seen by a generation of post-WWII
Anglo-American historians of science as providing a source of inspiration for adopting
an intermediate position between “vigorously self-conscious internalism and temperate
eclecticism” (Shapin, 1992; 341). As a result, the externalism-internalism controversy came
to be increasingly seen as a fake dichotomy.
In fact, the very distinction between “internal” and “external” aspects of science is a
philosophically laden notion, and sidestepping such distinction implies a rejection of the
philosophical assumption on which it rests. The idea that purely logical features are internal
to science while contextual ones are best characterized as external to it overlaps to a great
extent with the epistemological distinction between a “context of discovery” and a “context
of justification”. First introduced by Hans Reichenbach, this pair of notions pointed to the
inherent difference between questions of the origins of scientific theories and questions of
their validity. “If a more convenient determination of this concept of rational reconstruction
is wanted”, Reichenbach wrote, “we might say that it corresponds to the form in which
thinking processes are communicated to other persons instead of the form in which they are
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subjectively performed. … I shall introduce the terms context of discovery and context of
justification to mark this distinction” (Reichenbach, 1938; 6–7, emphasis in the original).
Drawing on this influential distinction, logical empiricists were able to describe the scope of
philosophy of science in terms of justification. “Epistemology”, Reichenbach stated, “is only
occupied in constructing the context of justification” (Reichenbach, 1938; 7). Specifically,
criteria of justification were used by philosophers of science to demarcate science from
“non-science” in terms of the ability of scientific theories to withstand justification. “The
logical analysis of scientific knowledge”, wrote Popper, is concerned “only with questions
of justification or validity … Its questions are of the following kind. Can a statement be
justified? And if so, how? Is it testable? Is it logically dependent on certain other statements?
Or does it perhaps contradict them?” (Popper, [1934] 2002; 7). Accordingly, the task of
philosophy of science—or, in Popper’s parlance, of the logic of knowledge—consists “solely
in investigating the methods employed in those systematic tests to which every new idea
must be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained” (Popper, [1934] 2002; 8). Through
the enduring influence of demarcationist philosophies of science such as Popper’s ([1934]
2002) or Lakatos’s ([1974] 1978), philosophy of science would thus assume the problem of
demarcation as its central question and limit its scope to theories of justification.
As Giere (1999a) points out, however, this historically circumscribed assumption was
to be challenged again by the immense and variegated historically-oriented scholarship
of philosophy of science that followed the publication of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962). Most notably, he argues, historical approaches to the philosophy of
science as well as societal implications of scientific discoveries were being explicitly debated
both in the United States and in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, and they were often
considered as more relevant questions than the ones concerning the validity of scientific
conclusions. It is only in the heyday of Logical Empiricism in post-WWII United States—
ironically, a major influence on the scientization of political studies—that Reichenbach’s
distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification came to be accepted
almost universally as a cornerstone of philosophy of science. As Giere notes, therefore,
questions of disciplinary history had long been included into epistemological considerations.
As Mill suggested in the passage quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, scientific development
inevitably reinforces the ascription of the phenomena under consideration to a homegeneous
but specific class, lest science lose its scope and therefore its identity. As far as social science
is concerned, one might see this process in action in the conceptual differentiation of social
reality into different and separate domains—the economy, society, and the polity—as a
mirror of the branching out of the social sciences between the nineteenth and the twentieth
century. For the present purposes, it is important to stress that the way in which the idea of
politics as an autonomous sphere of the social world became institutionalized in the guise
of the notion of a “political system” and its cognate concepts is inextricably intertwined
with the distinguishing features of political science as an academic discipline. The issue of
scope, therefore, is a philosophical problem, and one that counts among the distinctive foci
of traditional philosophy of science. Indeed, it is by focusing on the institutionalization of
CHAPTER 1. THE OBJECT OF POLITICS 14
the logic of inquiry of a particular science that the philosophical relevance of its scope can
be unraveled.
3. The rise of the “noble science” of politics
By the time economics and sociology had become separate academic disciplines, political
science had already been turned into an established university curriculum with its own
chairs, graduate schools, departments, associations, journals, textbooks, libraries, and even
institutions of its own. Before British universities like Oxford, The LSE, and Cambridge each
introduced a chair in politics (in 1912, 1914, and 1928, respectively: see e.g. King, 1977; xi),
as early as 1856 a short-lived chair at Columbia College in New York had been designated
as “History and Political Science” at the request of Francis Lieber, its first incumbent and
one of the founders of U.S. political studies (Gunnell, 1993). At Yale, a Chair of Political and
Social Science was created in 1871 to carry on the Lieberian tradition after the retirement
of Theodore Dwight Woolsey, Yale’s president and a disciple of Lieber’s; in 1860, the new
Cornell University founded a College of History and Political Science.
Lieber’s Manual of Political Ethics (1838–1839) and Civil Liberty and Self-Government
(1853) were adopted as textbooks in the mushrooming politics courses at U.S. universities,
as was one generation later Political Science and Constitutional Law (1890) by John W.
Burgess, who inherited Lieber’s chair at Columbia and founded the first graduate training in
political studies in the form of the Columbia School of Political Science (1880). Aside from
creating a library and organizing the Academy of Political Sciences, The School of Political
Science at Columbia also published its own journal—the Political Science Quarterly—since
1886, as did the American Academy of Political and Social Science (established in 1889)
with its Annals, and soon after the creation of the American Political Science Association
(APSA) in 1903 an American Political Science Review appeared (Gunnell, 1990; Farr, 1991;
Somit and Tanenhaus, [1967] 1982; Stein, 1995; Seidelman, [1985] 2015; Gunnell, 2006).
Yet still in the 1930s many practitioners of the discipline lamented the stagnation of what
Collini, Winch, and Burrow (1983), following Cockburn ([1856] 1910), called the “noble
science” of politics. Speaking of the “nebulous province” of early-twentieth-century political
science (especially British), Collini, Winch, and Burrow write:
The absence of any distinctive and agreed-upon ‘science’ was certainly evident in the familiar
heterogeneity of the syllabuses, a mixture usually made up of classical political philosophy and the
history of political theory on the one hand, British constitutional history and a selective taxonomy
of political institutions on the other. (Collini, Winch, and Burrow, 1983; 375)
By now stripped of much of its traditional scope by the successful institutionalization of the
other social sciences, British political science had to abandon its pretension of constituting a
comprehensive science of associated life and undertook a readjustment of its boundaries, yet
it generally remained “a kind of intellectual refugee-camp” for those who did not easily fit in
other areas of social scientific expertise (Collini, Winch, and Burrow, 1983; 374). Still at the
end of the 1940s, only four British journals of political science existed—International Affairs
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(started in 1922), Public Administration (started in 1923), the Political Quarterly (started
in 1930), and Parliamentary Affairs (started in 1947)—and when, in 1949, the UNESCO
Conference proposed that an International Political Science Association be formed, a British
Political Science Association had yet to be created (Chester, 1975; see also Stein, 1995).
Despite having garnered earlier institutional legitimacy, the status of political science in
the United States at the end of the nineteenth century was still essentially contested, as was
its disciplinary autonomy. At that time, the influence of the German Staatswissenschaften
(“sciences of the state”) was still predominant on the pioneering work of first-generation
political scientists. Francis Lieber (born Franz Lieber) was a Berlin-educated, American-
naturalized Prussian. Although born in America, John Burgess was also trained in Germany,
and so were other founding figures of U.S. political science like TheodoreWoolsey, Andrew D.
White (the founder of Cornell University and its president at the time the College of History
and Political Science was created), Herbert Adams (who created the John Hopkins University
Studies in Historical and Political Science), and Julius Seelye (Adams and Burgess’s tutor;
see Farr, 1991; Crick, [1959] 1998; Gunnell, 1990). Indeed, Herbert Adams described the
first political science association in the United States, the Hopkins Historical and Political
Science Association (1877), as “a kind of Staatswissenschaftlicher Verein, or Political Science
Union like that in Heidelberg University” (Adams, 1887; 194, italics added).
Drawing on the academic organization of political science curricula at German universi-
ties, Lieber saw political science as a systematic and abstract activity, to be kept separate from
practical politics and history. Accordingly, he identified the organizing concept of political
science in the notion of “state”, which he saw as a theoretical abstraction quite distinct from
the government and the legislative. As Gunnell (1990) points out, the vast adoption of the
German academic model certainly spurred the professionalization of U.S. political science,
and the identification of the state as the central focus of political studies met the quest for
autonomy on the part of political science. Under the influence of traditional Staatslehre
(“doctrine of the state”), Lieber—like Woolsey, White, and Burgess—came to see the state in
a radically different way than contract theory would prescribe, namely, as the ultimate source
of rights and the crowning accomplishment of the historical development of the political
community (Gunnell, 1990). Such abstract and metaphysically-infused notion of “state”
adapted from the German idealistic tradition could match “the search for a community
that stood behind an expanding and sometimes intrusive government and the conflictual
pluralism of region and interest seemed necessary to give substance to the idea of democracy”
(Gunnell, 1990; 156).
Because of its vague and open meaning, however, this idea of state did not serve to
pinpoint the object of political science once and for all, and“the search for what it represented
continued in other forms” (Gunnell, 1990; 157). With the so-called “behavioural revolution”
of the post-WWII period, focus on the state came to be viewed as an unwarranted conceptual
limitation to the scientific study of politics, which could be best accounted for by referring
to its “function” or through a “systemic” approach to the political sphere. In introducing his
1960 landmark comparative study on the “developing areas”, Almond programmatically
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wrote:
[The] rejection of the “state and non-state” classification, which is found throughout the anthro-
pological, sociological, and political science literature is not merely a verbal quibble. It is a matter
of theoretical and operational importance. Such a dichotomous classification could come only
from an approach to politics which identifies the political with the existence of a specialized,
visible structure, and which tends to restrict the political process to those functions performed by
the specialized structure … The articulative, aggregative, and communicative functions may be
performed diffusely within the society, or intermittently through the kinship or lineage structure.
An adequate analysis of a political system must locate and characterize all of these functions, and
not simply those performed by the specialized political structure …The rule to follow which we
suggest here is: If the functions are there, then the structures must be, even though we may find
them tucked away, so to speak, in nooks and crannies of other social systems. (Almond, [1960]
2015; 12)
In his seminal book The Political System (1953), David Easton had suggested that the
word “state”“should be abandoned entirely”, and that if the notion is scrupolously avoided,
“no severe hardship in expression will result. In fact”, he argued, “clarity of expression
demands this abstinence” (Easton, 1953; 108). As a substitute, Easton famously introduced
his notion of a “political system” which he identifies as “a set of interactions, abstracted
from the totality of social behaviour, through which values are authoritatively allocated for
a society” (Easton, 1965; 57). Not too dissimilarly, Dahl (1976; 10) wrote that “A political
system is any persistent pattern of human relationships that involve to a significant extent,
control, influence, power, or authority”. Crucially, the notion of the political system thus
understood is used precisely to characterize the scope of political science. In the same way
as Almond characterized political structures as “political systems”, “What distinguishes
political interactions from all other kinds of social interactions”, writes Easton, “is that
they are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society”
(Easton, 1965; 50).
Unsurprisingly, this redefinition of the object of political science was premissed upon
the general conception of the science of politics prescribed by the behavioural model. As
Almond and Genco (1977) characterized it:
The … “behavioral” tradition in political science tends to rest on three epistemological and
methodological assumptions which it has taken from the hard sciences: (1) that the purpose of
science is the discovery of regularities in, and ultimately laws of, social and political processes; (2)
that scientific explanation means the deductive subsumption of individual events under “covering
laws”; and (3) that the only scientifically relevant relationships between events in the world are
those which correspond to a physicalistic conception of causal connections. These assumptions are
highly interrelated, and each carries important substantive implications for the study of politics.
(Almond and Genco, 1977; 497–498)
So, for instance, Easton argued in The Political System (1953) that “knowledge becomes
critical and reliable when it increases in generality and internally consistent organization,
when, in short, it is cast in the form of systematic generalized statements applicable to large
numbers of particular cases” (Easton, 1953; 55). Similarly, Robert Dahl claimed that “[i]f
we wish to explain an event, E, in a strictly causal manner, we consider E as an effect and
bring it under some generalization of the form: ‘Every event C is accompanied later by an
event E’” (Dahl, 1965; 87). Tellingly, what Dahl identified as the features of the political
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system—control, influence, power, and authority—are for him amenable, qua behavioural
relations, to scientific investigation in terms of causal analysis:
when we single out influence from all other aspects of human interaction in order to give it special
attention, what interests us and what we focus attention on is that one or more of the persons
in this interaction get what they want, or at least get closer to what they want, by causing other
people to act in some particular way. We want to call attention to a causal relationship between
what A wants and what B does. (Dahl, 1976; 30, emphasis in the original)
For P. A. Hall (2003), the emergence of the concept of the “political system” and the
view of the political world as governed by laws that establish causal relations constitute two
“ontological shifts” that jointly encouraged the methodological innovations that began with
the “comparative revolution” of the 1950s and 1960s and continued to exert an enduring
influence on the development of political science. By attaching an overwhelming importance
to the function of political systems irrespective of the kinds of institutions in which the
system is instantiated—states or non-states—the search for law-like regularities could be
best performed through a comparative inquiry that sought to identify stable causal patterns
across different national contexts, while at the same time increasing the general knowledge
of the characters of the political system itself.
At a deeper level, one might see how the idea of a political system and the covering-law
model of political explanation are in fact interrelated. As Sartori (1970) remarked, an
unresolved problem of the structural-functional approach is that the category of “structure”
largely collapses into that of “function”. Despite Almond’s claim that “What we have done
is to separate political function from political structure” (Almond, [1960] 2015; 59), Sartori
argues, the notion of structure is seldom adequately defined in its own terms—i.e. qua
structure; on the contrary, structures typically bear a functional definition. So, for instance,
the political system is for Easton a means—a structure—for the authoritative allocation of
values, while for Dahl it is defined by its function of exerting control, influence, power, or
authority. For Sartori, this functional definition of the central political concepts means that
these are applicable based on the presence or absence of a given property, as per the logic of
classification building. Scientific taxonomies, he argues, follow an either-or type of logic by
constructing class concepts that represent characteristics which the objects must either have
or lack. Understood as defining the scope of political science, the concept of the political
system can be seen precisely as such a class concept, or a meta-concept that encompasses
all objects that bear similar properties—or more precisely, functions—so as to qualify as
political.
What Sartori calls conceptual stretching—the increasing vagueness and amorphousness
of class concepts with indefinite extensional coverage, the ultimate instance of which cannot
be but the overarching concept of the “political system” as co-extensive with the scope
of political science—is required precisely to accommodate the comparative expansion of
political science as a discipline. Comparative inquiry, he argues, ultimately needs “‘universal’
categories—concepts that are applicable to any time and space” (Sartori, 1970; 1035), and
therefore their meaning must be just as broad. Functionally defined concepts, then, provide
CHAPTER 1. THE OBJECT OF POLITICS 18
sufficiently universal categories that underpin comparative research. Taking one step back,
however, one may ask why it is necessary or at least desirable to compare at all. Revealingly,
in an influential article Arend Lijphart defined the comparative method as “a method of
discovering empirical relationships among variables” (Lijphart, 1971; 683) and described
its logic as corresponding to the general standard of the experimental method expounded
by Ernst Nagel, i.e. a method of discovering empirical correlations between variables in
order to arrive at general laws (Nagel, 1961; 452; Lijphart, 1971; 684). For Lijphart, “It
was the promise of discovering universal laws through global and longitudinal comparisons
that made Edward A. Freeman enthusiastically espouse the comparative method” in his
1873 Comparative Politics (Freeman, 1873; Lijphart, 1971; 686). Similarly, in agreeing
with Lijphart Sartori concludes that the distinctiveness of comparative politics consists “of a
systematic testing, against as many cases as possible, of sets of hypotheses, generalizations
and laws of the ‘if … then’ type” (Sartori, 1970; 1035).
Conclusion
The structural-functionalist definition of “the political system” thus rests necessarily on a
law-based understanding of political explanation which requires and indeed is exhausted by
the search for stable correlations. More generally, the demarcation of the scope of political
science and the subsequent definition of its object of investigation in methodological terms
rests upon a foundationalist view of science which underpins comparative methodology
understood as the search for invariant regularities. It is from this foundationalist standpoint
that the scope of science could be seen as the product of the methodological differentiation
between the different scientific disciplines: by assuming logical criteria of justification as
the demarcation line between science and non-science, traditional philosophy of science
focused solely on the context of justification as instantiated in the methodology of science.
In this way, methodology could be seen as the very site of demarcation between science
and non-science, and therefore as the distinguishing feature of a science. It is on the basis
of this assumption that the boundaries of scientific disciplines—i.e. their scope—could be
defined in terms of the scientific objects as seen through purely methodological lenses. Given
its demarcationist and foundationalist presuppositions, the view that scientific objects are
defined by the methodology of science—which provides the context of justification—can
only be defended as long as the underlying image of science is accepted.
The next chapters will show how criticism to covering laws in social explanation impinges
substantially on the issue of scope of science. The idea that causal relations can be fully
accounted for in terms of relations of logical dependence from law-like regularities and that
causal explanation can be defined as a logical deductive argument rests on the foundationalist
philosophy of science of the logical empiricists, according to which the nature of science is
entirely defined on the basis philosophical—more specifically, logical—criteria. Chapter 2
will consider mechanism-based criticism to covering laws in terms of a realist criticism to
the causal eliminativism and logical foundationalism implicit in the covering-law model of
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explanation. While the explanatory power of covering laws is defended on a non-causal,
logical basis, mechanism-based critics of covering law point to a causal-realist view according
to which causal explanation is about detailing the causal process that actually occur in the
world.
Once such eliminativist reductionism about causation is rejected in favour of causal
realism, a different account of scientific objects is required. For such realism entails a
commitment to the existence of mind-independent causal processes, and therefore it assumes
that the role of scientific explanation is to provide true theories about such causal processes.
Chapter 3 will thus proceed to examine the scientific presuppositions of causal realism.
The idea that causal relations are real-world causal processes to be reflected in scientific
explanation will be linked to a productive view of causation, according to which the social
world be ontologically defined in terms of causal powers. The metaphysics of science that
underwrites causal realism, it will be argued, is one that sees causal processes as contextually
produced by the particular properties of individual entities.
A definition of the object of politics in realist terms must thus depend on the causal prop-
erties of entities that generate what are described as political phenomena. The demarcation of
the scope of political science depends on the classification of causal properties into political
and non-political ones. In chapter 4, such classification will be presented as the result of
a stipulation. Because phenomena are individually generated by the causal properties of
particular social entities, which of them count as political must depend on the recognition of
“family resemblances” between different properties. Such family resemblances, however, are
only established by the inquirers a posteriori, and therefore different stipulations about what
family resemblances are politically relevant can lead to very different conceptualizations of
politics as a scientific objects.
Chapter 5 will address this problem by considering the definition of scientific objects that
result from the classifications of particular causal properties as representational models. Like
all scientific models, representational models are neither true nor false; in fact, they are all
equally valid to the extent that they all represent reality in some way. Like the experimental
models of science, however, representational models can be judged on the basis of the models
of reality they assume. From a realist perspective, definitions of the object of politics that
result from a covering-law understanding of political processes can thus discarded because
of the inadequacy of the explanatory model of causation they depend on.
Chapter 2
Productive causation and political
explanation
It may seem extraordinary that anyone should ever
have held the view that there is definitely no “be-
cause” in nature—that there is definitely nothing
about the world in virtue of which it is regular. It
is … one of the most baroque metaphysical sugges-
tions ever put forward—principally by people who
pride themselves on dispensing with metaphysical
extravagance.
Galen Strawson (1989)
Introduction
This chapter will consider the enduring influence of the positivistic image of science in
political explanation as well as criticism to it. The positivistic foundationalism that justified
the adoption of a covering-law approach to political explanation, in particular, will be shown
to be the ultimate target of the long-lasting debates on political methodology that have
accompanied the development of the discipline. Critics of the use of covering laws in political
explanation as well as in social explanation broadly understood typically defend what has
come to be known as “the mechanism approach”. Social explanation, the argument goes,
requires detailing the “causal mechanism” that produced the phenomenon to be explained
rather than deductively subsuming it under covering laws.
This contention in turn presupposes that all explanation is causal. As Jon Elster (2007)
put it,
The basic type of explanandum is an event. To explain it is to give an account of why it happened,
by citing an earlier event as its cause. Thus we may explain Ronald Reagan’s victory in the 1980
presidential elections by Jimmy Carter’s failed attempt to rescue the Americans held hostage in
Iran. Or we might explain the outbreak of World War II by citing any number of earlier events,
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from the Munich agreement to the signing of the Versailles treaty. (Elster, 2007; 3, emphasis in the
original)
Although some authors have openly equated explanation and causal explanation (Salmon,
1984; Lewis, 1986b), most scholars now tend to leave open the possibility of non-causal
explanation, if only by not excluding it explicitly. In this latter case, however, it is not
entirely clear what a suitable candidate for a non-causal explanation would be (Skow,
2014). Therefore, throughout this work I will simply assume the (realist) equation between
explanation and causal explanation.
What appears to be a purelymethodological debate between different models of explanation—
the covering-law model and the mechanism-based model—will in fact be shown to be a
metaphysical debate about the nature of social causation. The explanatory power of covering
laws can only derive from an eliminativist view about causation according to which the
regularities which those laws describe are seen as more fundamental than causal relations
themselves. It is on the basis of such causal eliminativism that regularities can constitute the
very focus of scientific explanation. On what is often referred to as “the Humean view of
causation”, causal links are nothing but shorthand for regular co-occurrences of otherwise
unrelated events: it is because of such eliminativism about causal links that the validity of
scientific explanation can only derive from the empirical confirmation of such regularities
and on the deductions they accordingly yield. The logically foundationalist approach to
science that supports the covering-law model of explanation thus rests in its turn on an
anti-realist metaphysics of causation.
Covering-law explanations will thus be criticized as unwarranted generalizations of par-
ticularistic causal claims. According to the above view of causal explanation, generalizations
of causal claims have no explanatory value per se. In fact, I take it that causal generalizations
are usually valued because of an implicit commitment to an anti-realist empiricism according
to which causal claims are heuristic devices rather than real-world processes. In contrast,
the use of mechanisms for political explanation and social explanation in general are often
advocated on the basis of a realist view of causation. The explanatory power of social
mechanisms, in particular, is defended comparatively to covering laws in that mechanisms
are deemed capable to “open up the black-box” between the relata of causal laws and show
the causal “cogs and wheels” that make up causal processes. Mechanism-based explana-
tions are thus considered to be true descriptions of real-world causal processes, while the
phenomena to be explained are considered to be the outcomes of genuinely productive and
metaphysically real causal processes.
Despite the unquestionable theoretical influence of the covering-lawmodel of explanation,
the idea of explanatory mechanisms is as old as the idea of scientific laws, both of which
originated during the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century. But while explanation in the
social and political sciences have often been presented in law-like terms in accordance with
the precepts of the positivistic image of science, the actual explanatory relevance of laws
in empirical analysis is far from indisputable. In fact, the idea that scientific explanation
amounts to inferring particular phenomena from general causal laws arguably played no
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serious role in the social sciences despite having been the dominant view in philosophy for
decades. Explanation of statistical associations have nearly always been provided in terms
of causal mechanisms. Causal realism thus seems to be a tacit assumption of much social
and political science in the form of mechanism-based explanation. Causal explanation, the
argument goes, must necessarily rest on the assumption that causal mechanisms are real
processes, and that mechanism-based explanation is capable of capturing them.
Since the main goal of science is to provide causal explanations of particular events, one
can take political science to be a set of statements that provide answers to why-questions,
i.e. a set of causal statements. Coupled with a realist view on the nature of causal relations,
this assumption posits the reconstruction of those causal relations as the main goal of
political science, to which other goals are subordinate. On the variant of causal realism
consider here, for instance, causal relations are considered to be the materialization of the
particular properties of individual entities. It is in order to explore the conception of scientific
objects that derives from this perspective that the latter part of this chapter will detail the
metaphysical implications of the realist approach to causation. The reality of causal processes,
it will be argued, implies the notion that the phenomena at stake in scientific explanation
have been actively generated by the productive activities that make up the social world.
Causal realism, therefore, is conducive to a productive view of causation according to which
causal activities are primitive relations that cannot be further reduced to logical relations of
inferential dependence. This will provide the guidelines for a social ontology of scientific
objects to be outlined in the next chapter.
1. Political science and covering laws
As P. A. Hall (2003) pointed out, the covering-law view of the political system that arose
with the comparative revolution continued to exert a heavy influence in the discipline of
political science. Writing in 2001, the late Charles Tilly wrote that “approved political science
doctrine generally favors some combination of propensity and covering law explanations”
(Tilly, 2001; 25). Citing studies on regime transitions as a case in point, Tilly remarked that
in the existing political science literature democratization processes are often accounted for
by singling out the necessary and sufficient conditions for those processes to occur, or by
invoking well-established empirical correlations between variables such as e.g. the creation
of representative institutions and the democratization of a polity. Within this framework,
political outcomes are explained by reconstructing the intentional states of relevant agents
(i.e. their “propensity” to perform a certain action) within the process under examination, and
by subsuming the actions determined by such propensity under a “covering law” concerning
human behaviour.
The notion of a “covering-law explanation” was first introduced by Dray (1957; see
Hempel, [1963] 2001), even though an earlier sketch of this explanatory model can be found
in Karl Popper’s early work (see e.g. Popper, [1934] 2002; 38). Its textbook version, however,
is most often associated with Carl G. Hempel’s “deductive-nomological” model. Drawing
CHAPTER 2. PRODUCTIVE CAUSATION AND POLITICAL EXPLANATION 23
on the logical-empiricist image of science as based in large part on deductive inferences from
true universal generalizations, Hempel set forth a formal model of explanation in which the
explanandum—i.e. what is to be explained—features as an individual statement logically
deducible from the explanans—the explanatory theory, formed by a logical conjunction of
individual statements specifying some initial conditions and some universal statement(s) in a
law-like form, whence the name “deductive-nomological”. Following this idea, a physical
phenomenon like a swift rise in the mercury column of a thermometer rapidly immersed
in hot water is explained by deduction from some initial conditions—such as the fact that
the thermometer consists of a glass tube filled with mercury and that it is immersed into
hot water—together with some law-like statement about the thermic expansion of mercury
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948).
In a very much logical-empiricist vein, this model is intended to provide a rational (and
logical) reconstruction of actual scientific practice, assuming the natural sciences—and the
physical sciences in particular—as the ideal of science. Interestingly, however, Hempel first
presented his covering-law model with reference to historical explanation. Through it,
Hempel intended to show that general laws have quite analogous functions in history and in
the natural sciences, that they form an indispensable instrument of historical research, and that
they even constitute the common basis of various procedures which are often considered as
characteristic of the social in contradistinction to the natural sciences (Hempel, 1942; 35). To
exemplify this point he considers the migration of farmers from the Great Plains to California
during the Great Depression. Not unlike physical phenomena, he argues, particular historical
events of this kind are explained by specifying some initial conditions—e.g. continual drought
and sandstorms rendering the farmers’ existence increasingly precarious, California offering
better living conditions than the Great Plains—and by subsuming them under some“covering
law” concerning human behaviour, such as the universal hypothesis that populations tend to
migrate to regions offering better living conditions. This model, for Hempel, can be extended
rather straightforwardly to explain revolutions as well as to “historical explanations in
terms of class struggle, economic or geographic conditions, vested interests of certain groups,
tendency to conspicuous consumption”, and indeed to virtually all social explanations
(Hempel, 1942; 42).
While in the late 1950s Hempel’s deductive-nomological model began to lose momentum
in the face of devastating philosophical criticism (Salmon, 1989), and although the consensus
around the covering-law model of explanation seems to have had little impact on other
areas of empirical social research (Hedström and Bearman, 2009), many authors identified
the main stream in political science methodology as tied to a covering-law account of
explanation (see e.g. Moon, 1975). According to Tilly (2001), political science manuals,
courses, and presidential addresses tend to endorse a model of explanation that is in large
part based on covering laws. For him, this approach is epitomized in traditional studies on
regime transitions insofar as they provide explanatory theories centred on the democratizing
action of crucial agents (most typically the ruling elite, but also collective actors such as
unionized workers) and on the overarching assumption that such action conforms to some
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law that makes it a necessary and sufficient condition for transition to democracy to occur.
Indeed, in a seminal book-length study on contentious politics jointly authored with fellow
social movements scholars Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow, Tilly detected covering-law
explanations in vast areas of empirical political research, including not only the rational-
actor analyses predominant in the fields of industrial conflict and electoral politics, but also,
and more broadly, what the authors identify as the classic agenda of North American and
European social movement scholarship (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001).
By the 1980s, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly argue, most social movement investigators
came to pursue a unified explanatory schema that, aside from the varying degrees of emphasis
placed on its different components, referred to some invariant factors that jointly characterize
the emergence of contentious episodes—typically: social change (however defined); the
presence of mobilizing structures (such as existing social movement organizations or the
less institutionalized networks of everyday life) and political opportunities; repertoires of
political means for contention; and the frames that orient participation in collective action.
For McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, however, compressing the complexity of the different
episodes of contention under investigation into these pre-ordered boxes inevitably led social
movement scholars to single out the relevant actors in each of the contexts expressed by the
boxes, in the same way as traditional propensity-based approaches to political explanation
focused on the actions of key social agents in order to nomologically explain the dispositions
that allegedly resulted in those actions. To show this, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly focus on
what they believe to be a paradigmatic case, namely, traditional accounts of the rise of the
U.S. Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s–1960s. Classic scholarship, they argue, typically
framed this phenomenon against the background of large societal changes—the collapse of
the cotton economy and the resulting migratory flows—that triggered the other factors in the
scheme: migratory flows to the North increased the importance of the “black vote”, opening
up political opportunities for African Americans, while migration from rural to urban areas
favoured the development of black churches, black colleges, and civil rights organizations as
mobilizing structures. This resulted in a different and more politically-oriented framing of
long-existing grievances, such as those against segregation on city buses, and in a broadening
of the repertoire of contention to marches, sit-ins, and other forms of protest.
For McAdam,Tarrow, and Tilly, however, in focusing exclusively on such single, invariant
pattern, the classic social movement agenda obliterated the causal pathways that led, for
instance, Montgomery protesters to attribute an opportunity to the bus boycott and move-
ment leaders to appropriate the formerly conservative black church, both engaging in an
interpretive framing effort that extended to the adoption of innovative collective action. By
leaving unspecified the inner causal workings of the process at stake in favour of subsuming it
under a pre-ordered schema, that is, the classic social movement agenda presupposed a model
of explanation that is as unsatisfactory as is subsuming political phenomena under general
laws, and for the same reasons: in both instances, causal relationships are black-boxed into
stable links connecting the variables of an invariant model rather than explained.
Criticism of covering laws of the kind advanced by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly underlies
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Figure 2.1: The Classic Social Movement Agenda for Explaining Contentious Politics, as
presented in McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001; 17).
much recent methodological debate in the social sciences, especially the debate on social
mechanisms. More specifically, it will be shown, those who advocate the use of mecha-
nisms instead of covering laws for the purpose of social explanation typically question the
adequacy of covering laws for causal explanation altogether. Indeed, some point out that
empirical phenomena can hardly be explained in a law-like form, and that aside from theo-
retical advocacy of the logical-empiricist model of deductive science epitomized in Hempel’s
deductive-nomological scheme, mechanism-based explanation has been a staple in social
science for decades (albeit perhaps in a covert form, see Hedström and Bearman, 2009; 5,
see also f. 3; Bechtel, 2006; 3–4). Supposedly, such presumed explanatory inadequacy is a
consequence of the anti-realism about causation built in into the covering-law approach.
By defining explanation entirely in terms of logical dependence, as per Hempel’s deductive-
nomological model, advocates of the covering-law approach identify explanatory power with
the capacity to yield logical deductions. In this way, causal explanation altogether evaporates
in logical deduction, and causation itself ceases to be an irreducible feature of the (social)
world to become analyzable in terms of more primitive relations of logical dependence.
Such reductionism about causation, it will be argued, is the implicit target of criticism of
covering laws. Advocates of the mechanism-based approach typically defend the greater
explanatory power of mechanisms vis-à-vis laws by virtue of their capacity to unravel the
actual, real-world causal processes that bring about the phenomena at stake in scientific
explanation.
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2. Political mechanisms
Critics of the covering-law approach to social explanation typically see it as unsatisfactory in
that law-like links between events obliterate rather than detail causal relations. In criticizing
the “classic social movements agenda”, for instance, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001)
contend that the pursuit of a covering-law explanatory model led to the formulation of
a coarse-grained and highly static explanatory scheme, which obfuscated the dynamical
complexity of single episodes of contention by evaporating specific causal pathways into
purportedly universal causal links. For this reason, they advocate replacing covering-law
accounts of political processes with mechanism-based ones. In their understanding, the
mechanism-based approach consists precisely of placing “under microscopes” the law-like
links that featured in the traditional explanatory agenda in order to “observe what goes on
inside them” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; 189). Rejecting the view that explanations
should proceed by subjecting whole categories of phenomena to general models, they argue
that contentious episodes are best analyzed by locating recurrent mechanisms within them,
which they define as follows:
Mechanisms are a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in
identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations. (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001;
24, emphasis in the original)
Accordingly, they propose a different account of the outbreak of contentious episodes within
the U.S. Civil Rights struggle. Mechanisms of competition for power, McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly argue, were active when the moderate leadership of the civil rights movement
was being contested by the more radical currents of the movement, resulting in a further
radicalization of the latter. Mechanisms of diffusion of forms of contention can be found in
the spread of “sit-ins” and “freedom marches” across geographically, organizationally, and
ideologically different civil right groups. Mechanisms of repression operated in the broader
civil rights movement’s marginalization of ghetto militants, who organized into paramilitary
groups such as the Black Panthers. Finally, mechanisms of radicalization account for the
younger civil right activists’ search for new themes and new forms of action to revivify the
movement after the exhaustion of the equal opportunity agenda. It is the combination of
such mechanisms (together with other, more context-specific ones) and their coalescence into
a process of polarization of the polity that lie at the basis of contentious episodes such as the
Montgomery bus boycott.
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s definition of mechanisms in terms of classes of “events” is
not unproblematic, especially since they contrast mechanisms with processes and episodes.
In their view, processes are “regular sequences of … mechanisms that produce similar
(generally more complex and contingent) transformations” of the elements of mechanisms,
while episodes are “continuous streams of contention including collective claims making
that bears on other parties’ interests” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; 24). Yet this
tripartite distinction seems to be arbitrary, and deliberately so, since its proponents state that
“Mechanisms and processes form a continuum. It is arbitrary, for example, whether we call
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brokerage a mechanism, a family of mechanisms, or a process. In this book, we generally
call it a mechanism to emphasize its recurring features” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001;
27). Episodes, in turn, are somewhat counter-intuitively described as entanglements of two
or more processes (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; 28), but the introduction of this
nested taxonomy of political phenomena leaves open the question as to what are the ultimate
explananda of political mechanisms—and indeed, whether political mechanisms presuppose
any specific explanandum at all.
Yet McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly are by no means the only authors advocating mechan-
ism-based explanations of political phenomena, nor are they the only ones to contrast
covering-law explanations with mechanism-based ones. Studies on democratization, as well
as historical inquiries on macropolitical outcomes such as revolutions, modernization, regime
change, and the like, make extensive use of mechanism-based explanations in accounting for
large-scale historical processes (P.A. Hall, 2003; Falleti and Lynch, 2009). Paul Pierson (2003)
argued for instance that the gradual replacement of political generations is the principal causal
mechanism involved in slow-moving, cumulative political outcomes such as the changing
fortunes of political currents within the U.S. Congress. Thelen (2003) identifies cases in
which gradual but nevertheless transformative institutional change (including transition to
democracy in Eastern Europe) occurs through what Schickler (2001; 15, emphasis added)
described as a “tense layering of new arrangements on top of preexisting structures”—a
mechanism through which “new coalitions may design novel institutional arrangements but
lack the support, or perhaps the inclination, to replace preexisting institutions established to
pursue other ends”. And so on.
At a more abstract level, Mahoney (2001) identified twenty-four different definitions of
“mechanism” as put forward by various authors—including social and political scientists.
Aside from McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, even authors otherwise very unsympathetic to the
epistemological underpinnings of mechanism-based explanation like King, Keohane, and
Verba (1994; 85) conceded that it “makes intuitive sense” to account for causation in terms
of mechanisms linking causes and effects. In fact, many commentators pointed to the lack of
consensus on an unequivocal definition that could serve as a shared explanatory paradigm
(Mahoney, 2001; Hedström and Bearman, 2009; Hedström, 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski,
2010). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, for instance, emphasize that mechanisms operate at
different levels to bring about complex outcomes: in the civil rights movement example,
environmental mechanisms responsible for urbanization and relational mechanisms such as
the civil rights activists’ brokerage of aggrieved people combine with cognitive mechanisms
(e.g. the attribution of an opportunity for voicing grievances to the injustice of bus segregation)
into a process that led to the bus boycott in Montgomery. Not dissimilarly, Mayntz (2004;
250–251) stresses that relational mechanisms are irreducible to individual-level ones and
nevertheless indispensable to political explanations in that “relational constellations that
may, but need not, be institutionally based are integral parts of the processes generating
social macro-phenomena”. A political science example of this would be Ostrom’s ([1990]
2015, 1999) work on common pool resource problems, the occurrence and solution of which
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Ostrom ascribes to institutional rules and to structural properties of social groups more than
to the individual behaviour of group members. On the other hand, Hedström and Swedberg
(1998; 11-12) contend that mechanism-based explanations in the social sciences necessarily
invoke causal agents of some form which cannot be but individual actors; as a consequence,
“intelligible social science explanations should always include references to the causes and
consequences of their actions”. Others (Schelling, 1998; Cowen, 1998; Gambetta, 1998) tie
the very idea of a mechanisms to the decision-making processes constantly undertaken by
social actors, thus subscribing to a principle of methodological individualism similar to that
invoked by Hedström and Swedberg.
Yet other crucial differences divide the camp of mechanism advocates. Followers of
Hedström and Swedberg’s account of mechanism-based explanation typically contrast it with
the deductive-nomological model of explanation, while early defenders of the mechanism
approach seem to adopt the jargon—if not the conceptual apparatus—of the covering-law
approach. Little (1991; 15), for instance, defines mechanisms as “series of events governed
by law-like regularities that lead from the explanans to the explanandum”, while Glennan
(1996; 52) writes that “A mechanism underlying a behavior is a complex system which
produces that behavior by of the interaction of a number of parts according to direct causal
laws.”
In their extensive review of mechanism approaches in philosophy and in the social sciences,
Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) tried to impose some order on this diversity by listing the
features shared by most definitions of “mechanism”, namely, that mechanisms are effect-
specific, causal, structured, and hierarchically nested. Virtually all of these characteristics,
however, are contradicted by some well-established theory about mechanisms. The idea that
mechanisms are identified by the kind of effect they produce, for instance, is seemingly at odds
with a widely praised and supposed advantage of mechanism-based explanation, namely, their
(semi-)generality. Hedström and Bearman, for instance, favourably cite Merton’s famous
characterization of self-fulfilling prophecies as a quintessential epitome of a mechanism on
grounds that it is capable of explaining phenomena as diverse as the placebo effect and bank
runs (see also Biggs, 2009). And while Hedström and Bearman carefully specify that these
phenomena are all of the same type in that they exhibit the same structure linking the types
of entities—irrespective of the particular actors, beliefs, or actions that occur in the concrete
phenomena—it is not clear whether such a degree of generality still allows to talk of effects
as a defining feature of mechanisms in any meaningful sense.
As Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) acknowledge, even the condition of causality has been
violated by a pioneer in the social mechanism approach such as Jon Elster. Although in
his earlier work Elster openly subscribes to Donald Davidson’s view that intentional states
such as beliefs and desires can be bona fide causes of actions (Elster, 1983; 20–24, emphasis
added), his early definition of “mechanism” as “a continuous and contiguous chain of causal
or intentional links” seems to allow for non-causal interpretations of mechanisms.
The idea that mechanisms have a structure is actually encapsulated in many arguments
making reference to the metaphor of “black-box” explanations. The :osition between non-
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explanatory “black-boxism” and the explanatory conversion of black boxes into “translucid
boxes”through the disclosure of themechanisms that make up its internal structure is typically
associated with the thought of Mario Bunge (for an early statement of this theory see Bunge,
1963). In Hedström and Ylikoski’s understanding, this opposition can be translated into one
between variables and components of actual causal processes:
When a mechanism-based explanation opens the black box, it discloses [its] structure. It turns
the black box into a transparent box and makes visible how the participating entities and their
properties, activities, and relations produce the effect of interest. For this reason, the suggestion
(e.g., Opp, 2005) that a mechanism is just an intervening variable misses an important point.
The focus on mechanisms breaks up the original explanation-seeking why question into a series
of smaller questions about the causal process: What are the participating entities, and what are
their relevant properties? How are the interactions of these entities organized (both spatially and
temporally)? What factors could prevent or modify the outcome? And so on. (Hedström and
Ylikoski, 2010; 51–52)
However, Mahoney (2001; 578) points out how a large family of definitions of mechanism
understand this notion precisely as “an intervening variable or set of intervening variables
that explain why a correlation exists between an independent and dependent variable”, citing
seven references in support of this claim which interestingly include also the seminal work
that Hedström himself co-authored with Swedberg.
Finally, the claim that mechanisms form a hierarchy is justified by Hedström and Ylikoski
in the light of an epistemologically reductionist position—albeit a weak one: “While a
mechanism at one level presupposes or takes for granted the existence of certain entities with
characteristic properties and activities”, they argue, “it is expected that there are lower-level
mechanisms that explain them”. Yet it is not entirely clear how “lower-level” mechanisms
can explain causally the properties and activities of entities that figure in “higher-level” ones.
Elsewhere, Ylikoski (2013) has drawn on Salmon’s (1984) distinction between “etiological”
(i.e. causal) and constitutive explanation and argued that mechanism-based explanations
of the (causal) capacities of entities are of the latter kind. However, the application of
this distinction to the levels of mechanism-based analysis is problematic, since it would
licence, contra Hedström and Ylikoski, a non-causal interpretation of (mechanism-based)
explanation.
3. Mechanisms versus covering laws?
Admittedly, Hedström and Ylikoski’s review serves a critical rather than descriptive purpose,
its stated goal being one of detailing “some general ideas about what good social science is
all about” (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; 58) as articulated by the self-named “Analytical
Sociology”movement within the social sciences (see Hedström and Bearman, 2009; Hed-
ström, 2005). What is perhaps most distinctive about the mechanism approach, at least in
the self-understanding of its advocates, is that it can be viewed as a plausible response to a
general dissatisfaction with the covering-law model of explanations guiding correlational
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and variable-oriented analyses in empirical research.1 Followers of Hedström and Swed-
berg’s (1998) approach, for instance, draw on the Mertonian tradition of “middle-range”
theorizing—later revivified by authors like Boudon (1991)—the main thrust of which they
find in Merton’s ([1949] 1968; 39) opposition to “the all-inclusive systematic efforts to de-
velop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social
organization and social change”. The “middle-range” alternative to such unifying theories of
explanation Merton identifies precisely in the task of detecting “social mechanisms”, which
he defines as “the social processes having designated consequences for designated parts of
the social structure” (Merton, [1949] 1968; 44).
More broadly, as the previous section sought to suggest, defenders of mechanism-based
explanations in the social and political sciences tend to conceive of them in quite prescriptive
terms as a research programme capable of overcoming the flaws of the more well-established
methodologies at use in actual social research, which they identify with the covering-law
model of explanation. In his review of the volume on Social Mechanisms edited by Hedström
and Swedberg, Mahoney (2001) reinforces this view by framing recent contributions to
the literature in the field of social mechanisms within a broader trend of methodological
innovation. Specifically, he draws a parallel between mechanism-based explanations and
Ragin’s (2000) “fuzzy-set”methodology, though he understands mechanisms in quite specific
terms as “posited entities or processes capable of generating certain outcomes”. One example
of the latter would be the power relations postulated by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), which
are hypothetical but nonetheless capable of producing political equality and hence democracy
when they are balanced among classes, between state and society, and between states in
the international arena. Both the search for causal mechanisms thus understood and the
fuzzy-set approach, Mahoney argues, focus on necessary and sufficient causes for given
outcomes, favour case-oriented research, and unequivocally stand in sharp contrast to the
search for bivariate correlations prescribed in traditional social and political analysis.
Even more ambitious in generality of scope, though more selective in extent of coverage,
Little’s (2009) review spans two decades of methodological debates within U.S. social science
and arrives at similar conclusions regarding the critical relationship between mechanism-
based explanations and its methodological antecedents. Little summarizes the ontological
insights he draws from these debates as follows:
doubt about the availability of strong universal laws among social phenomena; attention to the
multiple pathways and structural alternatives that exist in large-scale historical development;
awareness of the deep heterogeneity of social processes and influences—in time and place; attention
to the substantial degree of contingency that exists in historical change; attention to the plasticity
of social organizations and institutions; and attempts at bridging between micro- and macro-level
social processes. Almost all of these points amount to a fundamental challenge to positivist social
science. The skepticism that is now well established about social regularities is a deep blow to
1. Notable exceptions to this widespread attitude include Opp (2005) and King, Keohane, and Verba (1994).
Opp (2005; 174–177) argues for instance that Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model neither
prescribes nor prohibits mechanism-based explanations; therefore, covering laws and mechanisms are mutually
compatible. Indeed, for Opp they complement one another: as King, Keohane, and Verba (1994; 75–87) argue,
identifying causal mechanisms presupposes rather than provides causal inferences, which can only be established
using the variable-oriented methods of correlational analysis.
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the positivist program. The emphasis on causal mechanisms suggests a post-positivist, realist
approach to scientific explanation. The point about heterogeneity of social processes suggests
the importance of theoretical pluralism rather than unified grand theories of social phenomena.
(Little, 2009; 161–162)
Taken together, these reconstructions of the emergence of mechanism-based thinking seem
to portray it as a reaction to the near-predominance of law-like explanation in empirical social
research under the influence of the positivistic philosophy of logical empiricism. On closer
inspection, however, this picture proves to be in need of some adjustments. As Hedström
and Bearman (2009; 5) admit, the covering-law model devised by logical empiricism in
philosophy “never played any serious role in sociology … Sociological explanation is all
about mechanisms and statistical associations and has been so for decades”. In support of
this claim they cite a sample survey run on the two leading journals in the field of sociology—
the American Journal of Sociology and the American Sociological Review—over the period
spanning from their date of establishment (1895 and 1936, respectively) to the turn of the
last millennium (2001). Throughout this publication history, only 40 articles prove to refer
to “‘scientific law(s)’, ‘social law(s)’, ‘covering law(s)’, and the like” in their titles or abstracts,
and only 8 of them were published after 1950. Analogous conclusions can be drawn if one
considers the philosophy of the natural sciences, and the philosophy of biology in particular.
In the social mechanism narrative, it is rather commonplace to justify the use of mechanisms
vis-à-vis law-like regularities by making reference to an epistemological contrast between
physical and biological explanation, which are taken to be the natural-science epitomes of
the covering-law and the mechanism-based model, respectively. This contrast is based on
the idea that social phenomena are inherently different from physical phenomena in a way
that makes them hardly amenable to deterministic laws governing them, while biological
mechanisms provide a more suitable explanatory model to draw on in explaining social
phenomena (see e.g. Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; 2, see also f. 4; McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly, 2001; 23). However, a search of titles of Science articles undertaken over the
first 118 years of the journal’s history would reveal 656 articles including “mechanism”,
“mechanisms”, and “mechanistic” in their titles—the earliest of which concerning biological
phenomena appeared in 1904 (earlier titles referred to psychological mechanisms)—almost
four times as many as the articles including “law” or “laws” in their title (165 between 1880
and 1998: Bechtel, 2006; 3–4).
In fact, even though modern-day approaches to mechanism-based explanation in the
social sciences developed by and large autonomously from antecedent philosophical debate,
it is worth noting that both the idea of a mechanical philosophy of nature and that of
laws of nature emerged during the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century and did not
become rival explanatory paradigms until the twentieth century. Descartes, for instance, is
alternatively regarded as one of the first philosophers having made use of the concept of
“scientific laws”and as a leading figure in the mechanistic philosophy of nature. So is Newton,
whose laws are one of the main influences on the logical empiricist movement in philosophy
despite the fact that in his work he refers to forces as “mechanical principles” and that his
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attempt to administer mathematical treatment to physical phenomena aims at supplementing
rather than replacing the principles of mechanical philosophy (Boas and Hall, 1959). It
was Wesley C. Salmon (1984) who, insisting on some well-known problems besetting the
deductive-nomological account, came to the conclusion that deductive laws stood in need
of being themselves explained in mechanism-based terms. On the deductive-nomological
account, he argued, an observation to the effect of a sharp drop in the reading of a properly
functioning barometer licences one to infer not only that there will be a storm, but that
it is the barometer drop that causes it. This is because the deductive-nomological model
allows no room for causation, which is replaced by logical deduction, and hence provides no
criteria for telling causal relations from non-casual ones. After all, Hempel ([1959] 1965;
300) himself went so far as to claim that “causal explanation is a special type of deductive
nomological explanation”, suggesting that logical deduction is a more fundamental and more
comprehensive relation than causation itself. For this reason, Salmon concluded that the
only possible solution to the barometer puzzle is to consider deductive laws as in themselves
non-causal—the true cause of the rain being the mechanisms of falling atmospheric pressure.
No philosophical urge to replace laws with mechanisms, however, has been perceived
even by early proponents of a mechanism-based solution to the barometer problem with
Hempel and Oppenheim’s model, who were prone to interpret it as a complement to rather
than as a replacement for the theory of deductive-nomological explanations (see e.g. Jeffrey,
1969; Railton, 1978). The relationship between mechanisms and covering laws, therefore,
does not seem to be one between different, subsequent stages of a cumulative path towards
explanatory adequacy. Nor do the mechanism-based and covering-law model amount to
incommensurable, self-enclosed and full-blown explanatory paradigms. In fact, the reason
why mechanisms are most often opposed to covering laws does not seem to lie in any formal
aspect of the mechanism model itself, but rather in its underlying understanding of causation
and its role in (social) explanation.
In this respect, it is worth noting that while the mechanism approach is, at different
degrees, critical of the received view of social explanation, it does not target uniquely covering
laws. Recall from the previous chapter that the “behavioural revolution” in the study of
politics led to the characterization of the “political system” in terms of “structures” and
“functions”. While such structural-functionalism laid the foundations for a “systemic”
approach to politics that allowed for political functions to be subsumed under covering
laws, philosophers of science typically regard functional explanations to pursue a sui generis
explanatory logic that overlaps only partially with that of the covering-law model. G.
A. Cohen ([1978] 2000) provided an influential account of functional explanation in his
reconstruction of Karl Marx’s Theory of History. In his 1859 Preface to A Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy, Marx had written:
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which
are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the
development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. (Marx,
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[1859] 1987; 263)
Taking this passage as “the clearest statement of the theory of historical materialism” (Cohen,
1983; 112), Cohen contends that the relations expressed by such formulas as “appropriate to
…” or “the real foundation, on which arises …” constitute a particular kind of explanatory
relations, namely functional relations. In the attempt to provide epistemological foundations
for historical materialism thus understood as an explanatory programme, Cohen suggests
that functional explanation can be seen as a special case of consequence explanation, of
which he aims to provide a logical reconstruction. Indeed, Cohen straightforwardly argues
that “central Marxian explanations are functional, which means, very roughly, that the
character of what is explained is determined by its effect on what explains it” (Cohen, [1978]
2000; 278). To establish a functional relation of the kind expressed by statements of the
form “The function of x is to φ”, Cohen argues, is to subsume such statements under a
“consequence law”, which states that whenever the occurrence of an event x would have
a functional effect φ, the event x will occur. Functional explanations, therefore, are but
deductions from law-like schemes having the following form:
If it is the case that if an event or fact of type E were to occur at t1, then it would
bring about an event or fact of type F at t2,
Then an event or fact of type E occurs at t3. (Cohen, [1978] 2000; 260)
As one can readily see, Cohen’s account of functional explanation makes it nothing but
a variant of the covering-law model of explanation, whereby covering laws are instanced
by what Cohen calls “consequence laws” that correlate the occurrence of an event with its
consequences.
As Kincaid (1996) has argued, Cohen’s account of functional explanation is inadequate
for the same reasons that the covering-law model is, namely, that it replaces causation
with other kinds of relations such as the correlation of events and their consequences. For
Kincaid, what makes such substitution problematic is that it does not make functional
explanation robust with respect to spurious correlations, since correlation alone is not
enough to establish causation, as per the well-known dictum. Accordingly, Kincaid puts
forward a different account of functional explanation that takes the cue from L. Wright’s
(1973, 1976) “consequence-etiological” model. On this account, functional explanation is a
conjunction of three components that must be jointly satisfied for the resulting explanation
to be a valid one:
(1) A causes B;
(2) A persists because it causes B;
(3) A is causally prior to B.
Within this scheme, condition (2) is introduced for the purpose of excluding spurious corre-
lation through an explicitly causal statement of the relationship between a fact’s persistence
and its functional effects. In a similar fashion, Little (1991) has argued that functional
explanation can be valid on the condition that the causal history of functions be available,
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lest the explanation prove defective. Accordingly, Little provided a model of functional
explanation that is logically equivalent to Kincaid’s. Let P be a social practice in a society S
and B the benefit it confers to S. Then, a functional explanation for the persistence of P in
S would correspond to the following scheme:
(1) P persists in S;
(2) P has the disposition to produce B in the circumstances of S;
(3) P persists in S because it has the disposition to produce B. (Little, 1991;
94)
Like Kincaid’s condition (2) above, Little’s requirement (3) that “P persists in S because
it has the disposition to produce B”must be satisfied for the explanation to be a causal—
and therefore acceptable—one. Much like Kincaid acknowledges that the causal condition
“does much of the work” (Kincaid, 1996; 111), Little characterizes it as an outright “causal
explanation establishing the postulated functional relationship” (Little, 1991; 91). Such
remark is indeed a crucial one, in that it suggests that functional explanation per se is no
explanation after all, the entire explanatory work lying with the lower-level causal relation
that in turn explains functional relations.
Most relevantly for the present purposes, the requirement of causal relations is tantamount
with the requirement that a causal mechanism be detailed in order for a causal explanation
to be valid. As Little writes:
The causal history requirement above is often the most difficult to satisfy in defending a functional
explanation for it is almost always possible to come up with some beneficial consequences of a
given social feature. Therefore to justify the claim that the feature exists because of its beneficial
consequences we must account for the mechanisms that created and reproduced the feature in
a way that shows how the needs of the system as a whole influenced the development of the
institution. (Little, 1991; 98–99)
The same point had effectively been already raised by Jon Elster in his critique of Cohen, and
of functionalism in the social sciences in general (Elster, [1979] 1984, 1980, 1982, 1983). Like
Little, Elster derives the requirement for a causal mechanism from functional explanation
in biology. Functional explanation, Elster argues, may succeed in biology because it can
demonstrate that a “feedback loop” operates from the consequence of a phenomenon to the
occurrence of the phenomenon itself, as per criterion (5) below:
An institution or a behavioural patternX is explained by its function Z for group
Z if and only if:
(1) Y is an effect of Z;
(2) Y is beneficial for Z;
(3) Y is unintended by the actors producing X;
(4) Y—or at least the causal relation between X and Y—is unrecognized by
the actors in Z;
(5) Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through Z. (Elster, 1983;
57)
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The functional theory of evolution through natural selection adapting a species to its envi-
ronment, for instance, is a scientifically acceptable one in that “natural selection” provides
such a feedback loop: natural selection, for instance, is capable of causally explaining the
the survival of an asexually reproducing species in terms of the random emergence of a
mutation within a population of that species that yields higher reproductive capacity, thus
allowing that mutation to spread within the population and therefore to be preserved (Elster,
1983; 49–55). Lacking an analogous to such mechanisms, Elster argues, Cohen’s defence of
historical materialism and Cohen-style functional explanation in the social sciences are in a
“pre-Darwinian” or “Lamarckian” stage, a fact that Cohen himself acknowledges (Elster,
1980, 1983; Cohen, 1982b, 1982a).
The point is that, for Elster, the lack of such causal mechanisms leaves open the possibility
that an external causal factor explains both the occurrence of a phenomenon and its function,
just like Darwin was able to explain—contra Lamarck—that natural selection caused giraffes
to develop a long neck and why giraffes feed predominantly on leaves from tall acacia trees.
The Lamarckian explanation that the species giraffe developed a long neck because of the
utility of that feature in relation to its diet is, therefore, a non-causal explanation, and indeed
an invalid one that proves to be a pseudo-explanation. As Elster categorically concludes: “I
am simply at a loss to see why functional explanation should be of interest over and above
the particular mechanisms that may justify it in any given case” (Elster, 1980; 126).
Revealingly, Elster’s critique of functional explanation in the social sciences was one of
the earlier advocacies of mechanism-based explanation. As mentioned above, the philosophy
of biology provided a prominent source of inspiration for defending the explanatory power
of mechanisms in the social sciences, and the idea that the mechanism is required to fulfill
a causal requirement served just the purpose of ruling out consequence explanation (i.e.
functional explanation in Cohen’s form) and covering-law explanation alike as altogether
non-explanatory. Whatever the formal similarities between covering-law explanation and
consequence explanation, the reason why they are demanding from a mechanism-based
point of view is not that they share some puzzling logical feature that makes them inadequate
to capture a commonsensical or operational understanding of explanation. Rather, the
argument from mechanisms holds that whatever practical or formal inadequacies one may
identify in such models of explanation points to a deeper-level lack of a causal account
of the explanandum, which then proves to be the ultimate defining feature of any proper
explanation. The general attitude of mechanism advocates towards covering laws can be
summarized through Bunge’s (1997) contention that while covering laws and mechanisms
are formally compatible with one another, the former make for incomplete explanations.
In order for them to be “truly explanatory”, they must refer to the causal mechanism that
produces the regularities they describe; this implies the view that regularities per se are
non-explanatory in a causal sense. The whole point of mechanism-based explanation, in
short, seems to be based on an understanding of scientific explanation in fundamentally
causal terms.
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4. Causal realism versus causal eliminativism
Although Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) consider it one of the advantages of the mechanism-
based account of explanation that it is not tied to any specific theory about the nature
of causation, they nonetheless acknowledge that some constraints can be put as to what
theory is acceptable within the mechanism framework. For instance, most critics of the
use of covering laws in social explanation seem to agree that law-like accounts presuppose
a regularity view of causation that is incompatible with the causal underpinnings of the
mechanism approach. This view is so tightly associated with the thought of David Hume
that it is often referred to as simply the Humean view of causation. The reason for this lies
in a number of statements in which Hume defines causation in epistemic terms as the result
of experiencing the repeated co-occurrence of two events. In his Treatise, for instance, Hume
writes:
A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of
the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a
more lively idea of the other. Hume ([1738] 1978; 170, emphasis in the original)
What is especially distinctive about this view across the many variants of “the Humean
view” is its eliminativism about causation. The choice between realism and eliminativism is
a fundamental one for theories of causation. Interestingly, eliminativist and realist positions
may be further distinguished into realist or eliminativist positions about causal laws and
realist or eliminativist positions about causal relations altogether, depending on the extent
to which causation is accorded or denied existence. On the realist view, causal relations
(or even causal laws) are taken to be analytically basic and not susceptible of being further
analyzed in terms of more ontologically fundamental relations (such as, say, accidental
uniformities, or counterfactual dependence); conversely, eliminativists tend to conceive of
causal relations and/or laws as supervenient on more primitive relations between events or
states of affairs (Tooley, 1990a). The Humean view clearly falls within the most radical
wing of the latter camp. In the regularity view, causation is not regarded as a real feature of
the world. For the world is made up solely of atomistic, discrete, and unrelated events that
(jointly) occur with a certain degree of regularity: no underlying relation can be invoked to
further explain those regularities. Quite on the contrary, those regularities are taken to be
as ontologically fundamental as the very events they involve—or, in Hume’s parlance, the
“objects”. Causation, therefore, is at best an epistemological device which nonetheless is
formed, as Hume put it, only in the mind of the observer.
Whether or not the regularity view can be said to be altogether anti-realist is a debated
issue, and even more so is Hume’s supposed anti-realism. Hume’s own positive use of
expressions such as “necessary connexion”, “secret power”, and “inviolable connexion”
has led some to see it as problematic to assimilate him in the anti-realist camp, and indeed
to question whether “the Humean view” actually corresponds to the Humean view (see
e.g. Kemp Smith, [1941] 2005; J. P. Wright, 1983; Buckle, 2001; Strawson, [1989] 2014).
These authors generally regard Hume as a sceptical realist, i.e. one for which any causally
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productive relations underlying the experienced regularities can be postulated, or at least
presupposed, even though their true nature remains hopelessly hidden from us. Arguing
along the same lines, the regularity view’s seeming anti-realism can be contested, too. It is safe
to assume, for a start, that regularity theorists would be unembarrassed to commit to realism
about entities, phenomena or, for that matter, regularities. Yet whether such realism requires
postulating something more primitive than regularities which underwrites them is an entirely
different story (see Table 5.). While Strawson ([1989] 2014; 23) has labelled the idea that
there is nothing about the world in virtue of which it is regular “absurd” and “dogmatically
anti-realist”, he nonetheless acknowledged that there is no “conclusive evidence” for taking
any further ontological step beyond a metaphysics of mere regularities (Strawson, 1987;
264), nor is it conducive to metaphysical inconsistency (see e.g. Beebee, 2006).
(Humean) causal eliminativism Causal realism
Events X X
Regularities X X
Causal processes X
Table 2.1: Realism vs. eliminativism about causation.
It is also true, however, that the price of such “epistemological humility” (Strawson,
1987; 264) includes a considerable degree of scepticism about causation itself, which has
led regularity theorists to be cavalier about the notion of causation: even before the logical
empiricists attempted to replace the concept of causation with that of logical deduction or
probability for explanatory purposes, Bertrand Russell (1912–1913; 1) famously dismissed
causality as “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erro-
neously supposed to do no harm”. Thus, even setting aside the question as to whether the
regularity view is altogether anti-realist, it is safe to consider it a plainly eliminativist view
about causation.
The link between covering laws and causal eliminativism is not a necessary one. Genuinely
realist arguments for the existence of causal laws can certainly be provided; David Armstrong
(1983), among others, put forth an influential account of laws of nature as relations of
necessitation between whole kinds of properties or relations, or universals. If universals
can be granted real existence, the argument goes, then nomic relations can be assumed to
actually exist between two universals F and G to the effect that some particular a being
F necessitates that particular a being also G. Within this framework, causation can be
described as the instantiation of laws between particular states of affairs: given a nomic
relation between F and G, a acquiring the property F can be said to properly cause a to
acquire the property G. Note, however, that this realist approach is strongly opposed to the
ontology of regularities considered so far, according to which nothing exists beyond states of
affairs and hence no ontological difference can be posited between accidental regularities and
nomic relations instantiated in causation. For one thing, Armstrong’s nomological realism
entails that laws can be ascertained directly and non-inferentially, since laws are fully present
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in singular causal instances and, by definition, no causation proper can occur without a
covering law. On the other hand, the way in which a number of research traditions are
often regarded as exemplifying the covering-law model in social and political analysis clearly
suggest their leaning towards a regularity view of causation rather than a necessitarian one:
allegedly covering-law explanations in social and political research typically make use of
variable-oriented methods to establish probabilistic correlations rather than causal laws.
In principle, Armstrong’s account can be extended to accommodate probabilistic laws by
allowing for relations of “nomic probabilification” (Armstrong, 1978a; 158–159). Other
proponents of a similar theory of nomological realism, like Tooley, have argued that causation
proper occurs only between singular events; laws between universals merely retain the
“direction” of causation, which Tooley understands as a “transmission of probabilities” from
causes to effects (Tooley, 1987, 1990b). It would seem, however, that to the extent that social
and political explanations make reference to covering laws, these are best interpreted as
regularities rather than as laws of nature that really exist and govern the relations between
universals. Lijphart’s (1971) and Smelser’s ([1976] 2013) seminal advancements in the
statistical method for comparative research, for instance, are explicitly presented by their
proponents as an approximation to the “Joint Method of Agreement and Difference” that
Mill ([1843] 1974) prescribed to natural scientists. Like his other “Methods of Experimental
Inquiry”, Mill’s own statement of the “Joint Method” prescribes that causes be identified in
terms of their regular occurrence in conjunction with the phenomenon identified as their
effect:
If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common,
while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence
of that circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect,
or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. (Mill, [1843] 1974; 396)
Mill’s choice of wording strongly suggests that some form or another of the regularity
view of causation is presupposed in his “Joint Method”. It is also true, however, that all
of Mill’s “Methods of Experimental Inquiry” are intended as guidelines for ascertaining
causes empirically, not as metaphysical definitions of them. A committed empiricist, Mill
himself is highly sceptical about the claim that causation implies “a mysterious and most
powerful tie, such as cannot, or at least does not, exist between any physical fact and that
other physical fact on which it is invariably consequent” (Mill, [1843] 1974; 326). Yet no
such metaphysical scepticism is strictly required or logically necessary for the purposes of his
methods—nor indeed is any metaphysical position at all, as it has been argued above. Indeed,
the vast majority of methods for social and political analysis whose critics identify with
the covering-law model generally focus on issues of explanation rather than causation, and
therefore their proponents tend to be theoretically parsimonious when it comes to grounding
their epistemological inclinations onto a particular causal metaphysics. Yet precisely such
purported metaphysical innocence is the implicit target of the mechanism-based criticism of
covering laws.
As Salmon realized, the claim that laws fail to explain causally rests upon the idea that the
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observed regularities—however well confirmed—cannot be the whole story about causation,
which has led many to dismiss causation talk altogether in addressing explanatory issues.
Insisting on this point, Mahoney (2001; 575) argued that the problems with the covering-law
model embodied in correlational analyses, as identified by the social mechanism approach,
“are not simply familiar themes such as a correlation fails to represent causation because
it might be spurious or because the time order of correlated variables may not be clear”.
Rather, contributors to the social mechanism tradition generally go so far as to suggest “that
even nonspurious correlations in which the time order of variables is well-established may
be inherently limited representations of causal processes”. What is being implied here is that
there is more to causation than the covering-law account would allow. This is perhaps most
explicit in the claim that mechanisms explain by opening up the “black box” of statistical
correlations and showing the underlying causal wheel-work—the “cogs and wheels” that
make up the causal chain of events leading up to their outcome. Here, the explanatory focus
is directed to the cogs and wheels of the mechanisms in that they are considered to be the
relevant factors capable of causally producing the outcome to be explained. Implicit in this
idea is a commitment to a realist view of causation according to which causes are, at least in
principle, clearly discernible and, a fortiori, real; conversely, law-like explanations would fail
to acknowledge the reality of causes and hence to adequately portray causation as it occurs.
As Salmon reconstructed in his Four Decades of Scientific Explanation (1989), in the first
decade after the publication of Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) article, the covering-law
model of explanation “was widely accepted by scientifically minded philosophers; indeed,
it qualified handily as the received view” (Salmon, 1989; 4). During the second decade,
however, criticism of Hempel’s comprehensive account of scientific explanation became
increasingly vocal through counterexamples to particular instantiations of the Hempel-
Oppenheim model. Salmon (1989; 46–50; 1992; 20–29) groups them into a number of
different families according to what have long become standard counterarguments to the
Hempel-Opennheim model and which ultimately led to the demise of the covering-law model
as the definitive account of scientific explanation. Revealingly, some of the earliest lines of
criticism to the covering-law model were explicitly expressed in causal terms, and targeted
the inadequacies of law-like explanation by pointing to the presupposed anti-realism about
causation from which they derived. Michael Scriven, for instance, objected to the use of
covering-law explanation of particular events through his famous “ink stain” example:
If you reach for a cigarette and in doing so knock over an ink bottle which then spills onto the
floor, you are in an excellent position to explain to your wife how that stain appeared on the
carpet, that is, why the carpet is stained (if you cannot clean it off fast enough). You knocked the
ink bottle over. This is the explanation of the state of affairs in question, and there is no nonsense
about it being in doubt because you cannot quote the laws that are involved, Newton’s and all the
others; in fact, it appears one cannot here quote any unambiguous true general statements, such
as would meet the requirements of the deductive model. (Scriven, 1962; 198)
For Scriven, what this example shows is that one may have reasons to make a causal claim
without thereby being able to quote laws. This suggests that explanation is not necessarily
coextensive with subsumption under covering-laws, since one may legitimately explain
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singular events by virtue of singular causal claims. Still other counterexamples aimed to
show that covering-law model was explanatorily defective on accounts of its neglect of
causation. Such is the case, for instance, of explanatory asymmetries. Going along with the
covering-law model, Salmon argues, it is possible to deduce the occurrence of a total lunar
eclipse from the relative positions of the earth, sun, and moon at some time after the eclipse
in conjunction with the laws of celestial mechanics that govern their motion. The reason why
this does not seem to qualify as an explanation even though it satisfy the requirements of the
Hempel-Oppenheim model, Salmon concludes, is that some temporal constraints must be
put on explanation—which, incidentally, Hempel (1965a; 353) refuses to do. Yet the reason
why this counts as an objection to anti-realism about causation is that causal relations can
count as asymmetrical temporal relations (Salmon, 1984; 171), and therefore the appeal
to causality does impose the required temporal constraints that prevent the occurrence of
explanatory asymmetries. Intriguingly, Salmon also invokes causal relations to explain the
appearance of explanatory irrelevancies in covering-law explanation, such as the well-known
case in which a man explains his failure to become pregnant by invoking his regularly taking
birth control pills. While such explanation would satisfy the requirement of covering-law
explanations—it is perfectly deducible from a true law stating that “All man who regularly
take birth control pills will not get pregnant”—a requirement of relevance must be met for
such explanation to be a genuine answer to the question: “Why did the man fail to become
pregnant?”—i.e. for it to be an explanation at all. This is because defining explanation in
terms of truth and validity instead of causality allows one to cite as a contributing cause
something which is not (Salmon, 1989; 102–103, 300-301). As in Scriven’s ink stain example,
the singular causes may be cited—indeed, in this case must be cited—to fully explain a given
phenomenon while dispensing with law-like inferences.
Crucially, Salmon concludes from the above that covering laws have no explanatory
role, explanation being best characterized in causal rather than inferential terms. More
importantly, Salmon commits to a realist understanding of causation, which is required to
make sense of temporal asymmetry and relevance in explanation: causes, in other words,
must be conceived of as singular and contributing process that produce a certain outcome.
Such ineliminability of causal relations is required for causal explanation not to be further
analyzable in purely inferential terms and for causality not to be reducible to some underlying
relation of logical dependence. Salmon even makes his causal realism vividly clear in calling
his account of scientific explanation “the ontic conception” as opposed to “the epistemic
conception”, so as to suggest that causal explanation is best characterized in terms of causality
as an ontological feature of the world rather than of merely inferential requirements (Salmon,
1984). Most notably, however, Salmon’s realist theory of causation is also cited as one of the
early defences of explanatory mechanisms. This is because causal interactions are for Salmon
characterized by (spatio-temporal) contiguity and by their ability to transmit a mark, which
are required to make sense of causal explanation to be sensitive to temporal asymmetry and
to relevance. Accordingly, an explanation can be characterized as valid insofar as it traces the
causal process that leads up to the explanandum (Salmon, 1984). Such model of explanation
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Salmon calls the “causal-mechanical”, and in fact, the idea of explanation as process-tracing
is in many relevant respects equivalent to the requirement that a causal mechanism be made
explicit.
5. Social mechanisms and causal realism
While Salmon’s “causal-mechanical” model is explicitly premissed on a realist understanding
of causation, still other authors in the mechanism tradition have explicitly invoked causal
realism in defence of the use of mechanisms for social explanation. Mahoney (2001; 580)
argues for instance that going beyond correlational analysis requires a realist interpretation
of mechanisms to the effect that “the activation of a mechanism actually generates an
outcome”, since only such an account is robust enough as to rule out explanations in terms
of variables increasing or decreasing the probability of having higher or lower values on
an outcome. From a different angle, Hedström (2005; 28) places an explanatory premium
on individual-level mechanisms on grounds that actors and actions are the cogs and wheels
of social mechanisms. This, he argues, follows from a “realist principle” underlying the
scientific rule that “theories should be formulated in terms of the processes that are believed
to have generated the phenomena being studied”. How such realist approach to causation is
to be translated into a specific theory about the nature of causation, however, is once again
the source of substantive disagreement among mechanism advocates. Salmon, for instance,
introduced his own version of a “causal process theory”, which he once summarized through
the following quote by John Venn:
Substitute for the time-honoured “chain of causation”, so often introduced into discussions upon
this subject, the phrase a “rope of causation”, and see what a very different aspect the question
will wear. (Venn, 1966; 320; cited in Salmon, 1980; 67)
The idea that the ultimate nature of causal relations is one of continuous flows or pro-
cesses rather than, as Venn (1966; 320) put it, one “of determinate distinct links following
one another in succession, of stages marked off from one another” has however been put
into question with respect to its ability to provide adequate foundations to mechanism-
based explanation. Hedström and Ylikoski (2010; 53) point out for instance that very
few scientific disciplines outside of some specific sub-fields of physics actually deal with
spatio-temporally continuous processes, and therefore Salmon’s process-centred theory of
causation proves ill-suited to ground the use of mechanisms for social or even biological
explanation. Chakravartty (2007) has recently defended a process-based view of causation
on grounds that only continuous causal processes as opposed to the discrete links of a causal
chain of events can overcome the “contiguity objection” to causal realism. First formulated
by Russell (1912–1913), the objection from contiguity alleges that no two events C and E
can be contiguous because temporal contiguity is incompatible with the baseline notion that
time is dense and compact. For Chakravartty, this objection requires that a coherently realist
theory of causation disposes of proximate causes and conceives of causation as a continuum
rather than as a chain of discrete causal links.
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Hedström and Ylikoski (2010; 53) state quite clearly that “the mechanism-based account
of explanation is not wedded to a specific theory of causation”. Yet they, too, seem to allow
for some constraints to be put on acceptable causal ontologies. Building on their critique to
Salmon, they write that “a more natural complement to the mechanism-based approach”
would seem to be a manipulative-interventionist theory according to which causation can be
described as a relation of counterfactual dependence in terms of its being invariant under
manipulative intervention (such as, e.g., that developed byWoodward, 2002, 2003; Hedström
and Ylikoski, 2010). Such is, for instance, the proportional relation between the frictional
force of a block sliding down an inclined plane and the normal force exerted by the surface
of the plane perpendicular to the direction of motion of the block: such relation can be
considered as causal on grounds that it supports counterfactuals, viz. it will hold without
variations even if one modifies the inclination of the plane or the materials of which the
block and the plane are made (Woodward, 2002).
Hedström and Ylikoski seem to suggest that Woodward’s account alone is insufficient
to provide a causal basis for the mechanism approach. The latter, they write, “differs
fromWoodward’s approach by its emphasis on the importance of opening up black boxes
and making explicit the causal cogs and wheels through which effects are brought about”
(Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; 54). This may sound misleading in the light of the authors’
clear-cut distinction between the goal of the mechanism approach and the definition of
causation, since this passage seems to suggest that the mechanism approach has something to
say about how causation operates. Yet this is entirely consistent with what has been argued
in the preceding sections. If the adoption of the mechanism approach is to be preferred
over covering-law accounts on the basis of a realist position about causal explanation, some
non-eliminativist theory of causation is required to replace the regularity view. It is not
entirely clear, however, whether a manipulative-interventionist approach alone could fulfil
this task. Manipulative intervention is taken to be explanatory on accounts of its ability to
support counterfactuals. In this way, however, causation is reduced to what is believed to be
a stronger relation, namely, counterfactual dependence.
Not too dissimilarly, Mahoney defends mechanism-based explanations on the basis of a
theory of causes as relations between necessary or sufficient conditions, as detailed in Ragin’s
([1987] 2014, 2000) work. As comparative studies in political research show, and contrary
to what the use of regression analysis in comparative research presupposes, Ragin points
out that causation hardly occurs homogeneously across different instances. For the same
phenomenon (e.g. land hunger, sometimes treated as a causing variable) may or may not
concur in bringing about a certain outcome (e.g. peasants rebellion) depending on the factors
it occurs in conjunction with (e.g. commercialization of agriculture, or lack thereof). In fact,
the same outcome may happen in different settings in the absence of any recurring condition,
suggesting that a whole combination of conditions is causally required for the outcome,
and not any of the independent individual variables correlating with a change in outcome
(Ragin, [1987] 2014). In Ragin’s version, therefore, causes are combinations of conditions
that are sufficient for an effect to be brought about. Of course, this begs the question of
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how sufficiency is defined. One may be tempted, for instance, to interpret sufficiency in
counterfactual terms as in: a certain set of conditions would regularly produce a given
outcome in all possible settings. In this case, however, we would fall back to the sophisticated
regularity theory detailed in the previous paragraph. Mackie ([1974] 1980), the main source
for Ragin’s theory, also seems to have in mind a refined version of the regularity view in
providing his account of causation in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Famously, Mackie
(1965, [1974] 1980) describes causes as at least INUS conditions, i.e. as Insufficient but
Non-redundant (viz. necessary) parts of an Unnecessary but Sufficient set of conditions for
the effect. Importantly, the fact that causes must be at least INUS conditions implies that they
can be sufficient conditions, necessary conditions, or both. Yet for Mackie such conditions
are still to be characterized in terms of regularities: the regularity view, he argues, has the
merit of not relying on “the mystery of a special sort of regularity, a ’nomic universal’, to
account for the ability of causal laws to sustain counterfactual conditionals” (Mackie, [1974]
1980; 60). Accordingly, he describes necessity and sufficiency in terms of co-occurrence:
“X is a necessary condition for T” will mean that whenever an event of type T occurs, an event
of type X also occurs, and “X is a sufficient condition for T” will mean that whenever an event
of type X occurs, so does an event of type T . (Mackie, [1974] 1980; 62)
Following Mill, Ragin insists that the same event may be brought about by a wide range of
combinations of particular conditions, none of which recurs in more than one instance, and
the capacity to account for this he presents as the main advantage of a multicausal approach.
Also drawing on Mill, Mackie ([1974] 1980; 64) argues that in these cases where one effect is
caused by non-overlapping conjunctions of conditions—say, ABC,DGH , or JKL—it is the
whole disjunction of such conjunctions—(ABC or DGH or JKL)—that does the causing.
It is in this sense that Mackie speaks of such disjunctions as “complex regularities” and to
the extent that these are arguably the most distinctive contribution of his theory of causation,
this can in turn be characterized as a refined version of the regularity view.
6. Causal realism and productive causation
Luckily, the appeal to regularities—whether in a counterfactual or complex form—is by
no means the only possible complement either to Hedström and Ylikoski’s account of
mechanisms or to Mahoney’s appeal to Ragin’s multicausality. At this point, however, one
might wonder how a properly realist causal ontology is to be qualified. In this respect, it is
perhaps worth referring to a fundamental distinction between two varieties of causation,
namely, causation as dependence and causation as production. As N. Hall (2004; 225)
has it, this distinction is essentially one between causation understood as a relation of
counterfactual dependence and a theory of causes as factors that help to generate or bring
about or produce an effect. Hall (2004; 256, 265) acknowledges that production seems
to be the more “central” causal notion, yet he believes this on the basis of a deliberately
restricted account of production, which he defines as “the ancentral of proximate causation”.
He further acknowledges that counterfactual dependence and productive causation often
CHAPTER 2. PRODUCTIVE CAUSATION AND POLITICAL EXPLANATION 44
coincide in practice, yet he takes this to reinforce rather than undermine the autonomy of
counterfactual causation. Accordingly, he takes the two variants to be distinct and mutually
irreducible kinds of causation.
As with manipulative-interventionist theories, however, counterfactual dependence theo-
ries of causation tend to come down to the regularity view, since some degree of uniformity
between actual and counterfactual states of affairs is required for the latter to be mean-
ingful. This is the route followed by David Lewis in his classic treatment of causation as
counterfactual dependence (Lewis, 1973a). Revealingly, in his paper Lewis draws on Hume’s
([1777] 1975) counterfactual definition of causation, whereby Hume posits a cause to be “an
object, followed by another, and … where, if the first object had not been, the second never
had existed” (Hume, [1777] 1975; 76). Such definition Hume overtly meant to be a mere
rephrasing of his regularity-based definition of a cause as “an object, followed by another,
and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second”
(Hume, [1777] 1975; 76). Unpersuaded by this equation, Lewis opens his essay with a quote
of Hume’s two-fold definition, and interprets causal relations to be of a counterfactual nature
in that “[w]e think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it
makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it. Had it been absent,
its effects—some of them, at least, and usually all—would have been absent as well”. It is
to provide an analysis of causation thus defined that he resorts to the semantics of possible
worlds. In a seminal paper, Stalnaker (1968) had defended the thesis that counter-to-fact
conditional statements are false in the actual world but have a positive truth value in a
possible world that otherwise “differs minimally” from the actual one (Stalnaker, 1968;
102). Building on this, Lewis provided a now standard analysis of causal statements as
counterfactual conditionals: C causes E if, in the world closest to actuality where C does
not occur, E does not occur either.
Lewis’ “closest to actuality” clause, like Stalnaker’s “minimal difference” clause, is of
course required for the truth of conditional—and therefore causal—statements to be mean-
ingful in the actual world. Suppose we are to interpret a causal relation of the form “Striking
the match caused it to light” in counterfactual terms as equivalent to the subjunctive con-
ditional “Had the match not been struck, then it would not have been lit”. We might well
imagine a possible world in which the match did light despite its not having been struck,
e.g. because a lightning struck it. This would make the conditional statement “Had the
match not been struck, then it would not have been lit” false, and therefore we may be led
to reject also the causal statement “Striking the match caused it to light”. Plainly, this is not
a satisfactory analysis of the causal relation as occurred in the actual world. To overcome
this, a constraint can be put on possible worlds to the effect that the only difference between
the actual world and the possible world under consideration must be the striking of the
match. Such is Lewis’ closest-to-actuality clause. To be sure, such ranking of possible worlds
rests, in Lewis’ words, on a primitive relation of comparative over-all similarity which makes
alternative worlds mutually comparable. The overall interpretation of causation as a relation
of counterfactual dependence, therefore, depends entirely on the existence of such primitive
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relation of similarity. In a later article, Lewis (1979) provides a definition of similarity suited
to his analysis of causation in terms of counterfactual dependence that is based on “laws”.
Two worlds, the argument goes, are more similar to one another the less violations of laws
occur between them. Or, in other words, two worlds are similar insofar as they are governed
by the same laws. In what has come to be known as the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of
laws, Lewis (1973b, 1986e) adopts Ramsey’s ([1928] 1990) view (originating in Mill ([1843]
1974; Book III, Chapter IV, Section 1)—that laws are “consequences of those propositions
which we should take as axioms if we knew everything and organized it as simply as possible
in a deductive system” (Ramsey, [1929] 1978; 138). For Lewis, laws are generalizations that
are simple and strong—i.e. informative—enough to serve as axioms for deductive system.
Qua generalizations, therefore, laws are regularities, and the whole Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view
of laws is, in Lewis’ words, “a regularity theory of lawhood” (Lewis, 1986e; 122).
Indeed, Lewis’ overall work on causation and counterfactuals can be interpreted, in
the author’s own words, as “a prolonged campaign on behalf of Humean supervenience”
(Lewis, 1986c; ix). The supervenience part of this doctrine holds that any two worlds
matching in laws, causal connections, and the like must also match in all matters of particular
fact. This thesis is warranted by a Humean view according to which all there is about a
world are particular facts, or combinations thereof (Lewis, 1986a; 111). In this sense, the
counterfactual theory of causation can be viewed as a sophisticated version of the regularity
view. The fact is that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of laws is the dominant approach to a
counterfactual theory of causation, the other main alternative being the nomic realism of
the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory briefly discussed above (Beebee, 2000, 2006). On the
Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong view, necessitarian relations are real relations between universals
rather than merely nominal relations that supervene on regularities. As we have seen, however,
hostility towards laws in social science explanation derives from the necessary anti-realism
of statistical correlations. Most explanation in empirical science is, to use Hempel’s jargon,
of an “inductive” rather than “deductive” nature. In other words, the “laws” that feature
in covering-law explanations, especially as far as social science is concerned, are usually
statistical correlations that arise from well-confirmed and empirically observed regularities.
This also makes it difficult to interpret such correlations as probabilistic laws by virtue of
their inherently statistical character. The Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong view allows for relations
between universals can be probabilistic as “universals which are instantiated only in the
cases where the probability is realized” (Armstrong, 1983; 129, emphasis in the original).
Nonetheless, this does not allow for probabilistic laws to support causal inference, and in
his refined account Tooley (1987, 1990b) explicitly characterizes probabilistic laws as non-
causal relations that merely retain a “transmission of probabilities” between universals. Such
view is clearly ill-suited to account for covering laws as they are employed in social science
explanation. Not only does the statistical nature of covering laws exclude the possibility
of a necessitarian as opposed to merely probabilistic interpretation of the link between
the variables designating the correlated events; insofar as they aim to capture causal links
between particular—if recurring—events, such laws are meant to explain by virtue of their
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being regular co-occurrences of particular events rather than probabilistic laws.
If the viability of law-like explanation in the social science is to be discarded on accounts
of its anti-realism, the nomic realism of the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong view is no use. We are
thus left with the sophisticated regularity view of theMill-Ramsey-Lewis theory of laws as the
only viable complement to a counterfactual-dependece theory of causation. It would seem,
therefore, that identifying causation as a relation of counterfactual dependence inevitably falls
back into the regularity-based eliminativism about causation that underwrites the standard
Hempelian account. This is indeed the inevitable outcome of any attempt to redescribe
causation in terms of a logical relation, a shared feature of the traditional covering-law model
of explanation and of Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation. Ruth Groff (2017) seems
to have something like this in mind when she evokes a distinction between productive and
passivist theories of causation. The idea that causation is productive, Groff writes, “assumes
that activity, or doing, is an irreducible feature of the world”; conversely, the passivist
view sees causation as a matter of rational or logical necessitation, empirical regularity, or
counterfactual dependence, but not activity or doing—at least not as irreducible to other,
“passive” relations. On the basis of what has been argued in the preceding paragraphs, this
distinction largely overlaps with N. Hall’s (2004) between causation as dependence and
causation as production: in discussing counterfactual dependence, Groff too points out that
“the appeal to alternative worlds that underwrites counterfactual dependence is simply an
appeal to regularity across a larger canvas” (Groff, 2017; 8). In this sense, counterfactual
dependence rests on the passive—i.e. non-causally-generative—notion of regularity as a mere
collection of given facts.
Crucially, Groff introduces this distinction for the purpose of assessing realism about
causal mechanisms. Anti-realists, she argues, entertain an utterly instrumentalist notion of a
mechanism as nothing more than a metaphor for variables, while realists take mechanisms to
identify actual entities and their properties. Yet insofar as purported realists adopt a passivist
view of causation, their position is virtually indistinguishable from instrumentalist anti-
realism. This can be seen most clearly if counterfactual theories of causation likeWoodward’s
manipulative interventionism are taken to provide a satisfactory and exhaustive causal basis
for the mechanism approach. In this case, Groff (2017; 8) argues, “the realism about the
mechanism is negated by the passivism about causation, which leaves the mechanism inert”.
Hedström and Ylikoski themselves seem to acknowledge that there is more to the causal
part of a mechanism than mere counterfactual dependence. As they write:
A simple causal claim tells us about counterfactual dependency: It tells us what would have
happened if the cause had been different. The mechanism tells us why the counterfactual depen-
dency holds and ties the relata of the counterfactual to the knowledge about entities and relations
underlying it. (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; 54)
If the mechanism approach is to be defended on the basis of realism about causal explanation,
therefore, some productive account of causation would seem to be indispensable.
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Conclusion
Rather than a fully-fledged metaphysical theory, the view of causation as production serves
as a general rule about what causation can or cannot be by the standards of scientific realism.
What the productive view postulates is, at most, the notion that causal processes ought be
seen as metaphysically primitive instead of supervenient on more or less regular patterns
of unrelated events. To state the contrary is tantamount to endorsing an eliminativist view
of causation which prescribes that causal explanation conforms to the Humean view on
which—contrary to much social science—the covering-law model depends.
On this view, manipulative interventionism, fuzzy set methodology, and even the search
for statistical correlations may well be operational methods for discovering causal relations,
but not theories about the nature of causal relations themselves. In the next chapter, I will try
to substantiate the productive view of causation by linking it with the philosophical literature
on causal powers as well as with metaphysical theories about dispositional properties. Causal
processes, it will be argued, can be thought of as the materialization of the causal properties
of individual entities. The ascription of such causal properties is in fact required to make
sense of causal processes as concrete relations as well as to account for the contextual, non
law-governed way in which events occur. The mechanism-based model of explanation can
itself be shown to demand reference to the causal properties that allow entities to interact
with one another like the cogs and wheels of a machine.
Pushing scientific realism from causal processes to causal properties allows us to extrap-
olate a theory of scientific objects from realism about causation. This will be shown to be a
theory about individual and heterogeneous entities which are characterized by their particular
and contingent properties. In the remainder of the work, the identification of politics as a
domain of scientific objects will thus be characterized as the outcome of the classification of
such entities into typologies according to a “family resemblance” mode of analysis: because
social entities are metaphysically heterogeneous, grouping them into homogeneous classes
must depend on some stipulation about the family resemblances between their properties.
Multiple and equally valid definitions of the objects of politics can therefore result depending
on what counts as “family resemblance”. Providing criteria on which one can assess those
definition will be the ultimate goal of this work.
Chapter 3
The nature of social science objects
Dispositions are as shameful in many eyes as preg-
nant spinsters used to be—ideally to be explained
away, or entitled by a shotgun wedding to take the
name of some decently real categorical property. It
is time to remove this lingering Victorian prejudice.
Dispositions, like unmarried mothers, can manage
on their own.
David Hugh Mellor (1974)
Introduction
Ruth Groff (2017) takes the productive theory of causation to be altogether coextensive with
a “power-based” approach, i.e. an understanding of the nature of causation as consisting of
dispositional properties, or powers, by virtue of which causal production is generated. In
what follows, I shall motivate this claim on the basis of the demands of realist models of
explanation. The demand for a causal mechanism, for instance, can only be coped with by
referring to the causal properties in virtue of which the entities that make up the mechanisms
interact to produce a certain outcome.
The link between mechanisms and powers has a long history. As mentioned, the idea of a
mechanical philosophy dates back to the seventeenth-century debate on natural philosophy.
The term itself was popularized by prominent scientist and philosopher Robert Boyle, whose
pioneering work also tried to combine the new mechanistic image of the world with a causal
ontology that owed much to the Aristotelian notion of “powers”. A critic of the concept of
natural laws as a moral notion that he deemed ill-suited to describe the clockwork of the
natural world, in his work Boyle conceived of bodies—both animated and inanimated—as
infused with God-given powers capable of setting other bodies into motion and thus trigger
mechanical causation. At the inception of mechanical philosophy, the power-based ontology
of causation introduced by the likes of Boyle, Locke, and Thomas Reid rapidly became so
popular that Mill ascribed it to “the schools of metaphysics most in vogue at the present
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moment”, but it gradually fell out of favour under the blows of the empiricists’ causal
scepticism only to be revived in the second half of the twentieth century.
Aside from the specifically mechanistic understanding of causal production, however,
causal realism defines causal explanation as an account of why an event happened as it
happened; while causal processes alone can explain change, to explain how such change
occurs one needs to make reference to the causal properties by means of which an object is
disposed to act in a certain way. It is in the attempt to fulfil the demand for causal mechanisms
through reference to properties that some realists elliptically invoke the “powers” of ancient
metaphysics. In the following sections I aim at showing that such power-based ontology
complements the productive view of causation as it is advocated in causal realism. Section
1 will clarify the sense in which the unobservable properties that define the metaphysical
structure of entities can be invoked to flesh out the notion that phenomena are produced by
real-world causal processes. Section 2 will argue that some reference to the causal structures
of entities is required to make sense of causal processes as concrete rather than formal
relations (section 2.1), to contrast causal processes with regularities (section 2.2), and to
detail the causal mechanisms that most realist models of social explanation require (section
2.3).
Section 3 will then introduce the current metaphysical debate on dispositional properties.
Causal properties are often invoked in epistemological theories about causal explanation,
and therefore they are often referred to as “causal powers” in order to emphasize their
causally productive role. Qua properties, however, the structural components of individual
entities are more appropriately referred to as “dispositions”. Having argued that some
properties must have a dispositional character in order to avoid a Humean metaphysics,
section 4 will explore the nature of dispositional properties quite apart from their role in
causal explanation. Specifically, dispositions will be shown to provide a theory of scientific
objects as “powerful particulars”, as per Harré and Madden’s phrase.
This will provide the ground for the realist theory of scientific objects that will be detailed
in chapters 4 and 5.
1. Productive causation and dispositions
The link between a productively realist approach to causation and the commitment to
unobservable “causal properties” is not universally accepted. On one side of the argument,
Galen Strawson, among others, has provided a defence of a theory of causation (which he
calls “Producing Causation”) that is clearly of a productive type: the only viable alternative
to the Regularity view of causation, Strawson argues, is to postulate that part of what it
is for A to cause B is for A to produce B (Strawson, 1987; 256). For Strawson, this is
tantamount to postulating the existence of “objective forces” that govern the productive
action of entities, of which the “fundamental forces” postulated by physics are a prime
example (Strawson, 1987; 254). For this reason, however, Strawson refuses to talk about
“causal powers” altogether: whatever causal powers one may ascribe to entities, his argument
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goes, these derive from those objective forces that do the causing, and therefore are redundant
for a “Producing Causation” theory (Strawson, 1987; 255). Strawson’s allusive reference to
dynamic “forces” whose nature deliberately remains unspecified aligns Strawson’s position
with the causal process theory of Wesley C. Salmon, later championed in a revised form by
Phil Dowe. As we have seen, Salmon’s own brand of causal realism was in considerable
part shaped by the idea that genuine causal processes must be able to transmit a mark, i.e. a
local modification in the structure of things. Welcoming Dowe’s (1992) objections, Salmon
later abandoned the “mark criterion” in favour of Dowe’s theory of “conserved quantity”:
on this view, causal interactions are those processes that propagate causal influence via the
transmission or exchange of a conserved quantity such as e.g. mass-energy, momentum, or
electric charge (Salmon, 1997, 1998; Dowe, 2000). Setting aside for a moment Hedström and
Ylikoski’s (2010) point that continuous, quality-conserving processes may represent what
happens in physical causation but are hardly applicable in the social sciences, one can see
how a conserved quality theory of causation is also ill-suited to accommodate a metaphysics
of causal powers. Conserved quality may very well be thought as a disposition—indeed,
Salmon (1998) speaks of it in terms of propensity—but it is the propagation of it that does the
causing. Like Strawson’s objective forces, Salmon’s and Dowe’s causal processes determine
dispositions to produce, but remain irreducible to them and indeed constitute the very nature
of causation.
Humeanism
Causal realism
Causal process theory Dispositionalism
Events X X X
Regularities X X X
Causal processes X X
Dispositions X
Table 3.1: Varieties of causal realism: causal process theory vs. dispositionalism.
On the other side of the argument, power theorists may defend the existence of powers
in a strong sense while at the same time denying that they play any serious role in causation.
Alexander Bird (2013), for instance, makes the case for maintaining a distinction between
powers and dispositions as two inherently different kinds of properties. While dispositions
are properties that can be ascribed to objects by virtue of such predicates as “being soluble”
or “being fragile”, powers are merely theoretical concepts that designate the essence of an
object implied in it being endowed with dispositions. Such powers are what David Lewis
identifies as the “fundamental physical properties” such as the charges or masses of particles
(Lewis, 1986d; 60). These merely theoretical entities, Bird specifies, are only relevant in
fundamental metaphysics: positing their existence serves the purpose of addressing questions
concerning “what the fundamental entities of the world are, how they relate, and how
they account for the most basic and general features of the world (such as the existence
of facts, the fundamental laws of nature)” (Bird, 2013; 30). As such, however, powers are
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no use in non-fundamental metaphysical projects such as the investigation of the nature of
causation. Powers may very well constitute the features that the world must possess in order
for there to be causal relations, but they do not illuminate the nature of such causal relations
in the slightest. By definition, only non-fundamental properties like dispositions, but not
fundamental properties like powers, belong in the province of non-fundamental metaphysics.
It is dispositions, not powers that contrast the counterfactual theory of causation. This might
sound like a merely terminological quibble, since non-fundamental dispositions may be just
what others, less concerned with distinctions between different metaphysical projects, would
simply call “causal powers”. In fact, however, holding such a distinction leaves the door open
to causal Humeanism as the metaphysical complement to a dispositional theory of causation,
and conversely, to a power-based metaphysics underwriting a counterfactual analysis of
causes. For the veritable oppositions are for Bird that between regularities and powers at the
level of fundamental metaphysics, and that between dispositional and counterfactual theories
of causation at the level of non-fundamental metaphysics. Accordingly, one might conceive
of powers to be “the cement of the universe” without conceding that they account for the
mysterious “necessary connexion” to which Hume alludes and which Humeans abhor.
To be sure, Bird’s view makes for a non-causal metaphysics of powers which nonetheless
can recast the causal focus on dispositions. This, however, imposes some constraints on
a theory of dispositions that is suited to provide a metaphysics to the realist approach to
social explanation. To see this, let us consider two different conceptions of metaphysics.
Jonathan Schaffer (2009) introduces—or more appropriately, re-introduces—an Aristotelian
understanding of the scope of metaphysics in order to counter the dominant view of meta-
physics originating in Quine’s ([1953a] 1961) path-breaking essay On what there is. On
the standard Quinean view, metaphysics is about “what there is”, its task being one of
saying what exists. On the Aristotelian view, by contrast, metaphysics is about substances,
or the fundamental units of being, and therefore its task is to ask what is fundamental, or
what “grounds” what. The reason for terming such view “Aristotelian” lies in the fact that
Aristotles sets out substances (themselves a quintessentially Aristotelian notion) as the object
of hisMetaphysics: “Substance is the subject of our inquiry; for the principles and the causes
we are seeking are those of substances” (Metaph.; 1069a18–19). To better appreciate this
difference, let us consider a locus classicus in Quinean metaphysics, namely the existence
of numbers qua mathematical entities. Questions about the existence of seemingly abstract
entities such as numbers, properties, or meaning are what makes the Quinean metaphysical
task non-trivial, since it goes beyond a commonsensical commitment to the existence of more
ordinary objects like, say, chairs. These questions, however, appear trivial to the Aristotelian
metaphysician, who would see a positive commitment to the existence of mathematical
entities as unproblematic. As far as numbers are concerned, Aristotelians would be interested
in investigating whether numbers are fundamental or derivative, i.e. whether numbers are
primitive or grounded in real entities, their existence being beyond question either way. (As
a side note, contrary to Plato numbers are for Aristotle grounded in concrete substances.)
There is a sense in which the distinction between a (neo-)Aristotelian notion of meta-
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physics and the more traditional understanding of metaphysics as “ontological commitment”
proves relevant for the present discussion. On one hand, Bird’s contention that powers are
of exclusive concern to fundamental metaphysics seems to imply the quasi-Aristotelian idea
that metaphysics is, at least in part, about fundamentals rather than about existence. On the
other hand, however, dispositions as they have been evoked so far seem to fulfill a properly
Quinean task. As Schaffer points out, the two views of metaphysics—the Aristotelian and
the Quinean—are characterized by a method as well as by a task. Famously, the Quinean
method prescribes that we extract existence commitments from our best theories, such as
the explanatory theories of science. So, for instance, we commit to the existence of numbers
because numbers are postulated in mathematics. Similarly, dispositions are invoked in social
theorizing insofar as their existence is required by the supposedly best explanatory theory,
namely the productive theory of causation that underwrites scientific realism as it is instanced
in social science explanation, e.g. in the form of mechanisms.
Yet the analogy must not be pushed too far so as not to become a source of confusion.
In fact, some cautionary words are in order before proceeding any further. To start with,
it is worth remarking that Quine’s method for extracting an ontological commitment is
expressed in purely semantical terms, as per Quine’s famous formula “To be is to be the
value of a bound variable”. Indeed, Quine interprets such variable as bound by an existential
quantifier, so that to say that x esists is to say that “there is an x (∃x) such and such”. None
of these strictures, however, need be added to the present analysis. If dispositions can be said
to answer a question raised by a traditional approach to metaphysics, this is so only at a
superficial level, namely because one can move from explanatory theories to extrapolate
a theory of dispositions. Such move invites no conclusion as to whether the existence of
entities needs be expressed in purely semantical terms, let alone in the form of an existential
quantification.
Furthermore, theories of dispositions per se can fulfill an Aristotelian task as much as a
Quinean one, or even neither task (e.g., they could be invoked to account for dispositional
talk in ordinary language). Aristotle himself seems to allow for a fully causal—and therefore
dispositional—metaphysics of fundamentals when he says that the primary kind of potency
is “an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other” (Metaph.;
1046a10–11). Nowwhat Aristotle calls “potency” (dýnamis) is precisely what Bird designates
with his use of the word “power”, namely, an essential property of substances. It follows
that the causal role fulfilled by dispositions can consistently be addressed within a project
of fundamental metaphysics. Not only could this reintroduce dispositions as part of a neo-
Aristotelian metaphysics; it also limits the extent to which the restrictions that Bird imposes
on the scope of dispositions can be said to derive from his adoption of an Aristotelian view of
metaphysics, since one can always expand fundamental metaphysics so as to include questions
of causation, dispositions, and explanation. To restate the point, therefore, the distinction
betweenArsitotelian and Quinean views of metaphysics only proves relevant to signal the fact
that a metaphysics of dispositions can be seen as the ontological prerequisite of explanatory
theories in the social sciences. Having said so much, let us now turn to dispositions as they
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are actually invoked to underpin a realist approach to causal explanation.
2. Dispositions for causal explanation
2.1. Dispositions for causal realism
In somewhat direct contrast to Salmon’s and Dowe’s process-based disavowal of dispositions,
Chakravartty (2007) has argued that the latter are a necessary complement of a sophisticated
version of scientific realism, which Chakravartty calls “semirealism”. A first-approximation
definition of realism would be some variant of the claim that mature and non ad-hoc scientific
theories describe the nature of a mind-independent world with some accuracy that is bound
to increase over time. Typically, such claim is defended on the basis of what is often referred
to as the “miracle argument” (or “no-miracles argument”), to which Hilary Putnam (1979)
gave the following standard formulation:
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of
science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer (this formulation is due
to Richard Boyd), that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true,
that the same term can refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theories—these
statements are viewed by the scientific realist not as necessary truths but as part of the only
scientific explanation of the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate description of
science and its relation to its objects. (Putnam, 1979; 73)
The naïvely realist position implied by the miracle argument, however, does not make
scientific realism robust with respect to anti-realist criticism. Chakravartty focuses on three
lines of criticism, namely, the objection to the validity of the inference at the basis of the
miracle argument; the possibility that more than one scientific theory account for reality;
and the availability of an equal argument from scientific development that yields opposite
conclusions to the miracle argument. The first of these objections insists on the radical
difference between success and truth: success, the argument goes, may have to do with
such features of a scientific theory as simplicity, elegance, or coherence, but this holds as no
warrant that the successfully accepted theory is the truest description of the portion of the
world it takes into consideration. This has to do with the fact that the miracle argument
is an inference of what Charles S. Peirce calls an “abductive” type, in which the truth of
the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the truth of the premisses (unlike deductive
inferences).
A second objection is associated with the thesis of “the underdetermination of theory by
data” associated with the names of Pierre Duhem ([1906] 1991) and W.V.O. Quine ([1953c]
1961).1 In the many variants of the underdetermination thesis, the aspect that most seriously
threatens the tenability of naïve realism is the suggestion that two mutually contradictory
scientific theories can account for the same piece of evidence, and therefore one cannot
conclude from the explanatory power of a theory to its truth. This is often claimed on the
1. Donald Gillies (1993) has argued that Duhem’s and Quine’s theses differ so significantly that usual reference
to “the Quine-Duhem thesis” is “something of a misnomer” (Gillies, 1993; 98). Here we will simply speak of
“the thesis of underdetermination of theory by data” or “the underdetermination thesis”.
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basis of the Quinean argument that no single scientific claim can be refuted by evidence,
since individual statements are part of a logically interconnected web of statements—the
theory—over which the refutation must be redistributed. It follows that one can always, at
least in principle, readjust a refuted theory through a modification of auxiliary hypotheses
so as to make it consistent with the recalcitrant evidence. At a minimum, therefore, for any
theory that is supported by evidence one can always produce a rival theory that is equally
compatible with the same body of evidence. Yet even if one brackets this extreme and
somewhat controversial part of the argument, one can see that the backbone of the thesis
of the underdetermination of theory by data lies once again in the fact that the truth of a
theory cannot be affirmed with deductive certainty from any positive explanatory feature of
that theory, such as e.g. empirical support by evidence. For the underdetermination thesis
rests upon the fact that it would be an inductive fallacy—namely, the fallacy of affirming the
consequent—to claim that since a theory entails some evidence, then the truth of that piece
of evidence entails the truth of the theory.
Finally, the third objection, much like the miracle argument itself, resorts to an abductive
argument from the history of scientific theories only to arrive at opposite conclusions. The
history of science, the argument goes, offers a large number of examples of theories that
could be deemed successful on any reasonable criteria and yet were not true since, as Boyd
and Putnam put it, their central terms did not refer. The crystalline spheres of ancient and
medieval astronomy, the humoral theory of medicine, the effluvial theory of static electricity,
“catastrophist” geology based on the Biblical tale of the Noachian flood, the phlogiston
theory of chemistry, the caloric and the vibratory theories of heat, the vital-force theories
of physiology, the electromagnetic aether, the optical aether, the theory of circular inertia,
theories of spontaneous generation are all theories that were once well-confirmed and yet
we now believe them to be non-referential (Laudan, 1981; 33). What is important to notice
is that all of these theories have been abandoned in favour of supposedly more referential
theories. Indeed, one can take this to make for a revised Kuhnian argument holding that
scientific development ultimately consists of shifts from an established scientific paradigm to a
newer one that is incommensurable with the former one in that the key scientific terms of each
have different and mutually incompatible referents. Accordingly, one has all reasons to claim
that no matter how mature a scientific theory is at the present state, it will sooner or later be
replaced by a future theory which implies the non-referentiality, and hence the falsehood, of
the current one. This argument is often referred to as “the pessimistic meta-induction” to
tone down the bleak connotation of Putnam’s label “disastrous meta-induction” (Putnam,
1978; 37).
The pessimistic meta-induction, too, is based on the discrepancy between the measure
of scientific success and the truth value of a theory. There are certainly many possible
responses to the way this argument yields a pessimistic meta-induction, such as restricting
the conditions for referentiality or for the maturity of a theory. According to Chakravartty,
however, the above objections correctly point to the need for a selective scepticism as a
corrective to naïve realism. On this selectively sceptical clause, not all aspects of a successful
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and well-confirmed theory can be retained as genuinely referential, since there are good
reasons to believe that some scientific claims will not survive over time. The point, of course,
is to identify precisely which is the referring component of scientific theories. Chakravartty
lists two classical responses to this problem: entity realism and structural realism. As their
names suggest, the two positions stress the mind-independent reality of different components
of a theory, namely, the entities the theory describes and the abstract structures of such
entities. The idea that the entities that are of interest to science are mind-independent is a
rather straightforward one, and indeed entity realism can be seen a sophisticated position
about the referentiality of scientific terms. The whole point of entity realism is to provide
refined criteria to tell genuine and spurious reference apart, such as e.g. the manipulability
of entities. Ian Hacking is a notable advocate of such idea, which he expressed in a famous
formula about the reality of the electrons as emitted by a polarizing gun: “So far as I’m
concerned, if you can spray them then they are real” (Hacking, 1983; 23, emphasis in the
original).
Structural realism is a much more variegated batch of different positions, primarily
because of the different meanings one can attach to the notion of “structure”. In its modern
versions, structural realismmoves from JohnWorrall’s (1989) suggestion, inspired by Poincaré
([1902] 1905), that what is retained when scientific theories are discarded is not their content
(i.e. the supposedly mind-independent entities they refer to) but rather their form or structure,
which is represented by the central mathematical equations of a theory. So, for instance,
when Fresnel’s wave theory of light was superseded by Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory,
reference to an elastic solid ether—necessary for the transmission of wave-like vibrations—
was abandoned and the electromagnetic field was introduced as the new central scientific
entity for the new theory of light. Yet Fresnel’s equations for the relative intensities of
the reflected and refracted light beams were taken over completely into Maxwell’s theory.
The content of optical phenomena, in other words, did not remain the same through the
“paradigm shift”, but the relations between such phenomena—the structure of the theory—
were preserved. Similarly, Newton’s force of gravity was replaced by space-time curvature
in Einstein’s relativity theory, but Newton’s equations continue to function within the new
theoretical framework—albeit describing only “limiting-case” relations such as terrestrial
gravitation (Worrall, 1989).
The problem that Chakravartty detects with structural realism is that mathematical equa-
tions say nothing about the mind-independent nature of the world: they are only informative
about their formal properties. For Chakravartty this makes structural realism too shallow
and weak a proposal for realism. Most importantly for our purposes, structural realism is
unable to substantiate realism about causation, since a purely structural-realist approach to
causation would require for causation to be described as a relation of logical dependence—
specifically, a mathematical relation—which we have already seen to be conducive to causal
eliminativism and therefore to be no causal realism at all. If the structural component is to
be a distinguishing feature of causal realism, this has to be made somehow compatible with
a productive view of causation. In this respect, it is worth following Chakravartty’s line of
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argument one step further, since his own proposal for realism will provide one solution to
this dilemma in a way that also helps elucidate the specific role dispositions play in causal
production.
What Chakravartty calls semirealism is a middle-ground position between entity realism
and structural realism. Selective scepticism, he argues, allows one to affirm the reality of more
than structural realism would allow, namely concrete structures as opposed to merely abstract
ones. Instead of merely describing the formal properties of relations between objects, concrete
structures are also informative about the nature or quality of such relations. Interestingly,
to qualify concrete structures Chakravartty takes the cue from Grover Maxwell’s (1970)
suggestion that causal connections are fully-fledged structural properties. As Maxwell writes:
“Causal connection must be counted among these structural properties, for it is by virtue
of them that the unobservables interact with one another and with observables” (Maxwell,
1970; 17). On semirealism, formal relations are grounded in concrete structures that allow
for such relations to actually refer to mind-independent interactions between unobservable
entities and therefore for realism about structures to become a genuine form of scientific
realism. This requires that one makes reference to the properties of things in the world,
the relations between which are described by the “concrete structures”. This is where
dispositions enter the equation. When it comes to causal realism, one needs to assume
that causal relations count among—indeed, they simply are—those concrete structures that
produce the formal relations on which structural realists center their focus. Yet this requires,
in order for structures to be concrete in any meaningful sense, that these are grounded in the
properties of entities, namely their dispositions to produce events. As Chakravartty puts it:
Why and how do particulars interact? It is in virtue of the fact that they have certain properties
that they behave in the ways they do. Properties such as masses, charges, accelerations, volumes,
and temperatures, all confer on the objects that have them certain abilities or capacities. These
capacities are dispositions to behave in certain ways when in the presence or absence of other
particulars and their properties. The property of mass confers, inter alia, the disposition of a body
to be accelerated under applied forces. The property of a volume on the part of a gas confers, inter
alia, the disposition to become more highly pressurized under applied heat, and so on. It is the
ways in which these dispositions are linked to one another—that is, the ways in which particulars
with various properties are disposed to act in consort with others—that produce causal activity.
Causation, ultimately, has to do with relations determined by dispositions, conferred by causal
properties. (Chakravartty, 2007; 41–42)
2.2. Dispositions against Humeanism
Chakravartty’s case for a dispositional realism about causation proves particularly appropri-
ate here, since the same conclusions can be arrived at via arguments from the inadequacy
of causal Humeanism for scientific explanation and even from the explanatory power of
mechanisms. In her early work, Nancy Cartwright (1983) has directly criticized the miracle
argument for realism which makes “inferences to the best explanation” that conclude from
the explanatory power of a theory to its truth. Explanatory power, Cartwright argues, is
by no means conducive to truth. This is because an essential component of explanation
is the reduction of causal complexity to its more simple components: the law of universal
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gravitation (F = Gmm
′
r2
) is one of the most celebrated achievements of modern physical
theory, and rightly so, on accounts of its manifest explanatory power. Yet it does not correctly
describe how two bodies actually behave when these are, say, charged particles—since in
that case Coulomb’s law would interact with the law of universal gravitation to determine
the final force. Thus, physical laws like the law of universal gravitation do not state the
facts. Such failure to meet the requirement of facticity, however, is precisely what secures
their explanatory power, since it is vital for the success of physical science that, say, the
final force interacting between two charged bodies be reducible to the composition of two
factually inaccurate laws even though neither describes how two charged bodies behave.
This means that explanatory power and truth trade off, since genuinely explanatory laws,
strictly speaking and in Cartwright’s own words, lie (Cartwright, 1983).
This also means that the covering-law model is literally false. The laws that feature in
covering-law explanation are typically empirical generalizations, yet such generalizations are
only true ceteris paribus, i.e. other things being equal. Interfering causes, in other words,
must be absent for law-like generalizations to hold in every relevant context of applicability
without a ceteris paribus assumption. Yet such condition of causal homogeneity hardly ever
obtains in reality, whose causal complexity—along with the possibility of reducing it—is
what makes laws explanatory despite their falsehood. To be sure, statistically established
correlations must reflect genuine causal relations in order for them to have any empirical
import, but such causal relations only hold with respect to the specific test population where
the probability that a certain cause will regularly produce an effect has been actually measured.
Yet causal claims need to reach beyond the test population if they are to acquire explanatory
power and be of any scientific relevance. Consider the example that Cartwright (1989)
derives from Germund Hesslow (1976). Birth-control pills may encourage thrombosis, yet
they may also inhibit it by preventing pregnancy, which itself tends to produce thrombosis. If
we were to establish a causal nexus between birth-control pills and thrombosis by empirically
administering those contraceptives to different test populations, the probability measure
of birth-control pills causing thrombosis would vary according to whether the women in
the test population are pregnant or nor, and whether or not they have a certain chemical in
their body that causes the blood to clot and thereby produces thrombosis. The probability
measure can only be the same ceteris paribus, i.e. if other causing factors such as pregnancy
or the presence of certain chemicals remain unaltered across the test populations (Cartwright,
1989; 99–101).
Statistical correlations, therefore, are true only locally, i.e. relative to the specific context
where they have been established. Not only would law-like generalizations from empirical
correlations make them false (or true ceteris paribus); they will also show that causation is
not reducible to regularity, as Humeans would have it. For causal processes are neither local
nor homogeneous: birth-control pills can either cause or prevent thrombosis depending on
the context in which they act, since they can be responsible for blood clots by favouring the
production of certain chemicals where they would not have otherwise been produced, or
by preventing pregnancies that would have otherwise occurred. Conversely, they may well
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be causally irrelevant with respect to thrombosis if they are used by pregnant women or
by women who already have thrombus-inducing chemicals in their bodies. Causes achieve
heterogeneous effects because causal process occur through the interaction of different causes,
and therefore they are not amenable to regularities. Indeed, the radical difference between
causal processes and regularities also implies that correlations fail to capture the nature of
causation even locally:
What makes the causal law true that [the cause] C causes [the effect] E in [the test population] T is
not the increase in probability of E with C in T , but rather the fact that in T some Cs do regularly
cause Es. The increase in probability is only a sign of that … (Cartwright, 1989; 144–145)
For Cartwright, this invites a tripartite conceptual distinction that allows not only to
differentiate law-like correlations from causal processes, but also causal processes from
causal properties. In Cartwright’s picture outlined above, causal processes occur only locally:
so does, for instance, the causal line leading from the intake of contraceptives on the part of
non-pregnant women to a reduced risk of thrombosis via the prevention of pregnancy as a
risk factor. Yet the same causal property (the contraceptive efficacy of birth-control pills)
may yield a different outcome when acting in conjunction with pregnancy, and yet others
depending on the patient’s individual predisposition to blood clots. Accordingly, causal
properties ought be kept distinguished from causal processes. Crucially, Cartwright thinks
of those causal properties in terms of capacities, a term she chooses in order to indicate
the enduring and stable tendency to bring about a certain outcome carried by properties:
relations like “Aspirins carry the capacity to relieve headache” indicate that the properties of
aspirin carry the capacity to inhibit the enzymes responsible for headache.
Cartwright refuses to discuss the nature of such capacities any further, her goal being to
investigate the empirical method of science and to defend the thesis that causal claims are best
understood in terms of ascriptions of capacities. “Does this mean”, she asks, “that there are
not one but two properties, with the capacity sitting on the shoulder of the property which
carries it? Surely not. However, I cannot yet give a positive account of what it does mean …
My aims … are necessarily restricted, then: I want to show what capacities do and why we
need them” (Cartwright, 1989; 9). Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that capacities clearly
have a dispositional character. Although they are meant to be synonymous with what Mill
calls “tendencies”, Cartwright recognizes the similarity between what she terms “capacities”
and what others call “propensities” or “powers” (the difference being that propensities are
inherently probabilistic and that powers are ascribed to individuals rather than to properties;
Cartwright, 1989; 9). Elsewhere, the notion of “capacity”—itself a possible translation of
dýnamis, Aristotle’s word for “potency”—is associated with Aristotle’s notion of “nature”,
except that the indirect appeal to natures (via capacities) in scientific explanation drops the
Aristotelian concern with natures being essences and that, once again, capacities-natures are
not assigned to individual substances but to collections or configurations of properties, or
structures (Cartwright, 1999; chapter 4). The latter distinction is required for Cartwright
precisely in order to account for the heterogeneous outcomes produced by capacities as
opposed to the homogeneity of causal processes. Consider again the interaction between
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two charged bodies. As we have seen, while such interaction will causally produce a certain
force that results from electromagnetic and gravitational forces, the outcome will change
depending on whether or not the bodies are charged. The capacity to bring about a certain
outcome, therefore, must be ascribed to the property of being charged, and not to the body
itself.
While the ascription of capacities to properties rather than to individual entities and
the conceptual distinction between powers and capacities seem to echo the neo-Aristotelian
metaphysics of grounding as reflected in Bird’s distinction between fundamental powers and
non-fundamental dispositions, Cartwright makes clear that capacities alone are required to
make sense of causal explanation in science. Moreover, Cartwright’s structural understanding
of capacities as assigned to properties converges largely with Chakravartty’s conceptualization
of scientific realism in terms of “concrete structures” grounded in the dispositional properties
of entities. Nonetheless, Cartwright resolutely draws a distinction between capacities and
dispositions, in that dispositions“are tied one-to-one to law-like regularities”, while capacities
“are not restricted to any single kind of manifestation. Objects with a given capacity can
behave very differently in different circumstances” (Cartwright, 1999; 59). This is indeed a
further step towards the qualification of the underlying metaphysics of causal realism, yet
before moving on it is worth pausing to consider a further aspect of Cartwright’s philosophy
of science.
In order to account for how laws are produced from capacities, Cartwright introduced the
notion of a“nomological machine”. A nomological machine is“a fixed (enough) arrangement
of components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable
(enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behaviour
that we represent in our scientific laws” (Cartwright, 1999; 50). Kepler’s laws, for instance,
describe the regularities of planetary motion that are produced by such a nomological
machine whose components are the sun, characterised as a point-mass of magnitude M ,
and the planet, a point-mass of magnitude m, orbiting at a distance r and connected to
the former by a constant attractive force directed towards it (Cartwright, 1999; 51). For
Cartwright, the modelling activity of mathematical sciences like physics and economics can
be viewed as directed towards constructing blueprints for nomological machines, such as the
aforementioned planetary model for Kepler’s laws devised by Newton or the economic model
for the persistence of high rates of unemployment, which is based on assumptions about the
fixed arrangement of the constitutents of the corresponding nomological machine (loss of
skills during unemployment, number of unemployed workers, number of jobs available at a
given time, cost of opening a job).
Although Cartwright does not quite put it this way, nomological machines patently fulfill
the demand for causal mechanisms as made by advocates of mechanism-based explanation.
The analogy with mechanism-based thinking is not limited to the mechanical metaphor
used to describe the production of laws from capacities in terms of the inner workings of
a “machine”. Rather, the use of mechanical language appears in its turn to be justified in
the light of a mechanism-based conception of causal production as being generated by a
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relatively stable arrangement of real, if unobservable, entities whose properties are thus
disposed to regularly generate a certain effect.
2.3. Mechanisms and dispositions
That dispositions are an inherent feature of mechanism-based explanation is an aspect that
has been brought to light by much mechanism-based philosophy of science, most notably
in the Harré-Madden-Bhaskar tradition. Seeking to underwrite causal claims with other
than Humean regularities, Harré and Madden (1975) contend that necessity rather than
regularity is the truth-maker of the conditional statements that analyse causation in terms
of counterfactuals. For them, to oppose the regularity view means to argue that there is
something more than regularities and to accept that necessity is a feature of the world. Harré
and Madden’s (1975) notion of necessity, however, is a natural necessity quite distinct from
the nomological realism of the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong view: natural necessity is of a
lawless kind that does not require for the world to be law-governed. As mentioned, for Harré
and Madden necessity underwrites causal production, yet if it is not laws that govern it,
something else is required. Harré and Madden’s concept of “generative mechanism” fulfills
precisely this role. Generative mechanisms are constituted by powerful particulars—the
relevant causing entities—that produce a series of events and therefore bind together into
a cause-and-effect relation what would otherwise be Humeanly unrelated events. To be
sure, within this framework is the powerful particulars that do the causing, and it is with
them that natural necessity lies. Harré and Madden’s theory of causal powers serves to
explain how properties can be causally necessitating in a non-deterministic (qua lawless) way.
For causal powers to constitute a theory of natural necessity, the ascription of such powers
to entities should allow for them to be instantiated in certain conditions while remaining
uninstantiated in others. This means that the conditions for causal production cannot be
assigned entirely to entities: it is generative mechanisms that determine the conditions for
their production. This also means, however, that Harré and Madden’s “causal powers”
clearly have a dispositional character, in that they do not qualify the intrinsic nature of
entities as much as their properties.
Harré and Madden’s work undoubtedly acted as a major influence on Roy Bhaskar’s
([1975] 2013) seminal treatment of causal powers and mechanisms in scientific explanation.
Like Harré and Madden, Bhaskar straightforwardly identified mechanisms with causal
powers in that they amount to nothing but “the ways of acting of things” (Bhaskar, [1975]
2013; 3). Yet Bhaksar’s theory of mechanisms is the conclusion he draws from what he calls
a “transcendental” argument for realism, i.e. his response to the pseudo-Kantian question:
what must the world be like for science to be possible? According to Bhaskar, the traditional
empiricist answer lies in a Humean ontology entirely exhausted by atomistic facts and
their correlations. Yet for Bhaskar this answer is rebutted by the very premisses of his
transcendental question, namely, that scientific explanation be possible and, as a corollary,
that the experimental activity of science be intelligible. Experiments, he argues, require
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almost by definition that the experimenter be able to interfere with the pattern of events
forthcoming in the laboratory, yet those who identify causation with empirical regularities
fail to take this into account. For reducing causation to regularities rules out the interfering
action of the experimenter, and, as a consequence, provides no guarantees that such causal
relations will hold outside the context of experimental conditions.
This leads Bhaskar to conclude that causes can only be reduced to constant conjunctions
in a deterministic world that may very well correspond to the “closed systems” assumed
under experimental conditions, but not to the fairly uncontroversial and common-sense
picture of a natural world in which natural phenomena can be interfered with (Bhaskar,
[1975] 2013; 23–26). Conversely, the requirement that causal explanations remain true in
“open systems” involves for Bhaskar making “reference to causal agents; that is, to things
endowed with causal powers” (Bhaskar, [1975] 2013; 40, emphasis in the original). Thus,
the answer to the transcendental question, what must the world be like for science to be
possible?, would read something along the following lines:
The world consists of things, not events. Most things are complex objects, in virtue of which they
possess an ensemble of tendencies, liabilities and powers. It is by reference to the exercise of their
tendencies, liabilities and powers that the phenomena of the world are explained. Such continuing
activity is in turn referred back for explanation to the essential nature of things. (Bhaskar, [1975]
2013; 51)
It is such things that constitute the basic causal structure of the world and that Bhaskar calls
“mechanisms” on accounts of their being causally generative.2
Crucially, within this framework mechanisms are understood in quite realist terms as the
most basic level of a stratified ontology. Like Harré and Madden, Bhaskar argues that the
idea that mechanisms correspond to the causal powers of entities also entails that they need
not be actualized in order for them to be real. As he puts it:
It remains true to say of a Boeing 727 that it can (has the power to) fly 600 m.p.h. even if it is
safely locked up in its hangar; just as it would remain true to say of a person that he could (would
be liable to) get hurt if he happened to be in the way of a herd of stampeding buffaloes, even if as
a matter of fact we knew he had no intention of ever going to the Prairies. (Bhaskar, [1975] 2013;
77)
Unlike Harré and Madden, however, and more in tune with Cartwright’s tripartite distinction
among capacities, causal processes, and ceteris paribus laws, Bhaskar concludes that in
2. In the preceding and forthcoming discussion, I am deliberately setting aside the question of “emergent
properties”. In social ontology, the properties that generate—or materialize into—the mechanisms that produce
social phenomena are often ascribed to individuals, or social actors; however, from a metaphysical point of
view the question arises as to whether individuals can be said to constitute the “building blocks” of the social
world. Those who, like Bhaskar ([1979] 2015), defend the idea of “emergent properties” typically conceive of
the properties of individuals as emergent from their micro-structural properties but non-reducible to them—and
perhaps of the properties of social structures (e.g. institutions) as emergent from the properties of individuals
(see e.g. Archer, 1995; Lawson, 2003; Elder-Vass, 2010; Sayer, 2010). Reductionists, on the other hand, deny
emergentism and claim that all allegedly “emergent” properties can be reduced to the properties of the basic
constituents of the (social) world. While reductionism of the agentive properties of individuals to their physical
(neurobiological) properties is rather unpopular in the social sciences, reductionism with respect to the seemingly
autonomous properties of social structures and social “wholes” is the bread and butter of much methodological
individualism. The debate on emergentism, however, does not affect the present discussion on the nature of
properties qua causal properties.
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order for the causal powers of which mechanisms consist to be uninstantiated, they must be
distinct not only from the experiences that allow for them to be identified under experimental
conditions, but also from the very patterns of events that they are capable of generating. What
Bhaskar ([1979] 2015; 14) would later call nature’s “ontological depth” thus presupposes a
threefold ontological layering as represented in the following table:
Domain of Real Domain of Actual Domain of Empirical
Mechanisms X X X
Events X X
Experiences X
Table 3.2: Bhaskar’s overlapping domains of reality. (Bhaskar, [1975] 2013; 46)
Bhaskar’s transcendental argument for realism as well as his stratified ontology are among
his most original contributions to the philosophy of science debate, yet some commentators
noted that these ideas have raised “philosophical suspicions and doubts about their relevance
for the social sciences”, especially since Bhaskar’s followers “have largely tended to repeat or
reformulate often quite cryptic original statements by Bhaskar instead of engaging with recent
developments in the philosophy of science or using the ideas to explain important social
facts” (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; 57). But while there is more than a kernel of truth in
this contention, the relevance of Bhakar’s power-based account of causal mechanisms can be
more fully appreciated by situating it within the bigger picture of a theory of dispositions
understood as the necessary metaphysical complement to the causally productive account of
mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences.
3. A metaphysics for dispositionalism
In distinguishing between the causal powers that constitute a mechanism from the patterns
of events that they are capable of generating, Bhaskar also carefully distinguishes between
the causal powers and the natural tendencies of a thing. Tendencies, Bhaskar argues, are
“something more” than powers (Bhaskar, [1975] 2013; 222), namely necessity. In Bhaskar’s
example, “All men [sic] (living in certain kinds of societies) possess the power to steal;
kleptomaniacs possess the tendency to do so” (Bhaskar, [1975] 2013; 222). It is easy to see
that tendencies rather than causal powers are what true law-like statements are about, since
the realization of tendencies implies the closure of the system in which they are realized, i.e.
a necessary connection between events. As Bhaskar puts it, tendencies as occur in tendency
statements presuppose power statements, but the converse is not the case. For tendency
statements presuppose that a power is necessarily realized. The distinction between powers
and tendencies pinpoints the distinction between the “level of actual” and the “level of
real”, since it is the natural necessity of tendencies that underwrites the pattern of events
that are revealed in experimental conditions. Not unlike Harré and Madden, Bhaskar
takes mechanisms to generate outcomes by natural necessity, i.e. the causal powers of things
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manifest themselves in a generative mechanism that is entirely defined by the specific outcome
it necessarily produces. This also means that for entities to be endowed with causal powers
even when those powers are not realized, there must be a real basis for the possession of
powers independent of whether they are exercised or not. Such basis Bhaskar identifies in the
structure of entities: as he puts it, “To say that X has the power to do φ is to say that it will
do φ in the appropriate circumstances in virtue of its nature (e.g. structure or constitution);
that is to say it will do it in virtue of its being the kind of thing that it is” (Bhaskar, [1975]
2013; 229).
Bhaskar’s reference to kinds of things implies that structure is a categorical property of
entities, i.e. it can be ascribed to an entity by virtue of it being the kind or category of entity
it is. Indeed, things are of the kind they are because of their structure. Hydrogen atoms are
anything possessing a particular atomic structure, and it is such structure that gives them the
causal powers to bind with oxygen atoms to form water molecules. Bhaskar explains the
categorical nature of structures in terms of a transition from a “Lockean” level of scientific
knowledge, at which it is entirely contingent whether a thing has the kind of structure it
has, to a “Leibnizian” level of knowledge, at which it is no longer contingent—i.e. it is
necessary—that X has the structure it has if it is to be the kind of thing it is (Bhaskar, [1975]
2013; 164). It is easy to see that the distinction between a Lockean level and a Leibnizian
level corresponds quite neatly to the recurring distinction between the “non-fundamental”
level of dispositions and the “fundamental” level of powers. In fact, by allowing for the
categorical properties of structures to ground the dispositional properties that entities have
in virtue of their causal powers, Bhaskar seems to invoke structures as part of a fundamental
metaphysics of grounding.
The appropriate relation between categorical and dispositional properties is a widely
discussed topic in the literature of dispositions, and scholars in dispositional metaphysics
have endorsed a variety of different positions about the ultimate nature of the properties of
entities. Anecdotally, one may note that in the first half of the twentieth century dispositions
were discussed by the likes of Popper ([1934] 2002; section 25; appendix *x) and Carnap
(1936; 440) in the passages where they focus on the ordinary terminology at use in scientific
explanation. It is only in the second half of the twentieth-century, however, that dispositions
became a respectable topic of discussion in (analytic) metaphysics thanks to the resurfacing
of (neo-)Aristotelian themes. Psillos (2002) attributes this to the resurgence of the idea of
that necessity is to be found in the nature of things (that is, in their essences). For him, the
Aristotelian idea of natural necessity banned by Humeans gained new life when the regularity
view started to face serious metaphysical challenges:
It was Kripke’s liberating views in the early 1970s that changed the scene radically. By defending
the case of necessary statements, which are known a posteriori, Kripke (1972) made it possible to
think of the existence of necessity in nature which is weaker than logical necessity, and yet strong
enough to warrant the label necessity. (Psillos, 2002; 161, emphasis in the original)
Be this as it may, since the 1970s powers and dispositions came to the fore as the central focus
of new trends in metaphysics. Stephen Mumford (2009) usefully describes such trends as
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originating in different traditions that developed in relative isolation from one another. Harré
and Madden’s (1975) influence on Roy Bhaskar ([1975] 2013, [1979] 2015) has already been
shown, and while they may have also exerted some influence on Nancy Cartwright’s work
on capacities (see e.g. Cartwright, 1999; 73; 1989; 9, note 15), she developed her theory of
capacities and their role in causation and explanation relatively independently, taking a cue
from J.S. Mill’s notion of “tendencies”. D. Hugh Mellor (1974) can also be counted as a
member of this mainly British tradition though he essentially provides an independent defence
of pandispositionalism against those authors who argued that dispositional predicades must
rest on non-dispositional properties.
A different tradition originates in Martin’s (1994) and Molnar’s (2003) joint effort in
establishing a dispositional theory of causation while teaching at the University of Sydney in
the 1960s (Mumford, 2009). More recently, Brian Ellis (2001, [2002] 2014) has breathed
new life into this Australian tradition, though it is doubtful whether such a lineage can be
established beyond a merely geographical continuity (Ellis himself has credited contributions
to the position he himself defends to “philosophers from around the world”: see Ellis, [2002]
2014; 7). In fact, recent debate on dispositions has involved a cross-fertilization that also
brought the Australian tradition to bear on the European one (see e.g. Mumford and Anjum,
2011) as well as on the scholarship that more recently took hold in the U.S. (see e.g. Martin
and Heil, 1998; Heil, 2005). Given the large number of authors who have significantly
contributed to the debate, therefore, it would be pointless to rubric them all, let alone trace
a detailed genealogy. Indeed, more often than not disposition talk resorts to arguments
previously advanced by more classic authors, including not only Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap,
and even Carl Hempel, but also Gilbert Ryle, Nelson Goodman,W.V.O. Quine, J.L. Mackie,
David Armstrong, Saul Kripke, Sydney Shoemaker, and many others.3 Moreover, discussion
of the nature of dispositions is not always clearly distinct from arguments for their use in
causal explanation of the kind considered in the previous section.
It will prove more useful, therefore, to avoid reference to the particular arguments for
this or that position on the nature of dispositional properties and attempt instead to provide
a taxonomy of different theories that will help investigate the metaphysical presuppositions
of the form of causal realism considered so far. George Molnar (2003) suggests that a basic
distinction about the reality of properties is that between monists and dualists. Monists
believe that all properties are either of a categorical or of a dispositional type, while dualists
are committed to what Bird (2007) calls “the mixed view”, according to which dispositional
and non-dispositional properties are inherently different, and that instances of both types
of properties exist. As Bird points out, the three views that result from this classification
exhaust the whole spectrum of possible accounts of the nature of properties as far as
dispositions are concerned, in that other internal differences among theories of dispositions
can effectively be ascribed to differences in the characterization of the causal relations they
3. Hempel (See e.g. 1965b), Ryle ([1949] 2009; ch. 5), Goodman ([1954] 1983; ch. II), Quine ([1935] 1976,
[1953b] 1961; [1960] 2013; ch. 6, sec. 46; 1969; [1970] 1986; ch. 2; [1973] 1990; ch. 1, sec. 4–5; 1975, 1978),
Mackie (1962, 1977), Armstrong (1968; ch. 6, sec. 6; 1973; ch. 2, sec. 2), Kripke (1972), and Shoemaker (1980,
1998). Some of these contributions have been separately collected in Tuomela (1978).
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result in. Accordingly, one must also recognize that neutral monism, which Molnar (2003)
lists as a third monist option alongside categorical and dispositional monism, can in fact
be successfully reconduced to one of the other two. Neutral monism as advanced by e.g.
Heil ([1998] 2013) and Mumford (1998) sees the distinction between dispositional and
categorical properties as a merely conceptual and epistemological one, not one that has to
do with the nature of properties. As such, however, neutral monism has nothing to say about
the metaphysics of properties, and it must rest upon one of the remaining three alternatives
even though it remains silent as to which one is best suited to accommodate it (Mumford
has recognized the validity of this objection and has later rejected neutral monism in favour
of dispositional monism; see e.g. Mumford, 2004). The alternative metaphysical accounts of
dispositions can thus be typified as follows:
Property realism
Property monism
Categorical monism Dispositional monism
(Neutral monism)
Property dualism
The mixed view
Figure 3.1: Theories of properties (adapted from Molnar, 2003; 149).
Bird notes that categorical monism is a wholly Humean view, in that it denies that there
are genuinely dispositional properties and therefore undermines a productive account of
causation from a regularity-based point of view. This claim requires further qualification,
since the Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley view examined above can also be counted as categori-
cally monist on accounts of its view of laws as relations between the exclusively categorical
properties of universals, while at the same time seeing such relations as necessitarian rather
than regularity-based. For this reason, Bird calls this view “semi-Humean” but he sees no
problem in calling it Humean since the nomic necessity defended by Dretske, Armstrong, and
Tooley is by definition one that holds between kinds of entities rather than between entities
themselves. Whether an entity belongs to a certain kind is, on the Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley
view, an entirely contingent fact, and therefore relations between the properties of entities
are contingent on those entities being the kind of entities they are: they are, in other words,
based on regularities. To be sure, one may require that necessary relations hold between
the properties of individual entities rather than between kinds, yet this is precisely what
categorical monism denies: to conceive of an individual property a as necessitating the fact
that an entity that possesses the property a also possesses the property b is to conceive of
a as a dispositional property. Thus, Bird concludes, either categorical monism falls back
to a fully Humean view or it is no categorical monism at all and therefore it must be an
anti-Humean form of realism about dispositions, namely dispositional monism or the mixed
view (Bird, 2007; ch. 4, sec. 5).
At any rate, doubts about the relevance of the Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley view for
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Property realism
Property monism
Categorical monism Dispositional monism
Property dualism
The mixed view
Humeanism Anti-Humeanism
Figure 3.2: Humean vs. anti-Humean theories of properties.
providing a theory of causation capable of accounting for explanation in actual social
sciences have already been expressed in the previous chapter. We are thus left with only two
viable metaphysical positions that can qualify as anti-Humean by virtue of their realism
about dispositions: dispositional monism and the mixed view. As Molnar (2003) notes,
mixed-view dualism about properties can come in two flavours, which he calls “dualism of
pure types” and “dual-type theory”. On the first view, properties are pure types, i.e. they are
either wholly dispositional or wholly non-dispositional. This is the view held e.g. by Bhaskar
when he claims that entities have both causal powers and natural tendencies, the latter being
purely structural and non-dispositional properties.
The second view denies pure types, holding that some or all properties have a dual
character, i.e. they are partly dispositional and partly non-dispositional (Molnar, 2003;
149–153). Molnar specifies that the dual-type theory is “a view that may not be held by
anyone”, since its only recorded proponent, C. B. Martin (1993b; 15; 1993a; 46; 1996;
132–135), has since abandoned it (see Molnar, 2003; 149). However, Cartwright might be
seen as gesturing towards such a position—though reluctantly and only obliquely—when
she vehemently denies that there are “not one but two properties, with the capacity sitting
on the shoulder of the property which carries it” (Cartwright, 1989; 9).
To exemplify the dual character of properties Martin repeatedly evokes the metaphor of
the extension of a body, in that it expresses itself both in a purely qualitative size as well
as in a shape that affects how the body interacts with other bodies (a round body may be
said to have a disposition to roll). This, however, immediately raises the question as to
where the difference between the dispositonal and non-dispositional character lies: since the
dispositional and the non-dispositional are two faces of the same property, they cannot be
themselves two different properties. Addressing this problem requires introducing a third
dimension to the metaphysics of properties that cuts across the monism/dualism divide. At
last, this is the problem of grounding. Typically, what Molnar calls “pure-type” dualists think
of dispositional properties as grounded on categorical properties. In this way, pure-type
dualists are able to account for an entity being disposed to produce certain effects in terms
of that entity possessing certain categorical properties because it is the kind of entity it is.
This is the way in which Bhaskar, among others, accounts for the dispositional character of
causal powers: entities necessarily acquire certain “causal powers” in virtue of their structure,
which is a categorical property that derives from those entities being the kind of entities they
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are. Barring countervailing factors, hydrogen atoms will necessarily bind with oxygen atoms
to form water molecules because they have a certain atomic structure that endows them
with the causal power of binding with oxygen, i.e. because they are atoms of the hydrogen
type. To be sure, this solution raises problems of its own, since allowing for entities to derive
their dispositional properties from their categorical properties would reduce their whole
dispositional power to categorical properties, while making dispositional properties inert
and perhaps even otiose (even though there is nothing necessarily problematic with this
conclusion: see e.g. Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, 1982). Most importantly, however, the
grounding solution is not a viable one for dual-type theorists, since they allow for properties to
be both dispositional and categorical, and therefore cannot allow for dispositional properties
to be grounded on categorical ones. Therefore, one may object to the dual-type theory that it
inevitably faces an inescapable problem of the “missing base”. Molnar offers three possible
counter-moves to this objections, yet they all amount to purely epistemic solutions and make
dual-type theorists remain agnostic as to the metaphysical grounds of the duality of types
(Molnar, 2003; 152–153).
Bird notes that the mixed view and dispositional monism “are not so far apart”, though
he says so primarily because both views argue against categorical monism (Bird, 2007;
3). Dispositional monism and mixed-view dualism do in fact pursue different goals, in
that the mixed view needs to ground dispositional properties onto categorical ones to rule
out categorical monism. Yet this does not mean that the problem of grounding is alien
to dispositional monism. For even in this case, one should provide an account of what
dispositional properties derive their dispositional character from. By definition, dispositional
monism holds that all properties are dispositions, and therefore the dispositional character of
properties cannot derive from their being grounded on categorical properties: it must be other
dispositional properties that ground them. Unlike the mixed view, dispositional monism
is thus open to infinite regress, since it cannot invoke categorical properties to terminate a
potentially endless chain of grounding. Luckily, however, the problem of grounding can be set
aside for the present purposes, having been evoked solely to point to the similarities between
different varieties of realism about dispositions. As Chakravartty (2008, 2013) notes, once
dispositions are accepted as real features of entities one is legitimately entitled to account for
causation without making it supervenient on regularities, and therefore one is perfectly in the
position to provide a realist theory of productive causation capable of underpinning scientific
explanation. As a result, the dispositional realism that is required for scientific realism is
indifferent to whether the properties of entities are dual or singular, insofar as one is able
to mention real dispositional properties as the causal underpinnings of explanation. To use
Bird’s classification, one is only required to be anti-Humean, no matter whether dualist or
monist, to rule out categorical monism as conducive to causally eliminativist Humeanism.
Note further that this does not make causal realism metaphysics-less as far as entities are
concerned. As Chakravartty has argued, dispositional realism entails more than merely
structural realism would allow. For dispositional properties, qua properties of entities, carry
information about their otherwise unobservable structure. We are thus equipped to outline
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the characteristics of entities as they feature in scientific explanation, or in other words,
to provide a minimal theory of scientific objects according to the desiderata of scientific
explanation.
4. The identity of scientific objects
What, then, must scientific objects look like? We have seen at the end of the previous section
that the grounding of dispositional properties is irrelevant to their nature. This is what
distinguishes scientific objects from the unobservable entities of metaphysics. For scientific
objects are defined by their occurrence in scientific theory, whose foremost goal is explanatory:
the only relevant properties for an object to be scientific are its causal properties. Insofar
as dispositional properties are the roots of causal production, therefore, the nature of a
scientific object is entirely exhausted by the dispositional properties that can be ascribed
to it irrespective of their grounding. Within this framework, what Chakravartty calls the
“concrete structures” that the causal properties of entities compose are all that is required to
counter the weak causal realism encapsulated in the Poincaré-Worrall version of structural
realism.
Arguably,Worrall’s structural realism is by and large an epistemic position concerning the
definition of what is knowable rather than ametaphysical claim about the structure of reality.
Standard (epistemic) structural realism, then, amounts to the weakly realist claim that all we
can know is the structure of the world (Ladyman, 1998; Psillos, 2001). Drawing primarily on
the philosophy of physics, many have turned structural realism as an epistemic position into
a radical metaphysical position, to which French and Ladyman (2003) gave the name “ontic
structural realism (OSR)” by which it is generally known. According to OSR, structures are
all there is to reality. To be sure, these are what Chakravartty refers to as abstract structures,
since concrete structures are by definition composed of the properties possessed by entities.
OSR, on the contrary, is explicitly eliminativist about entities: what epistemic structural
realism considers simply unknowable, OSR crosses out as altogether non-existent. Many
distinct arguments have been provided for this somewhat counter-intuitive thesis, yet the
kernel of OSR is to provide a metaphysics that is consistent with the conceptual parsimony
characteristic of structural realism. If restricting our epistemic commitments to the structure
of phenomena is required to avoid the anti-realist pitfalls of the pessimistic meta-induction,
the argument goes, then either a consistently realist position concludes from this that only
structure is real, or it is no realism at all.
As one can see, postulating the existence of “concrete structures” is robust enough a
move to avoid eliminativism about objects. The objection to OSR from the point of view of
causal realism is that OSR presupposes causal relations without relata, while so far causal
realism has been discussed precisely on the basis of concerns about the inherently productive
character of causal processes which requires for causation to be thought of as a structural
property of entities. Indeed, one may go so far as to say that concrete structures are all is
needed to underpin causal realism. This is because, as mentioned in the preceding section, to
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go further than this is to address the problem of grounding of causal properties, on which
causal realism can provide no guidance. If categorical properties are properties in their own
right, i.e. if kindhood is a real feature of the world, then such structures clearly prove to be
categorical in nature. Yet this need not be the case, and whether or not concrete structures
are dispositional or categorical is irrelevant to the causal productiveness of dispositional
properties. Rather, to address this problem is to address the question of the primitive identity
of properties.
Nonetheless, some have argued that argue that dispositionalism is not especially prob-
lematic for OSR (see e.g. French and Ladyman, 2011). Ontic structural realists can certainly
concede that the relata of causal relations are objects, provided that these are not essential-
ized and continue to be understood as mere “nodes” in a structure. To be sure, this paves
the way to an infinite regress of reduction from relations to relata to relations. Insofar as
dispositions are required to ground causation and put an end to such regress, however, ontic
structural realists would ascribe dispositions to structures rather than to objects. As French
and Ladyman put it:
It may be objected that this threatens to lead to circularity: causal relations hold between causal
relata which are resolved into objects which are themselves nothing but “nodes” of (whatever that
means) sets of causal relations. The worry dissipates if we think of levels of metaphysical analysis,
but ultimately as far as the structuralist is concerned, there is nothing but the structure – that is,
the set of relations – and leaving aside the issue of relations without relata, there is the significant
concern about how relations can have in whatever sense causal powers. But it is unclear why
this should be more of a problem for the structuralist than the non-structuralist who, ultimately,
must hold that objects, or more basically, bare substances must have causal powers. (French and
Ladyman, 2011; 37)
It should be remarked that OSR is intended as an account of the nature of structural relations
at the level of fundamental physics, and therefore its eliminativism about objects need
not be extended beyond the domains of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, of relativistic
quantum field theory, and of the general theory of relativity. At a very minimum, however,
the compatibility between dispositionalism and OSR points to the fact that dispositionalism
alone is not sufficient to pinpoint the identity of objects, and that the objection that causation
requires relata is not especially problematic for object-eliminativism.
Against most ontic structural realists, however, Michael Esfeld (2004; see also Esfeld and
Lam, 2008) has defended a more “moderate” version of structural realism than OSR whose
main feature is the denial of ontological primacy to relations with respect to objects and the
rejection of the eliminativism about objects that derives from the ontological primacy of
relations. Moderate ontic structural realists observe that OSR ultimately draws its strength
from the fact that current fundamental physics does not make the intrinsic identity of objects
available, and therefore the haecceities or primitive identities of objects need not be included
into the metaphysics of OSR. Nonetheless, the argument goes, this licences no conclusion as
to whether relations are metaphysically prior to objects, let alone to objects being reducible to
mere “nodes” of relations. Accordingly, moderate OSR defends a metaphysics of objects that
does not require appealing to the “essences” of individual entities—i.e. their haecceities—to
distinguish them from relations at the metaphysical level. More precisely, moderate ontic
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structural realists argue that the distinction between objects and relations is a conceptual
rather than a metaphysical one, and therefore metaphysical primacy cannot be assigned to
either (for an updated version of moderate OSR denying the ontological distinction between
objects and relations see Esfeld and Lam, 2011). Metaphysically speaking, objects and
relations are on the same footing, and it follows from this that neither term can be suppressed
by appealing to the metaphysical primacy of the other, as object-eliminativists contend.
Esfeld and Lam (2011) go so far as to argue that OSR entails a positive metaphysics of
objects since, they argue, a theory of individual entities can be provides without evoking
haecceitism. Flirting with a Spinozian conceptual apparatus, some authors argue that the
properties of objects can be conceived as the “modes” in which objects exist, and since
objects—like Spinoza’s “substance”—do not have any existence in distinction to their modes,
one need not draw a distinction between objects and properties (Armstrong, 1989; ch. 5;
Strawson, 2008; Heil, 2003; chapter 13; Esfeld and Lam, 2011). (For the sake of basic
accuracy, one should note that Spinoza’s notion of “substance”—in the singular—makes
for an ontologically monist position, while the mode theory of properties applies to a
numerical plurality of objects—conceived, in a very much Aristotelian fashion, as “individual
substances”.) Heil (2003) remarks that viewing properties as modes does not necessarily
rule out haecceitism: by way of example, one may cite John Locke as holding such a
mode-like view of properties while at the same time positing the existence of an unknowable
“substratum”, a hypothetical substance that “supports” those properties (Locke, [1689] 1975;
particularly bk. II, ch.XXIII). It is also true, however, that Locke conceives of such substratum
as a “categorical” or “sortal” substance, i.e. as a substance that underwrites categories or
sorts of objects rather than individual ones. Individual substances, on the other hand, are
complex modes, or bundles of properties, without anything like an individual substratum:
their only “support” is the sortal substratum. Even Locke’s categorical essentialism, therefore,
does not extend to postulating the existence of haecceities to support his view of objects as
modes, or arranged properties. Therefore, whether objects are propertied entities (haecceities
plus properties) or simply modes (ways properties are arranged) is, as Heil concludes, an
open question, at least as far as the mode theory of properties is concerned (Heil, 2003; 178).
This means, at a very minimum, that no further and ineffable essences need to be postulated
to make sense of the identity of individual objects insofar as the properties of entities are
conceived as modes of their existence.
According to Esfeld and Lam, conceiving properties as modes of existence of objects
provides a suitable ground for moderate OSR, i.e. the idea that objects and relations are
metaphysically on a par. What moderate OSR needs is reject eliminativism about objects
while at the same time avoiding the pitfall of making relations supervenient on objects.
For making object metaphysically prior to relations would contradict the very premise of
moderate OSR. How, then, can properties alone satisfactorily account for the identity of
individual objects? The idea that properties constitute the modes in which objects exist
ultimately amounts to a neo-Spinozian variant of the more traditional theories of properties
as tropes (Esfeld and Lam, 2011; 152; Heil, 2003; 127–128). Conventionally, the birth of
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Supervenient Fundamental
Haecceitism Properties
Haecceities
(e.g. “substrata”)
OSR Objects Relational properties
Moderate OSR
(Relational) properties
and
objects
“Modes”
Table 3.3: Alternative accounts of the nature of objects.
trope theory is associated with the work of D. C. Williams (1953a, 1953b), though earlier
formulations can be found in E. Husserl ([1921] 2001; investigation III), G. F. Stout ([1921]
1930; Moore, Stout, and Dawes Hicks, 1923), and I. Segelberg ([1947] 1999); more recently,
trope theory has gained new currency thanks to discussion by K. Campbell (1981, 1990),
K. Mulligan (1998), and P. Simons (1994; see also Mulligan, Simons, and Smith, 1984),
and critically, by D. M. Armstrong (1978b; ch. 4) and H. Hochberg (1988; 1991; 2002; see
Maurin, 2002; 3–4; Heil, 2003; 128).
In the trope-theoretical jargon, “tropes” are “particular properties” as opposed to
Armstrong-like “universals”. Keith Campbell (1990) illustrates the notion of trope by
contrasting examples of token properties with the corresponding type properties:
Consider the peas in a pod. They are all very much alike—proverbially so. Suppose in this
pod there are half a dozen peas which are all the very same shade of green and all the same
near-spherical shape. They differ slightly in size from one another and, of course, have different
locations.
Any assay of this situation will have to recognize the presence of colour. But colour occurs here
both as type (what all peas have, a certain shade of green) and as token (the particular case of
colour which each different pea has, peculiar to itself). There are six tokens of that shade of green
present in the pod.
In the same way there are six tokens of the near-spherical shape, but only one case each of the size
involved, since in our example each pea is a different size from every other. (Campbell, 1990; 2)
Token properties like particular shades of a certain colour (a type property) or the different
sizes in which a shape (again a type property) can manifest itself are examples of tropes.
Much like the particular properties of the individual peas in a pod, therefore, tropes need be
conceived as real properties—in contrast to Armstrong’s theory of universals according to
which only categorical properties are real.
Aside from commitment to the existence of tropes, however, what is most distinctive
about trope theory is the contention that tropes are metaphysically fundamental and that,
as a corollary, tropes are all there is to reality (Maurin, 2002; 5–6). To put it differently,
ours is neither “a world of states of affairs” (as per Armstrong’s phrase) nor a world of
objects; instead, it is a world of (particular) properties. For our purposes, it is relevant to
note that this aspect of trope theory typically translates into a theory of objects as consisting
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of nothing but bundles of tropes. As Maurin observes, trope theory is in fact compatible with
the idea that objects are more than mere compounds of properties or tropes. C. B. Martin
(1980), for instance, has advocated the necessity of positing Locke-like substrata to sustain
tropes, mainly out of the need to account for the unity of objects: “An object”, writes Martin,
“is not a collectable out of its properties or qualities as a crowd is collectable out of its
members” (Martin, 1980; 8); instead, properties must be properties of things, and substrata
are required as the bearers of such properties. To put it differently, property-ascription
statements like “The passionfruit is round” and “The passionfruit is purple” must be true of
one and the same object (Martin, 1980; 9), and the truth-makers of such statements must
be the substrata of objects. As Armstrong (1978b) had pointed out, however, to invoke
substrata that support properties is to introduce a third, relational term (“support”) that
must be accounted for metaphysically. This, Armstrong argues, opens the trope-substrate
approach to the kind of infinite regress first exposed by Bradley ([1897] 1999; 27–28): if the
“support” relation is a real metaphysical entity, then a further relation is required to account
for how a substratum relates to it, and so ad infinitum.
The trope-bundle approach, by contrast, is capable to overcome Bradley’s regress in
virtue of its monism about tropes: if all that exists is nothing but bundles of tropes without
further concern as to how they coalesce into a coherent whole (if at all), then relations are not
part of a trope metaphysics and Bradley’s regress is eschewed. Nonetheless, this leaves the
question open as to how one can distinguish between an inchoate congeries of enumerated
properties and the ordinary, more restricted notion of object to which we attribute a certain
unity. Many attempts at solving this problem have been proposed (Maurin, 2002, 2010,
2011); typically, solutions go in the direction of invoking some sort of internal relation which,
unlike external relations, is necessitated by rather than added to the presence of its relata.
Internal relations, that is, necessary relate what they in fact relate, i.e. “there is no possible
world in which the relation exists and relates entities other than those it actually relates
or where the relation exists without relating anything at all” (Maurin, 2010; 322). Thus
characterized, internal relations are self-sufficient—qua necessary: they do not relate in virtue
of further relations, and therefore Bradley’s infinite regress of relations-all-the-way-down
does not ensue.
More importantly for the present purposes, the reduction of objects to bundles of tropes
is the reason why some author favour a theory of modes instead of tropes. Heil (2003)
believes for instance that objects are distinct entities from their modes, and accordingly
rejects the trope-bundle approach on accounts that “[p]roperties are ways particular objects
are, not parts of objects” (Heil, 2003; 12, emphasis added). Aside from Heil’s apparent
commitment to underlying essences of objects—the “substrata”—Esfeld and Lam (2011)
argue that, insofar as one takes tropes to be relations as well as properties, the trope-bundle
theory of objects dangerously approaches OSR’s eliminativism about objects. It is for this
reason that they characterize moderate OSR as a metaphysics in which objects and relations
have equal standing, and although the distinction between the two types of entities is a merely
conceptual one, neither type can be fully accounted for in terms of the other. Nonetheless,
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the main reason why modes can be presented as a variant of trope theory lies in the fact
that both are alternatives to the view of properties as universals. From the point of view
of universals, token properties are instantiations of type properties: the different shades
of green of the peas in a pod are all instances of the same type of properties, “greenness”.
As Armstrong (1978b) repeatedly points out, one of the main advantages of a the theory
that universals are real and that particular properties instantiate them lies in its capacity to
provide an elegant solution to the “One over Many” problem already raised by Plato (see
e.g. Resp.; 595): how is it that distinct particular entities with distinct particular properties
bear similarities? The obvious answer from the point of view of realism about universals is
that particular properties are all instances of the same kind of property.
The reason why mode and trope theorists are sceptical about the reality of universals,
however, lies in the difficulties with the view that particular properties instantiate universals.
For one thing, instantiation cannot be a relation on pain of a Bradley regress analogous to
the one Armstrong himself identified in a trope-substrate approach. If instantiation were a
relation, then it would be itself a universal that is instantiated in the particulars; to prevent
circularity, one would thus be forced to introduce a further relation of instantiation that
allows particulars to instantiate instantiation, and so ad infinitum (see e.g. Lewis, 1983;
Baxter, 2001; Mumford, 2007). To avoid this problem, Armstrong reformulated his account
of instantiation, much like trope theorists, in terms of an internal (i.e. necessary) relation—or,
as he also called it, a “fundamental tie” (Armstrong, 1989; 94; see also 2004; 46–48). As he
writes:
I have had a change of heart about the instantiation of universals. In previous work I conceived of
the instantiation as a matter of contingent connection of particulars with universals. New work
by Donald Baxter, at the University of Connecticut, has made me think that the link is necessary.
See his paper “Instantiation as Partial Identity” (2001). I have been convinced by him that what is
involved in a particular instantiating a property-universal is a partial identity of the particular and
universal involved. It is not a mere mereological overlap, as when two streets intersect, but it is a
partial identity. This in turn has led me to hold that instantiation is not contingent but necessary.
(Armstrong, 2004; 46–47)
Yet even aside from Bradley’s regress, those who are inclined to view properties in terms
of tropes or modes tend to more generally regard commitment to the reality of universals
as an unnecessary metaphysical complication that is best shaved off with Ockham’s razor.
After all, both trope and mode theory provide their own solution to the main argument
in favour of universals, Plato’s One over Many problem. In both variants, properties have
metaphysical reality that is not supervenient on the objects that possess them. As Esfeld and
Lam (2011) stress, to say that properties and relations are modes, or ways in which objects
exist, is to eradicate the metaphysical distinction between objects and properties/relations,
which then becomes a merely conceptual distinction. To say that tropes compose objects, on
the other hand, is to say that objects with similar features in fact share the same property,
not just similarities between individually different properties (whether or not a substratum
is required to tie them together into a unified whole). Thus, the One over Many problem
is solved in a way that utterly entails nominalism instead of realism about universals: as
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Nominal Real
Realism
about
universals • Particular properties
(e.g. shades of green)
• “Bare particulars” (haecceities, substrata)
(e.g. “bare peas”)
• Uninstantiated universals
(e.g. “being green”)
• Instantiated universals or “states of af-
fairs”
(e.g. “The pea is green”)
Nominalism
about
universals
Mode theory
• Universals
(e.g. “greenness”)
• Unattributed (particular) properties
(e.g. shades of green)
• Unpropertied objects
(e.g. peas)
• Modes
(e.g. peas being particular shades of green)
Trope theory
Trope-substratum
approach • Universals
(e.g. “greenness”)
• Tropes
(e.g. shades of green, sizes)
• Substrata
Trope-bundle
approach • Universals
(e.g. “greenness”)
• Bundled tropes
(e.g. a particular shade of green together
with a particular size)
Table 3.4: Realism vs. nominalism about universals.
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Mumford (2013) put it, “there is no mystery why electrons and other kinds of things behave
in a certain way. It is because they behave that way that things are members of that kind”
(Mumford, 2013; 17).
To sum up, the mode and trope-bundle theories of objects are two possible complements
to the theories of properties that have been considered as providing a metaphysics for
dispositionalism: the version of dispositionalism required by the type of realism about
causation analyzed above thus entails a theory of particular properties that makes no
reference to those properties being tokens of a certain type, or kind. Even when essences are
invoked as the “substrata” required to make sense of a theory of objects based on particular
properties, they are Aristotle-like “individual essences” that are not conducive to essentialism
about kinds. This should come as no surprise, since realism about universals has been
deployed by the likes of Dretske, Tooley, and Armstrong to support their nomological realism
and the consequent analysis of causation in terms of lawful connections between universals.
Conversely, the productive account of causation is a theory about the dispositional nature of
particular properties or, as Harré and Madden (1975) put it, a theory of powerful particulars,
but by no means a theory of kinds.
Particular properties thus appear to be the defining feature of entities that complements
the dispositional realism necessary to metaphysically underpin the productive account of
causation as demanded by actual social science explanation. Throughout the preceding
sections of this chapter, scientific explanation and scientific objects have been referred to
without any further qualification as to their applicability to the domain of social science.
Nonetheless, the very need for a productive account of causation has been advocated on the
basis of concerns from mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences, and of criticism
to the regularity view of causation as it features in correlational analyses of social phenomena.
This should not be read as a form of anti-naturalism, i.e. the thesis that knowledge of the
social world is inherently different from knowledge of the natural world, and the equivalent
ontological thesis about the qualitative irreducibility of natural and social objects. If anything,
the fact that most theories about the nature of causation and of unobservable entities that
proved relevant to complement the desiderata of social explanation stem from considerations
about the natural sciences should attest to the contrary. However, there is a sense in which
some aspects of scientific objects must respond to questions that are peculiar to the social
sciences. Recall from chapter 1 that the the various social science disciplines can be thought of
as having differentiated from one another by way of the apportioning of the social world into
different fields of inquiry. Recall further that such processes prove of great epistemological
significance in that such demarcation is consummated through the progressive methodological
differentiation, the institutionalization of which comes to define the identity of a particular
discipline. This has been labelled, following Mäki (2009), “the issue of scope”.
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Conclusion
As far as politics is concerned, the issue of scope has been associated with the institutional-
ization of political science concomitant with the “comparative revolution” of the post-WWII
period, and therefore the autonomy of politics understood as a specific domain of inves-
tigation has been associated with the comparative method of inquiry. At that stage, the
comparative method infelicitously relied on what Sartori denounced as a tendency towards
a “conceptual stretching” of classificatory concepts, which he interpreted as built-in into
the functionalist definition of the object of politics on accounts of its demand for maximal
universality and minimal variability. Yet independently of conceptual streching and its
premisses in structural-functionalism, political explanation at the inception of academic
political science relied on a covering-law model: comparative analysis was thus carried out
as a search for law-like invariances across national contexts. In the light of erosive criticism
of the covering-law model of explanation, two distinct but related issues have been raised.
On the one hand, the whole idea that methodology alone is both necessary and sufficient
ground to demarcate the scope of a science is tightly related to the anti-realist assumptions of
covering-law explanation, according to which scientific explanation can be fully explicated
by means of purely logical—and hence methodological—criteria. Once these assumptions
are rejected, however, one is left wanting for an alternative criterion of demarcation of the
scope of a particular science vis-à-vis its neighbouring disciplines. This is the question of the
autonomy of politics. On the other hand, and consequently, the demise of a covering-law
model in favour of a more realist approach to causal explanation casts serious doubts not
only on the possibility of a functional definition of the political system as the object of
political science, but also on the meaningfulness of the very concept of “the political system”.
For the generality of such a concept raises no particular problems insofar as regularities are
the focus of scientific investigation. Within this framework, comparative analysis is seen as
oriented precisely towards detecting such regularities in order to extract the invariances that
constitute the features of the political system. Once the focus is recast on context-specific,
really occurring causal processes, however, the object of political explanation needs to be
characterized in terms of the causal properties of the relevant entities involved in the produc-
tion of the outcome at stake. A definition of the object of politics in the abstract, therefore,
becomes a much more serious issue to tackle.
With the ground covered so far, we have enough material to outline the conditions for
addressing both questions. As discussed in the preceding section, the metaphysics of entities
that is required by dispositional realism about causation allows for scientific objects to be
defined entirely by their particular properties. Yet, as mentioned, such realism extends to
individual entities, not kinds. Scientific objects, therefore, must be seen solely as individual
objects, since the relevant scientific theory per se calls for no metaphysics of kinds. This
is no accident, nor should it be seen as an unfortunate limitation of the theory; in fact,
there are good reasons for this. The point is that, as mentioned in section 2, whether or
not an entity possesses dispositional properties because its kind membership endows it with
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certain categorical properties—as property dualists would have it—is irrelevant to their
expressing a causally productive behaviour. As Bird stressed, to be a realist about dispositions
is to be an anti-Humean, since dispositions are all that is required to reject the regularity
view of causation. The demand for kind membership, therefore, cannot descend from the
requirements of a theory of causation.
It is easy to show that kinds are just what is required to address the two questions raised
above. Let us start with the second question. The brand of causal realism considered so far
conceives of regularities as produced by real causal processes that involve the dispositional
properties of individual entities. Accordingly, the invariant features of the “political system”
as they emerge from comparative analysis can be explained away as supervenient on the
causal properties of the individual actors that feature in the political processes taken into
consideration. It is those properties, and not the invariances that they produce, that are part of
the basic inventory of the world. Yet there is nothing about those properties per se that allows
for the entities that possess them to be grouped together into a homogeneous class identifiable
as “the political system”. For there to be such a class, or any other equivalent object of
politics, some underlying criterion of kind membership is required. Kinds are therefore
needed to provide a unified definition of the object of politics. Coming now to the first
question, it is easy to see that the demarcationist pretensions of foundationalist philosophy
of science have to be abandoned together with the idea that scientific explanation can be
entirely reduced to logical criteria. If scientific explanation is about tracing causal processes
as they are produced by the activity of entities, no room is left for a purely methodological
foundation of the sciences. Yet if one can grant existence to kinds, there is certainly the
possibility of demarcating between different qualities of entities in a way that allows for the
scope of a particular science to be defined in terms of kind objects. If the causal theory does
not provide a theory of kinds, therefore, one has to look into some other aspect of science.
This will be the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 4
The disordered social
These ambiguities, redundancies and deficiencies
recall those which Dr Franz Kuhn attributes to a
certain Chinese encyclopaedia entitledThe Celestial
Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge. In its remote
pages it is written that the animals can be divided
into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed,
(c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g)
stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification,
(i) that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable,
(k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (l) et
cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n)
that from a long way off look like flies.
Jorge Luis Borges (1952)
Introduction
This chapter will provide an account of the object of politics that results from the classification
of social objects into kinds. Because kinds cannot be grounded onto any universal properties
that individual entities share, a non-essentialist theory of kinds is required. In accordance
with the current literature on the philosophy of classification, these will be referred to as
cluster-kinds (or, more simply, clusters) as opposed to natural kinds. Sections 1 to 4 will
explain this difference. Section 1 will introduce the idea of natural kinds with respect to
the theory of properties discussed in the previous chapter, while section 2 will clarify their
place in classification-building: natural kinds are held to mirror real divisions in reality, and
therefore the type of classifications they give origin to can be described as taxonomies. By
“carving nature at its joints”, taxonomies identify well-ordered hierarchies in which the
properties of objects that are included in a given class are necessarily and sufficiently shared
by members of subordinate categories.
Sections 2 and 3 will relate traditional law-based conceptualizations of the political
domain as a scientific object to this logic of classification-building: because the properties
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that define higher-order classes of objects are shared by all members of subordinate categories,
one can arrive at classifications of political objects by identifying invariant features of political
processes across time and space. Because of the anti-realist character of such essentialism
about kinds, however, political concepts are best understood in terms of clusters of properties
rather than natural kinds. Section 4 will explain how political concepts—including the
overarching concept of politics as co-extensive with the scope of political science—do not
include the individual properties of the members of the classes that such concepts define;
rather, they are defined by“family resemblances”between those properties. The role of family
resemblances in classification-building and political concept-formation will be explored in
section 5.
Section 6 will draw some conclusions from the preceding discussion. Specifically, the
identification of family resemblances will be shown to be dependent on stipulations on the
part of the inquirer about the similarities among individual properties. This gives rise to a
possibly indefinite number of divergent but equally valid classifications of social objects that
result in different conceptualization of politics and therefore in different definitions of the
scope of political science. A possible solution to this problem will be discussed in chapter 5.
1. Properties and natural kinds
The previous chapter ended with a brief discussion of the role of kinds in the light of a
metaphysics of individual objects conducive to a nominalist approach to universals. Although
kinds and universals are tightly related notions, the different positions concerning their
respective metaphysical status ought not be confused with one another. By way of clarification,
it will prove useful to draw a distinction between realism about universals and essentialism
about kinds. Realism about universal predicates is undeniably a background assumption of
those who believe that the reality of kinds of entities goes beyond the mere collection of its
members. Any kind is defined by the properties its members share, and therefore to argue for
the metaphysical reality of a kind is to argue for the reality of its defining properties over and
above the entities that possess them—i.e. the reality of universal predicates. This is a fairy
anti-nominalist position about universals. For classificatory purposes, however, we typically
need to be able to detail precisely which these properties are. Patently, this lies without the
scope of realism about universals. For theories of universals are metaphysical theories about
the nature of properties, not ontologies that provide criteria for their existence: realism
about universals tells us what properties are, but does not thereby tell us which properties
there are. Accordingly, from the standpoint of realism about universals we might well be able
to say what it is to be a real kind, but not which real kinds actually exist. What is needed to
understand the metaphysics of kinds and its taxonomical role, therefore, is a metaphysical
criterion that allows us to distinguish between real and non-real kinds.
“Real kinds” in the above sense are typically referred to as “natural kinds”. This notion
might appear confusing within this context, since it may misleadingly suggest that the relevant
distinction here is one between the kinds that classify the “natural world” and those that
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classify the “human” or “social world”—whatever this may mean. But while this distinction
is not entirely misplaced here—it would seem prima facie intuitive to consider the kinds
of the natural sciences somewhat “more real” than social or human kinds—the notion of
“natural kinds” as it is ordinarily used in the philosophy of classification is simply meant
to identify the kinds that are allegedly grounded in real (universal) properties, as opposed
to those whose existence is merely nominal. As mentioned, within this framework a theory
of universals can only explain what natural kinds are, but not which of the kinds we may
be using are factually natural kinds. Essentialism about kinds may be seen as providing a
criterion for telling natural and non-natural kinds apart by requiring that the properties of
natural kinds be metaphysically essential. The sense in which the properties possessed by
members of natural kinds can qualify as essential—as opposed to the non-essential properties
that define non-natural kinds—has been characterized in various ways. Khalidi (2013) lists
six different ways of characterizing essentiality that are among the most common in modern
advocacy of essentialism about kinds:
Criteria of essentiality Description References
Necessity and sufficiency Each of the properties associated with a natu-
ral kind is possessed by every individual that
belongs to that kind, and any individual pos-
sessing all of them belongs to the kind in ques-
tion.
(Ellis, 2001;
22; Soames,
2002; 15)
Modal necessity I Natural kinds are such that they are associated
with the same set of properties in every possible
world.
(Wilkerson,
1988; 35)
Modal necessity II The properties associated with a kind are such
that an individual member of the kind would
possess them in every possible world in which
that individual exists (not just in the actual
world).
(Ellis, 2001;
21)
Intrinsicality The properties associated with a natural kind
are possessed by an individual member of that
kind independently of that individual’s rela-
tions to anything else in the universe.
(Ellis, 2001;
20; Wilker-
son, 1988;
29)
Microstructure The properties associated with a natural kind
are “underlying” microphysical properties
rather than macrolevel properties.
(Wilkerson,
1988; 35)
Discoverability by science The properties associated with a kind can be
ascertained by scientific inquiry and are those
properties that will eventually feature in a com-
pleted science.
(Wilkerson,
1988; 29)
Table 4.1: Essentiality in essentialism about kinds (adapted from Khalidi, 2013; 12–13).
Note that these are not mutually exclusive features, and that essentialists about kinds
typically endorse more than one of these theses about the essential properties that define nat-
ural kinds (Khalidi, 2013; 13). More importantly, however, these theses jointly characterize
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the relation between natural kinds and the essential properties that define them. Broadly
speaking, one may say that essentialists believe that the defining properties of natural kinds
provide them with essences of their own, insofar as the universal predicates that characterize
them are deemed essential properties. This thesis lays the metaphysical foundations for the
classificatory use of natural kinds: because they have essences, natural kinds correspond
to real divisions in the world, not just to abstract divisions conventionally established by
the inquirers. Accordingly, to identify the necessary and sufficient properties—or otherwise
defined essential properties—that objects must possess in order to be members of a certain
kind is to identify real divisions among natural kinds.
2. Political concepts and the philosophy of classification
One of the most appealing features of essentialism about kinds is the great explanatory
power it ascribes to natural kinds. As Dupré (1993) has remarked, “what makes a kind
explanatorily useful is that its instances share the same properties or dispositions and are
susceptible to the same forces” (Dupré, 1993; 80). If there are no such things as natural kinds,
then the fact that two or more entities share a certain property is a merely contingent fact
that says nothing about their underlying nature. We are thus unable to draw any conclusions
about the causal outcomes of the dispositional properties of such entities when they are
subject to “the same forces”. To see this, consider Dupré’s example of a fairly non-natural
kind, namely, the kind of all biological organisms of the same sex. Male scorpion flies and
male ducks hardly share anything like a “maleness” essence, for even their essential genetic
structure and sex-determining genetic features are different. It would be difficult, therefore,
to consider maleness as constituting a natural kind in the above sense. Consequently, any
behavioural patterns that result dispositionally from the sexual properties of male scorpion
flies is scientifically uninformative about the causal patterns generated by the sexual properties
of male ducks.
Consider now a prime candidate for a natural kind: chemical substances. The chemical
substance “water” and its associated kind of chemical compounds can be seen as endowed
with an essence that derives from the essential property shared by all members of that kind,
namely that the molecules they are composed of contain one atom of oxygen and two atoms
of hydrogen—encapsulated in the formula H2O. For the sake of scientific explanation, this
means that one can always invoke the dispositional properties that derive from chemical
composition whenever a member of the kind“water” is involved. When asked a why-question
of the kind, why was the fire extinguished?, essentialists may appeal to the fact that water
was thrown on the fire coupled with the fact that water necessarily has the disposition to
extinguish fire because of its essence—i.e. because it is a member of the natural kind defined
by the chemical formula H2O. Before moving to essentialism in the social and political
sciences, let us first consider one further example from the natural sciences, and specifically
from biology. Within the natural world, the buzzing and blooming domain of biology is often
considered to be the one that bears the closest resemblances to the complexity of the social
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world, and the biological sciences have accordingly acted as a favourite methodological model
for the conduct of social inquiry (see above, ch. 2, sec. 2). And just because the variability
of living organisms makes it very difficult to “carve nature at its joints”, the naturality of
biological kinds is an especially contested issue in the philosophy of classification.
The taxonomical aspect is a predominant one within the biological sciences, yet the
criteria that determine the extension of the taxa of a genealogical nexus are disputed. Higher-
order taxa (genera, families, orders, and so on) are often denied correspondence with actual,
evolutionarily produced divisions among organisms, while species are more favourably
regarded as identifying concrete entities, namely evolutionary units (see e.g. Wiley, 1981;
Mayr, 1982; Ghiselin, 1987; Eldredge and Cracraft, 1980). Nonetheless, this distinction
depends on a particular evolutionary conception of species, which itself is not unequivocal.
Quite on the contrary, at least eight species concepts are available, though with varying
degrees of acceptance on the part of empirical and theoretical biologists (Ereshefsky, 1991;
Mayr, [1963] 1970; ch. 2; Sokal and Crovello, 1970; Ehrlich and Raven, 1969; Van Valen,
1976;Wiley, 1978; Cracraft, 1983; Paterson, 1985; Templeton, 1989; Mishler and Donoghue,
1982). While the pluralism of species concepts is itself an obstacle to the straightforward
application of the metaphysics of natural kinds to biological taxa, for the sake of argument
one can still select one taxonomical criterion and accord that the related taxa of a genealogical
nexus designate real essences. In traditional Linnaean taxonomy, for instance, the essential
properties of a species are defined by the morphological characteristics that its members
share; so, for instance, the unusually short and bristly tongue of certain woodpeckers can be
seen as both necessary and sufficient—i.e. essential—for those specimens to be members of
the sapsucker species. As in the case of water, such an essentialist interpretation of biological
taxonomy makes taxa explanatory useful, since by knowing that a woodpecker is a sapsucker
we know that it necessarily has a short, bristly tongue that disposes it to feed on sap as
well as on insects, and therefore we can provide a fully legitimate causal explanation of
why, say, sapsuckers are found on living trees much more prevalently than other species of
woodpeckers whose long tongues dispose them to pull insects out of the holes they drill in
the trunks of dead trees.
Because of the near-impossibility of identifying exceptionless criteria that are necessary
and sufficient for an individual to be a member of any given species, however, essentialism
about natural kinds is a remarkably unfashionable position in the philosophy of biology, let
alone in the morphological understanding of taxa. Even a prominent advocate of modern
scientific essentialism like Brian Ellis admitted quite openly that biological taxa are poor
candidates for natural kinds:
Because of the messiness of biological kinds, and in order to develop a theory of natural kinds
adequate for the purposes of ontology, I have broken with the tradition of using biological
examples, and taken the various kinds of fundamental particles, fields, atoms, and molecules as
paradigms. It does not matter if the resulting theory of natural kinds does not yield a satisfactory
biological taxonomy. (Ellis, 2001; 170)
As Ellis notes, this point had effectively been already raised by Locke in his criticism of
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Aristotle’s theory of natural kinds, at least as Ayers (1981) interprets it. In book III of his
Essay, for instance, Locke writes:
That which I think very much disposes men to substitute their names for the real essences of
species, is the supposition before-mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of
things, and sets the boundaries to each of those species, by giving exactly the same real internal
constitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who
observes their different qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the
same name, are, in their internal constitution, as different one from another as several of those
which are ranked under different specifick names. (Locke, [1689] 1975; bk. III, ch. X, § 20)
Here, Locke seems to deny that one can identify sharp distinctions between species in nature.
A few paragraphs earlier, he explicitly takes issue with the famous Aristotelian definition
of man as a rational animal, arguing that if the property “being rational” were to uniquely
single out the essence of the kind “man”, then we should conclude that those men who
engage in blatantly irrational behaviour such as “chance-medley, man-slaughter, murder,
parricide”, and the like must in fact turn out to be members of a different species (Locke,
[1689] 1975; bk. III, ch. X, § 18–19). Of course, the problem for Locke lies not so much
with Aristotle’s definition of man—whose strongly essentialist interpretation, incidentally,
can only rely on piecemeal textual evidence—as with the idea that there are natural kinds
that we can unequivocally identify and base our explanatory classifications upon.
What place, if any, the sortal essences of kinds might have in Aristotle’s metaphysics is a
notoriously controversial issue; nonetheless, Aristotle seems to share the Platonic premise
that knowledge of beings is knowledge of their species. This is particularly evident in his
theory of definition per genus et differentiam: what we can predicate of beings, Aristotle
argues, can be established by detailing the genus to which a being belongs together with the
specific difference that locates the species of that being within the genus—the species being
the “secondary substance” of a being along with the “primary substance” that identifies
it individually (see e.g. Cat.; ch. 5). This is also the method that Aristotle adopts in his
biological work, wherein he undertakes a systematic classification of animals through a per
genus et differentiam mode of analysis (e.g. by distinguishing the class of animals who have
red blood from the class of animals that don’t, and then proceeding to a further subdivision
of red-blooded animals into those that have lungs and those that have gills, and so on: see
Hist. an.; bk. I–IV). Moreover, one assumption of Aristotelian philosophy of science is that
the search for a definition and the search for a causal explanation are converging tasks (see
e.g.An. post.; 90a), and in his other zoological studies Aristotle seeks to provide a causal
investigation of the body and functions of animals taxonomically defined (Part. an.; De motu
an.; IA; Gen. an.).
As attested by the exceptionally long-lasting influence of Aristotle’s biology on modern,
pre-Darwinian taxonomy, the possibility of identifying morphologically defined kinds can
provide some grounding to biological explanation, and an essentialist interpretation of
taxa as natural kinds would lay the metaphysical foundations for causal explanation in
biology. But while the role of essentialism in both biological taxonomy and Aristotelian
philosophy of the special sciences is doubtful, Aristotle’s theory of definition per genus et
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differentiam is certainly a proximate ancestor of essentialism about political classifications.
Let us return to the epistemological underpinnings of traditional political science as detailed
in the first part of the present work. Covering-law explanation in political science, it has been
argued, methodologically translated into the adoption of comparative methods for empirical
analysis: the search for potentially explanatory regularities fostered the development and the
expansion of the field of comparative politics, which resulted in the publication of a large
body of comparative work on political regimes in the 1960s. Cross-area comparison was
seen as the royal road to empirically arrive at explanatory generalities, so much so that in
his opening article for the first issue of the Comparative Politics journal Harold Lasswell
(1968) wrote:
For anyone with a scientific approach to political phenomena the idea of an independent compar-
ative method seems redundant. Isn’t the scientific approach unavoidably comparative, since to
“do science” is to formulate and attempt to verify generalizations by comparing all relevant data?
(Lasswell, 1968; 3)
Within this framework, the focus on political regimes and the emphasis put on con-
cept formation can only be explained in terms of the logic of construction of explanatory
taxonomies. It has already been mentioned how, writing in 1970, Sartori chastised structural-
functionalism for relying too heavily on a functional definition of political “structures”
and for sloppily avoiding a definition of structures in their own terms, thereby defeating
its own premises of structuralism (Sartori, 1970). On closer inspection, however, such
hyper-functionalism proves to thoroughly serve the explanatory purposes that motivate the
identification of structures. Setting aside the covertly teleological flavour of function-talk,
one can see that “structures” can only have a role in political science insofar as they are
required for causal explanation, i.e. if their causal—or, in the biology-infused political science
jargon of the 1950s and 1960s, functional—properties are deemed to have been relevant
in the production of the particular outcome under consideration. To be sure, this leaves
unanswered the question of what structures are qua structures, i.e. what is the status of
structures in the metaphysics of political science. Now it is clear that the structures defined by
empirical political science are theoretical terms that result from the cross-area comparisons
that constitute its methodology: the causal properties that define them are identified by
isolating the features of political processes that remain constant across different national
contexts and controlling for the variables that may locally influence them.
Discriminating the defining causal properties of political structures, therefore, depends
directly on the extensional breadth of the phenomena taken into consideration. Consequently,
the scale of political structures can vary to a considerable degree and designate anything
from personality to entire families of national systems of government, depending on whether
the focus of analysis is cast on the political psychology of the power-holding elite (for a
classic example, see Lasswell, [1936] 1958, [1948] 1962) or on the general orientation to
politics embodied in a given “political culture” (as per Gabriel Almond’s famous concept,
see e.g. Almond, 1956; Almond and Verba, 1963). The overarching “political system”,
conceived as co-extensive with the overall scope of political science on the whole, could itself
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be reconciled with this logic by seeing it as the ultimate political structure. As Eckstein (1963)
put it, particular structures can be conceived of as “the elements of political systems, taking
‘elements’ to mean the parts into which such systems are divided and out of combinations
of which they are, for analytical purposes, constituted” (Eckstein, 1963; 4). Moreover, the
flexibility with which such elements refer to phenomena of different magnitudes depends on
what phenomena are to be explained, since political structures—from political personality
to the political system—are entirely defined by the causal properties of the “elements” they
purportedly refer to and, functionally, by the role such properties play in causal production.
Therefore, political structures are best understood as analytically constituted ideal types
or concepts, the formation of which was heartily perceived as a key task of comparative
politics—mostly as a way of imposing conceptual order on the wild complexity that results
from large-scale comparisons, or small-scale comparisons between a limited number of
countries that are however studied over long periods of time.
It should by now be apparent that the dynamics of formation of these concepts—often
referred to as “classificatory schemes”—in political analysis corresponds rather straight-
forwardly to the logic of taxonomy-building examined above. Recognizing this, Sartori
diagnosed how for earlier generations of political scientists “the background of comparability
was established by the per genus et differentiam mode of analysis, i.e., by a taxonomical
treatment”. In this context, he wrote, “comparable means something which belongs to
the same genus, species, or sub-species—in short to the same class” (Sartori, 1970; 1036).
Contrary to the Aristotelian per genus et differentiam classificatory logic, however, political
concept formation climbs rather than descends the ladder of abstraction from lower-order
taxa to higher-order ones. Instead of singling out the specific differences between types of
phenomena that already classified as belonging to the same “genus”, comparative political
research arrives at type-concepts by identifying similarities within the diversity of individual
phenomena. Political taxonomies are therefore constructed, as it were, bottom-up.
This does not in the least remove the fact that political concept formation leads to
fully-fledged taxonomies whose internal logic can be reconstructed using the tools of the
philosophy of classification. The “functions” of political structures, for instance, clearly
serve as universal predicates that pinpoint the defining type-properties of kinds, while the
structures themselves, and political type-concepts in general, can be unequivocally understood
as the kinds which those properties qualify. Almond and Verba’s (1963) “civic culture”, for
instance, refers to a general orientation to democratic participation based on communication
and persuasion that can be characterized by some individual and relational properties—
personality tendencies and socialization patterns that enable individuals to “manage the
inevitable dissonances among his diffuse primary, his obedient output, and activist input” and
therefore function so as (i.e. have the disposition) to support a democratic polity (Almond
and Verba, 1963; 33). This resulted from a comparative study on five nations—the U.S.,
Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Mexico—which led the authors to conclude that “the civic
culture” identified a property shared by socialization patterns that were well-established in
such countries as U.S. and Britain, and less so in others. The civic culture thus counts as
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a kind of political orientation that can be ascribed to participation in the polity of some
countries—the U.S. and Great Britain—in contrast to others—Italy, Germany, and Mexico,
or even countries with a non-participant, “parochial” culture such as African tribal societies.
At the most abstract level of political taxonomies—or to continue the biological metaphor,
at the “domain” level—one can see that the all-encompassing concept of “political system”
that embraces any structures whose effects are of interest to political science is also a
kind, particularly a kind of the highest rank in the ladder of abstraction. It has already
been mentioned how the concept of the political system makes no exception in bearing a
functional definition, its purpose being first and foremost explanatory. Almond ([1960] 2015)
interprets the relevance and influence of this notion in terms of its capacity to overcome
erstwhile definitions of politics that were concerned exclusively with the functioning of the
state, while the deliberately abstract notion of a “political system” allows to disregard the
nature of particular structures and focus on their functions within the broader social order.
What functions or properties are intrinsically attached to a political system as a kind is, of
course, the result of conceptual analysis and therefore depends on the political taxonomy
one adopts. Since the concept of the political system is meant to include all other structures,
its defining property must be one that is shared by any structure irrespective of its relative
positioning in the ladder of conceptual abstraction. Thus, the kind-defining properties of
political systems are established by a reverse per genus et differentiam mode of analysis, i.e.
by abstracting from the “species-specific” properties of lower-order political structures which
are in turn identified by empirical comparison between concrete and individual political
objects.
3. Natural kinds and political taxonomies
It is important to stress that the definition of politics as a field of scientific investigation
relies heavily on conceptual analysis, specifically in the form of identifying shared properties
among a wide variety of phenomena and classifying them into a well-ordered taxonomy. On
the whole, politics refers to a domain that constitutes a kind of social objects—the “political
system” and its cognate concepts—of the highest possible order. The fact that many different
conceptualizations of the political system in terms of its properties are possible and that
different demarcations of politics as a field of scientific inquiry have been theorized is an issue
that will be examined in the remainder of this section, particularly with regard to how this
can be reconciled with the logic of classification. Before moving on, however, a preliminary
question to be asked is whether the kinds of political taxonomies can be understood as
natural kinds.
At first sight, structural-functionalist conceptual analysis seems to imply precisely this,
as the formation of concepts is entirely (and behaviourally) grounded in the empirically
observable effects of the causal properties of particular structures. The only way in which
such concepts can prove explanatory useful, therefore, is by assuming that they map patterns
of behaviour that necessarily correspond to the “essences” of social objects, i.e. by assuming
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that social objects have certain dispositional properties to generate a certain outcome in
virtue of their being the kind of objects they are. This is what makes political classifications
explanatory, in that natural kinds allow one to pinpoint the relevant properties of objects
that dispose them so as to produce a given effect: one is thus in the position to answer why-
questions concerning the causes that brought about the phenomenon under consideration.
Recall, however, that the scientific validity of comparative research was originally justified
on the basis of a covering-law account of what counts as scientific explanation, which
provided guidance in identifying the relevant properties of political structures that ground
their classification into a conceptual taxonomy. This would seem to draw the metaphysics
of political science closer to the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong version of nomological realism,
in which the logically necessary association between unrelated events that covering laws
establishes are grounded in naturally necessary relations between the essential kind-properties
of entities. More realistically, however, one can argue that covering-law political explanation
does not need to carry such a cumbersome metaphysical baggage. Indeed, one feature of the
covering-law model of explanation, and one that has been questioned above, is that it does
away with any metaphysical presuppositions about natural relations between phenomena,
the only scientifically relevant relations being ones of logical necessity.
Wanting for a realist account of political concepts, one may thus wish to uphold the
existence of natural kinds. The problem, of course, is that hardly any kind of objects that we
may draw from our ordinary use of language meets the requirements to qualify as a natural
kind. Indeed, as seen in the preceding section, even more formally defined taxonomies like
those at use in the biological sciences fail to identify type-properties. While this is reason
enough to motivate scepticism about the possibility of discriminating natural kinds in the
social world, one can always relax the criteria for typologies of social objects to count as
natural kinds. Keith Dowding (2016) has suggested for instance that such a move is required
to preserve the explanatory power of conceptual analysis in political science. In order to do
so, Dowding adopts the following criteria:
P1 Objects to which the term is applied are similar in certain respects that guide
our ordinary application of the term, fallibly but reasonably accurately, to
new cases.
P2 These similarities have a single unifying explanation that involves counter-
factual invariant generalizations.
P3 We use the term in generalizations and explanations, and wish to do so with-
out identifying the term with the cluster of observed similarities. (Dowding,
2016; 204–205)
These criteria are admittedly derived from Soames’s (2010; 89, see also 2003; ch. 17)
reformation of Saul Kripke’s prerequisites of natural kinds. Kripke’s path-breaking essay
Naming and Necessity (1972) was crucial, among other things, in breathing new life into
scientific essentialism. By combining his theory of meaning with a theory of necessity, Kripke
provided an account of linguistic reference in terms of denotation rather than connotation,
or definite description; in a famous phrase, names are for Kripke “rigid designators”. Like
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Putnam (1962) before him, Kripke infers from our “rigid” use not only of proper names,
but also of cluster concepts like “gold” or “tiger”, that their meaning—i.e. the types of
entities they refer to—cannot be anything different than what it actually is. The entities we
refer to with common names are, therefore, necessarily of the kind they are: they are, in
short, natural kinds. Kripke’s and Putnam’s broadening of the theory of rigid designation
to kind-terms as well as their use of biological examples to illustrate it seem to imply a
certain degree of essentialism about biological species which, as we have seen, is particularly
controversial. More broadly, insofar as the resulting theory of kinds is one of natural kinds,
kind-membership becomes a necessary property of entities, and the ascription of those
property must be, at least in principle, infallibly of an either-or type (either a certain animal
can definitely be called a “tiger” or it definitely can’t, either a metal can definitely be labeled
“gold” or it can’t, and so on).
Recognizing the complications that arise from the essentialist interpretation of biological
taxa and, a fortiori, political concepts like“government”,“minister”, or“freedom”, Dowding
carefully specifies that, strictly speaking, there are no such things as natural kinds in political
science. For this reason, he introduces a certain degree of fallibilism in the referential use
of concepts while at the same time attempting to preserve their generalizability (see P1
above). Ultimately, he argues, the idea one wishes to defend is that “the structural features
of the models [that instantiate those terms] correspond to features in the actual world to
the extent that the models provide predictions that (non-miraculously) are corroborated by
empirical evidence” (Dowding, 2016; 206). If we replace the term “predictions” with the
term “explanations” in the previous sentence, we can see that what is being defended here is
the explanatory power that essentialism attributes to scientific taxonomies qua classifications
of natural kinds:1 it is because class-concepts reproduce properties that are necessarily shared
by all members of a given kind that those concepts are applicable to all new cases where
instances of that kind are found, and that reference to (the dispositional characters of) those
properties proves explanatory.
It is not entirely clear, however, to what extent the degree of fallibility that Dowding
injects into conceptual analysis still allows one to speak of their referents as natural kinds:
since kind-properties are, by definition, essential, their identification must pursue an either-or
mode of analysis and cannot, as Dowding would want it, rest content with “reasonably
accurately” applying it to new cases as per P1. This is particularly relevant in that the
essentiality requirement is precisely what makes (natural) kinds explanatory: lacking such
essentiality warrant, any new explanatory application of a political concept is arbitrary.
1. The extent to which prediction can be presented as a distinctive task of science is the source of much
debate. Emphasis on prediction often bears strong positivistic connotations and can be associated with what
Hempel (1958) presented as a “symmetry” between the logical character of prediction and the logical character
of explanation according to the D-N model. Accordingly, emphasis on the (potentially) explanatory power of
predictions is found primarily in the philosophy of science of those authors who influentially defended the D-N
model of explanation, including Hempel and Popper ([1934] 2002). Because of the limitations of the D-N model
discussed at length above, here we will speak of “explanation” instead of “prediction”: this will not affect the
thrust of the general argument (for a critical assessment of the role of prediction as described by Dowding, see
Hay, 2017; Spikermann, 2017).
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Consider Dowding’s own example of a vague political concept: the concept of “government
minister”. Reference to the powers of a government minister may prove of great importance
for explaining political processes, in that the resignation of a minister can bring down a gov-
ernment or lead to a cabinet reshuffle, thereby precipitating a political crisis. More generally,
ministerial duration “touches on a centrepiece of representative democracy: accountability.
Cabinet ministers are not only collectively, but also individually, accountable for government
policy” (Fischer, Dowding, and Dumont, 2012). Accordingly, conceptual analysis may focus
on durability as a decisive factor in determining the explanatory use of the “government
minister” category. Nonetheless, ministerial stability turns out to be only loosely related to
the stability of government: in post-war Sweden, high ministerial turnover did in fact secure
a strong government stability, while in Italy the average duration of ministerial experience
between the post-war period and 1992 was four times the average duration of the relative
governments (Bäck et al., 2009; Verzichelli, 2009). As Fischer, Dowding, and Dumont (2012)
argue, this variability can be related to the amorphousness of the assortment of phenomena
that “durability” describes. The duration of a ministerial office, as well as its consequences
for government stability, are likely to be affected by “environmental” factors like the type
of governmental system, constitutional rules, cabinet composition, ministerial rank, etc.,
along with the personality characteristics of the particular minister and PM and exogenous
shocks like scandals. Empirical studies, in particular, show that the resignation of ministers
in democratic systems has important political consequences due to considerations about
public opinion and accountability. The problem, of course, is that government ministers
play a decisive role not only in democracies, but also in authoritarian regimes. In this
sense, the concept of “government minister” encompasses a wide variety of different roles
with different characteristics, and a general theory of the political importance of ministerial
players in terms of their durability in office would be of no explanatory use. Without the
possibility of anchoring ministerial durability to any structural—i.e. essential—features of
the ministerial office under any regime, “durability” itself becomes so abstract a term to be
referentially vacuous: we are thus unable to causally explain the political consequences of a
ministerial resignation by simply referring to the capacity to produce government crises that
the durability in office of a government minister carries with itself.
As one can see, the explanatory power of political concepts like “government minister” is
irremediably weakened by the fact that they do not refer to natural kinds. It is because there
are no dispositional properties that are essentially shared by all ministerial offices that we
are unable to pinpoint the causal powers of ministerial “durability”, and therefore reference
to government ministers as such yields no conclusions that can count as causal explanations
of political processes such as cabinet crises. Importantly, the impossibility of identifying
natural kinds that could underwrite the explanatory use of political concepts squares nicely
with the metaphysics of dispositions defended above. As the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong
view of laws shows most clearly, the essential properties that define natural kinds are what
law-like statements are about, since the entities that carry them necessarily have the capacity
to bring about a certain class of events; the ascription of those dispositional properties
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to a certain class of entities thus implies a necessary connection between the activation
of those dispositions and the realization of their correlate events. As Bhaskar has argued,
such necessary connection between events implies the nomological closure of the system in
which they occur, as presupposed by the covering-law model of explanation. Contrary to the
Humean view according to which events are tied together by a relation of logical necessity,
but not a truly causal connection, the “productive” view of causation demands that causal
relations be understood as genuine processes. As argued above, such view is required by the
realist assumption that underlies non-nomological political explanation, and its metaphysical
complement can be identified in a theory of individual properties. Mechanism-based models
of explanation, for instance, distinctively refer to the organized way in which particular
entities interact as the decisive explanatory factor, thus recognizing implicitly that causation
is produced by the contextual activation of some causal properties of scientific objects.
Generally speaking, scientific realism bids that causal explanation correspond to the way in
which phenomena are brought about in a lawless world, and therefore identify the particular
causes of potentially recurring causal processes. Metaphysically, this translates into the
presupposition that it is the individual properties of particular entities that ultimately ground
the phenomenal explananda of science, and therefore underwrite both the regularities that
we may experience and the causal processes that generate them. The type-properties that
universal predicates express, therefore, can be thought of as supervenient on token-properties,
and the kinds of entities they define ought be treated nominalistically.
Within this framework, the explanatory value of political concepts remains an open
question to be answered, as is their overall status and value within political science as a
scientific endeavour. Ultimately, addressing this issue will also provide an answer to the
general question about the nature of politics as a separate domain of scientific investigation
since, as we have seen, this can be understood as a superordinate kind-concept belonging
in the highest taxonomical rank of social objects according to a ladder of classificatory
abstraction.
4. Political concepts as clusters
Given that many kinds of scientific objects, like biological species or political concepts, do not
present unequivocally essential (e.g. necessary and sufficient) characteristics that could serve
as guidelines for attributing kind-membership to individual objects, an influential tradition
in the philosophy of classification has altogether discarded essentialism about kinds. On
this view, the scientific class-concepts that are ordinarily employed for explanatory purposes
do not refer to anything like natural kinds. Indeed, the very idea of a natural kind is often
considered to be non-referential, since there are no such things as essential type-properties
and therefore sharp demarcations between different types of objects do not usually obtain.
For this reason, Nelson Goodman (1975) spoke of our classificatory practices as consisting
of “relevant kinds” rather than “natural kinds”, in that “‘natural’ suggests some absolute
categorical or psychological priority, while the kinds in question are rather habitual or
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traditional or devised for a new purpose” (Goodman, 1975; 63). Revealingly, Goodman
developed this idea in connection with the “new riddle of induction” he famously posed
with respect to the problem of confirming universal hypotheses. Generalizations, Goodman
argues, derive their law-like character from their confirmation, yet confirmation in turn
depends on the predicates they refer to: in a famous example, by observing that all emeralds
observed thus far have been green we may arrive at the universal conclusion that all emeralds
are green just as we can formulate a hypothesis that all emeralds are “grue” (i.e. that they
will be green until a certain date, and blue afterwards). Since those predicates are mutually
exclusive, the particular law-like hypotheses we assume depend on the predicates we choose:
emeralds cannot be at the same time green and grue, and therefore to hold that all emeralds
are green implies that we take the class of green emeralds to be real at the expense of the
class of grue emeralds. The reality of kinds, therefore, is only a matter of their relevance to
our explanatory theory; in Goodman’s words, “The uniformity of nature we marvel at or
the unreliability we protest belongs to a world of our own making” (Goodman, 1975; 63)
Drawing on Goodman’s notion that kinds correspond to “ways of worldmaking” rather
than real essences, Ian Hacking has developed a now standard nominalist account of what
he called “human kinds”. Unlike natural kinds, Hacking argued, human kinds are “peculiar
to people in a social setting” (Hacking, 1995; 25). For Hacking, the properties of entities
that require a social setting to be applicable are by definition non-natural and not anchored
to essences, and therefore allow us to select and organize social objects into kinds which are
constructed according to Goodmanian criteria of relevance rather than discovered (Hacking,
1991a, 1992; see also Hacking, 1999; ch. 5). In Hacking’s famous example, “child abuse” is
a socially constructed idea (though Hacking is reluctant to talk about social construction)
because the kind of phenomena it refers to is “made and molded”, as is the kind of social
actors that are responsible for those phenomena—the “child-abusers”. The term itself even
has a specific place and date of birth: Denver, 1961. In that year, a group of Denver-based
pedraticians led by C. H. Kempe identified and announced a “battered child syndrome”
caused by parents beating up their babies and based on X-ray proofs of unreported fractures
or bruises. This is not to say, of course, that before 1961 no physically abusive behaviour
could be identified in parental care. But the Hempe group constructed—or, in Hacking’s
jargon, “molded”—it as a kind by selecting radiological evidence of bruises and fractures at
different stages of healing as its defining property.
As Hacking (1991b) notes, human kinds are typically malleable categories. In everyday
language, for instance, parents are often identified as child-abusers without requiring for
the extent of their abusive behaviour to involve breaking their small children’s bones. Even
Kempe’s choice of label for the “battered children syndrome” does not match the larger
meaning that common law attaches to battery, which also includes burning children with
cigarettes, scalding them, and the like (Hacking, 1991b; 270). Hacking’s account of the
reasons why the Hempe group focused on bruises and bone fractures in molding child abuse
will prove particularly instructive for our purposes, and we shall return to them in section ??
Before asking why “human kinds” are constructed the way they are, however, it is important
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to ask how they are constructed. In the absence of essentially shared properties that ground
kinds onto natural divisions between real-world types of entities, assessing the scientific use
of non-natural kinds from a realist standpoint requires investigating the criteria that actually
guide those kind-making processes. Such criteria lie outside the scope of Hacking’s work,
and Hacking seems to allow for all sorts of criteria to be adopted in kind-making (Hacking,
1991b). This is because human kinds involve a selection of “social properties” which are, by
definition, identified as such in a “social setting”; they are selected not by nature, as it were,
but by the (socially situated) inquirers.
For this reason, human kind-concepts are often treated not as Kripkean rigid designators,
but as words whose meaning is determined by their particular use. This echoes some
fundamental aspects of the theory of reference developed by the laterWittgenstein,who coined
the term “language-games” to stress the fact that the referential use of language is regulated
by contextual and agreed-upon rules which resemble the rules of a game. Like the meaning of
common names, criteria of kind-membership are not determined by metaphysical criteria of
necessity and sufficiency. Indeed, rules of kind-making have no grounding whatsoever outside
the mind of the beholders; they are instead determined by their specific classificatory use.
For this reason,Wittgensteinian metaphors are often invoked to emphasize this contingency
and artificiality: the defining properties of human kinds are often characterized as “family
resemblances” that the observer identifies between objects rather than properties that kind
members possess essentially. The practice of kind-making thus appears, in Wittgenstein’s
terms, like spinning a thread by twisting fibre on fibre: “the strength of the thread resides
not in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping
of many fibres” (Wittgenstein, [1953] 2009; §66). Kind-concepts, that is, do not refer to
a hard core of necessary attributes that its members possess; rather, they are defined by a
whole spectrum of different attributes which stand in a relation of affinity to one another.
Following Boyd (1989, 1999a), Chakravartty (2007) characterized the kinds that result from
the application of such non-essentialist criteria of membership as clusters: unlike natural
kinds, which are characterized by necessitarian criteria of kind-membership, cluster kinds
are polythetic, in that “the possession of a clustered subset of some set of properties, no one
of which is necessary but which together are sufficiently many, entails kind membership”
(Chakravartty, 2007; 158).2
2. In the attempt to deal with anti-essentialist criticism while at the same time trying to rescue the notion that
natural kind-concepts may serve explanatory purposes, Richard Boyd (1988, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1999a, 1999b,
1999c) has introduced the idea of “homeostatic property clusters” (HPC). On the HPC conception, some causal
mechanisms may be active that tie particular properties together into clusters and keep them in homeostasis. As
a result, natural kinds may be real despite essentialism being false. So, for instance, biological species are the
product of a variety of homeostatic mechanisms—gene exchange between certain populations and reproductive
isolation from others, effects of common selective factors, co-adapted gene complexes and other limitations on
heritable variation, developmental constraints, the effects of the organism-caused features of evolutionary niches,
and so on—that establish stable evolutionary patterns (Boyd, 1999a). Accordingly, the species that manifest
those patterns may be recognized as real kinds.
However, the presence or absence of such homeostatic mechanisms in the social world is an entirely con-
tingent fact that can, at most, be established empirically. As a consequence, whether or not political concepts
designate HPCs does not affect the contention that political classifications do not map onto natural kinds in any
metaphysical sense.
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Let us return briefly to the child abuse example. Arguably, each case of child abuse
is different from the others in many respects, including crucial aspects concerning the
nature and extent of the abuse. And even if one confines their own attention to battered
children with unrecorded fractures, each fracture may be the result of being thrown at
the wall or down the stairs as well as beaten up. Individual cases of child abuse, in short,
bear more differences than similarities, at least as far as essential properties go. Focusing
on roentgenographic examination, however, allowed for the Kempe group to play down
the specificities of individual abuses and identify “family resemblances” between different
cases, and therefore arrive at a common definition of the “battered child syndrome” and
its associated kinds, “battered children” and “child-batterer”. Let us now move to political
concept-formation. As Goertz (2006) points out, the concepts at use in social research are
often characterized in a way that makes them based on variants either of the necessity-
and-sufficiency approach to kinds or the family-resemblance one. Indeed, while a latent
essentialism about social science concepts has always been the standard view, a family
resemblance concept structures has been implicitly but manifestly adopted in many strands
of quantitative analysis (Goertz, 2006; ch. 2). Consider again the example of cabinet
ministers. While emphasizing the relevance of ministerial stability in explaining political
processes, Fischer, Dowding, and Dumont (2012) note that stability is determined by the
theoretical concept of “durability”. Just like the concept of “minister” is an abstract term that
identifies a class of heterogeneous political offices, the theoretical properties that define it and
determine its explanatory role—stability and durability—are abstractly constructed from
the factors that empirically and even theoretically influence ministerial duration. No one
single property affecting the length of time ministers are in office is necessary and sufficient
to unequivocally pinpoint the concept of minister. Instead, durability identifies a cluster of
different properties that are not necessarily shared by all members of the class of ministers.
Ministers in authoritarian regimes, for instance, are less likely to be removed from office
depending on the length of time “their” leaders are in office, while cabinet reshuffles are a
recurring feature of democratic regimes. For these reasons, Fischer, Dowding, and Dumont
(2012) argue,“a ‘general theory’ of ministerial durability is likely to be somewhat amorphous”
(Fischer, Dowding, and Dumont, 2012; 516): the properties that affect ministerial duration
bear at best family resemblances between one another that allow for all of them to count as
“durability” factors.
The idea of “family resemblances” was introduced in political conceptual analysis by
Collier and Mahon Jr. (1993), in open contrast to the “Aristotelian” mode of concept
formation critically discussed by Sartori (1970). Collier and Mahon Jr. note that family-
resemblance categories are rather common in comparative politics (e.g. in the literature on
corporatism and political participation). In all these cases, they argue, concept formation
does not necessarily involve climbing the ladder of abstraction in order to increase the
extensional coverage of concepts. This is because family-resemblance concepts only require
a certain affinity between members of the kinds they define, not necessary and sufficient
properties. Therefore, the intensional definition of those concepts can be defined contextually,
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and the inclusion of new members does not require a higher level of generality. In these
respect, Collier and Mahon Jr. conclude, the typologies that are constructed according to a
family-resemblance logic are more similar to configurational typologies than to hierarchically
ordered taxonomies. Unlike necessity and sufficiency typologies, in configurational typologies
the attributes of a category are not added to those of superordinate categories, thereby
increasing the specificity; rather, the subordinate categories that “radiate” outward from a
superordinate category are fully contained within the latter. Lower-order categories are, in
short, diminished rather than augmented subtypes (Gerring, 2012; 728). In this respect, it is
often argued that democracy constitutes such a “radial” category, in that the differentiating
attributes associated with “participatory,”“liberal,” and “popular” democracy are contained
within the primary category (Collier and Mahon Jr., 1993; 824).
Whether the political kind-concepts that are constructed according to a family resem-
blance mode of analysis are best viewed as forming a taxonomy or a configurational typology,
family resemblances still provide a basis for constructing ordered typologies. Consequently,
one can still see the underlying general conception of politics as the primary kind-concept
from which all secondary categories radiate or differentiate. Consider again the example of
democracy. Where taxonomists see a concept with decreased intension (but increased exten-
sion) with respect to its sub-types (“participatory democracy”,“liberal democracy”,“popular
democracy”), the configurational typologist sees an ideal type which is instantiated in its
particular forms. On a non-essentialist view of kinds such as the one that family-resemblance
criteria of kind-membership imply, however, the concept of democracy cannot be but a theo-
retical abstraction that is arrived at—or constructed or molded—by selecting some relevant
affinities manifested by its real-world members. Similarly, “authoritarianism” constitutes a
nominal kind that is constructed by identifying some family resemblance between, say, the
authoritarian features of populist regimes and those of bureaucratic regimes, irrespective of
how one conceives the relation between authoritarianism and its populist or bureaucratic
subtypes. It is possible, along these lines, to identify further family resemblances between
democracy and authoritarianism, thus tying them together into a cluster of “regimes”, and
so on and so forth, all the way up to “the political system” or related kind-concepts.
5. Scientific realism and family-resemblance typologies
The non-essentialist view of kinds as clusters rather than essences seems to pose a prima
facie problem for realism. Because kinds are nominal, they belong in our language: it is
through our classificatory discourse that kinds are constructed. In this sense, kinds are
mind-dependent entities rather than real type-essences. From a realist point of view, this
makes kinds non-referential and of little explanatory use, since they do not allow one to refer
to actual causal process triggered by the particular dispositions of social objects. Reference
to the family resemblances between those dispositions is not sufficient to make inferences to
the causal processes they are capable of producing. Participatory democracy, for instance, is
characterized by involvement in the decision-making processes that directly affect people’s
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lives, while representative democracy involves the election of representatives to whom is
delegated the authority to adopt and make public decisions, and therefore to rule. As a result,
the policy-making processes that result from these different democratic forms will also be
very different from one another. The Rousseauian ethos that animates social movements
demanding participatory inclusion can be seen as emphasizing precisely this aspect, which
cannot be captured simply by referring to democracy as an abstract concept characterized by
“rule by the people”—a family resemblance between very different decision-making processes.
This is even more evident if democracy as a cluster of different systems of collective decision-
making is extended to include other procedures whose affinity to traditional democratic
types is more remote, such as e.g. economic democracy.
There is, however, a further dimension to many constructivist approaches to human
kinds that turns them into partially mind-independent entities. Hacking (1995), for instance,
famously spoke of “the looping effect of human kinds” with reference to the performative
action that classificatory practices can exert on the objects they classify. Human kinds,
the argument goes, refer to kinds of self-conscious people who can therefore take those
kinds into account as part of their self-knowledge. Unlike the inanimate entities of the
natural world (e.g quarks), people who are typified as, say, “woman refugees” can become
aware that they are identified as such and act accordingly. As Hacking put it, “Women
refugees who do not speak one word of English may still, as part of a group, acquire the
characteristics of women refugees precisely because they are so classified” (Hacking, 1999;
32). By acting in accordance with the way they are classified, that is, people can acquire
the defining characteristics of the kind they are ascribed to. In this way, kinds which were
merely nominal entities at the time of their construction can turn into real kinds (although,
perhaps, they lack the requirement of essentiality that would make them natural kinds).
The fact that kinds are real not in virtue of some mind-independent essence implies that
their construction is not itself regulated by some principles of realism. It is, to some extent,
contingent. Nelson Goodman captured this feature by referring to non-natural kinds as
relevant kinds: as he put it, “‘natural’ suggests some absolute categorical or psychological
priority, while the kinds in question are rather habitual or traditional or devised for a new
purpose” (Goodman, 1975; 63). Relevance is in fact a crucial factor in selecting the family
resemblances that define cluster kinds. As Hacking noted with respect to child abuse, battery
is but one possible form of abusive behaviour, and parents battering their children to the
effect of leaving radiographically detectable consequences are a yet smaller subset of abusive
carers. For Hacking, the reason why the Kempe group narrowly focused on X-ray evidence
is a matter of relevance. Specifically, what allowed them to identify a specific kind of parents
as “child-batterers” was its relevance in accounting for the consequences of their seriously
abusive behaviour: battered children may be repeating the type of childcare practiced on
them once they become parents, and it is necessary to counter the physicians’ generalized
reluctance to relating certain aspects of fracture healing to parental abuse. Although Kempe
et al. (1962) extended the “battered child syndrome” to include any type of injury, they
concluded their article with a warning to physicians about the importance of diagnosing the
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signs and symptoms of child abuse to avoid its future repetition.
That classifications are contingent because they are a matter of what is contextually
recognized as relevant by those who construct them also implies that multiple classifications
of the same phenomena are possible. Hacking points out for instance that before the Denver
group of paediatricians presented their findings in 1961 child abuse had been a widely
discussed social issue since the Victorian age. Yet what the Victorians identified as “cruelty to
children” was also shaped—or molded—by what they perceived as relevant. To cite but one
of the most striking examples, sexual assault did not count as cruelty to children in Victorian
courts—though it was surely dealt with as a serious offence. This is because, Hacking argues,
“cruelty to children was one of the last of the great Victorian crusades, and came after
anti-slavery, factory legislation about child employment, temperance, the extension of the
suffrage, anti-vivisection, and cruelty to animals” (Hacking, 1999; 134). Cruelty to children
was, in other words, an issue that liberals saw as demanding social reform, and therefore
it was framed in class-based terms as a matter of poor people hurting their children, not
in medical terms as a multi-faceted pattern of harmful parental care. In this case, different
family resemblances (primarily of a social nature) were being selected among different cases
of cruelty to children that led to a different extension of the concept of child abuse than
Kempe et al.’s definition of the “battered child syndrome”.
The fact that multiple, overlapping, and mutually incompatible classifications of the
same phenomena are possible does not per se speak in favour of the validity of one to the
detriment of another. In fact, all such classifications can be constructed (or re-constructed)
in a way that makes their relative kinds equally real. John Dupré (1993) recognized this
consequence of the non-essentialist view of kinds in his defence of “promiscuous realism”
about biological taxonomies:
My thesis is that there are countless legitimate, objectively grounded ways of classifying objects in
the world. And these may often cross-classify one another in indefinitely complex ways. Thus
while I do not deny that there are, in a sense, natural kinds, I wish to fit them into a metaphysics
of radical ontological pluralism, what I have referred to as “promiscuous realism”. (Dupré, 1993;
18)
Similar considerations can be found in Abraham Kaplan’s (1964) influential textbook on
the philosophy of the social sciences (Kaplan, 1964; see especially ch. 2, §6). Every concept,
Kaplan argues, is but “a prescription for organizing the materials of experience so as to be
able to go on about our business. Everything depends, of course, on what our business is”.
So, for instance, the concept of an “individual” can be many different things—“different
for the economist and the anthropologist, different even for the physical and the cultural
anthropologist, and perhaps different according to whether a prehistoric or a contemporary
culture is in question, and so endlessly” (Kaplan, 1964; 46). Consequently, the purpose of
scientific classifications based on those concepts—including social science classifications,
such as e.g. Lazarsfeld’s (1954) “latent structure analysis”—is “to facilitate the fulfillment
of any purpose whatever, to disclose the relationships that must be taken into account no
matter what” (Kaplan, 1964; 51)
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As far as politics is concerned, different aspects of social phenomena can be and effectively
have been emphasized as characteristic of political reality. Insofar as these are seen as uniquely
characterizing the nature of politics, however, these typologies are conducive to different
classifications of what counts as “political”. So, for instance, Easton’s (1957) presents
the political system as a unitary system for making binding decisions (the “authoritative
allocations of values”) that is functionally separate from the setting it is immersed in (4.1):
in this case, family resemblances are identified with respect to the institutional locus in
which authority is exerted, while the similarities with other methods of making authoritative
decisions are downplayed. Robert Dahl (1976), by contrast, defined the political system as
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Figure 4.1: Easton’s model of the functioning of political systems (Easton, 1957; 384).
“any persistent pattern of human relationship that involves, to a significant extent, control,
influence, power or authority” (Dahl, 1976; 10), thus suggesting that the use of coercive
means for making decisions is more relevant than the site in which those decisions are made.
Yet other theories, typically Schmittian or neo-Schimittian, emphasize sheer violence or
antagonism over the coercive achievement of decisions (Schmitt, [1932] 2007; Mouffe, 1993,
2000, 2005); and still other classifications are possible.3
One can certainly provide more nuanced accounts of the general character of politics that
are less easy to classify in terms the particular features of social life they emphasize. One way
to do so is to shift the focus away from the site in which binding decisions are made as well
as from the means by which those decision are implemented (authoritative or otherwise). In
defining politics as “the authoritative allocation of values for a society”, for instance, Easton
(1965) suggests that the outputs of the political system—the allocated values—are crucial
to the characterization of its functioning, thus reinforcing Lasswell’s ([1936] 1958) dictum
that politics is at once about “who gets what, when, how”. According to Bartolini (2016),
Easton defines politics simultaneously as institutional locus and as allocation. Nonetheless,
the authoritativeness of such allocation is what ultimately gives it a political character as
distinct, e.g., from the economic allocation of goods. What distinguishes political goods (i.e.
3. Bartolini (2016) has provided an extensive list of different conceptions of politics, which he grouped into
six families depending on the “family resemblances” they emphasize: politics as activity, politics as institutional
locus, politics as conflict, politics as the use of coercive means, politics as allocation.
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values) from goods of other sorts is the fact that their allocation is enforced authoritatively
by the political system. The institutional locus of political authority, therefore, is where the
distinction between the allocation of values and the allocation of other goods lies: the site
of politics thus becomes the ultimate factor that determines the boundaries of the political
sphere.
In fact, one may claim that the reason why the allocation of values is different from
the allocation of other goods is not that the political system makes binding decisions about
them, but that the political system guarantees that people are entitled to the achievement and
distribution of any goods in virtue of guaranteed rights (Stoppino, 2001; Bartolini, 2016). In
this conception, the authoritative means by which values are allocated as well as the nature
of the outputs of such allocation are less decisive factors in the definition of politics than is
the fact that the entitlement to those goods is guaranteed in the form of rights. This leaves
open the question as to what distinguishes guaranteed vs. non-guaranteed claims over final
values. As with allocation, further distinctions about the nature of social interactions need
be drawn in order to identify the specifically political character of certain social processes.
Typically, to talk about guaranteed rights is to talk about the legitimacy of the authority
that confers them, and therefore in the collective acceptance of the power of such authority.
Compliance to the system of rights, in other words, is necessary in order for the political
arena to be distinguished from other ways of obtaining access to goods, such as e.g. market
allocation or coercive allocation by means of brute force.
This does not mean, however, that conceptualizations of politics on the basis of collective
acceptance are less prone to the relativity that derives from the fact that concept formation
requires a stipulation about the relevant properties that define such concepts. Each of
the general theories of politics emphasizes a specific aspect of certain social phenomena
according to which they count as “political phenomena”, thereby making the objects that
dispositionally generate them belong in an analytically separate sphere of society. The
selection of family resemblances among those phenomena, as Goodman put it, a matter
of relevance: typologies necessarily discard some family resemblances in favour of others
while climbing the ladder of generality. Political phenomena can be seen as both taking place
in a more or less institutional locus and as decision-making processes that are carried out
through coercive means: whether one focuses on the former or on the latter aspect is a matter
of selection. This results in partially overlapping conceptions of the political sphere that
are at times mutually incompatible with one another. On the one hand, therefore, general
theories of politics can be made compatible with the requirements of scientific realism, and
causal realism in particular; on the other hand, promiscuity in Dupré’s sense seems to be
the inevitable outcome of our classificatory practices. For kind-concepts are both real and
dependent on how we go about defining it in a way that makes different, mutually exclusive
typologies equally valid on the basis of realist criteria.
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Conclusion
The apparent price that scientific realists have to pay because of their nominalist meta-
physics about universal properties seems to be the arbitrariness of scientific classifications,
even when these are constructed for explanatory purposes. The causal realist view that
sees explanandum-phenomena as generated by context-specific causal processes leads to
formulating causal explanations that trace causal processes to the dispositional properties
that endow individual entities with the causal power to generate certain phenomena. The
scientific metaphysics that results from this causal realist picture of the social world has been
shown to be one of “powerful particulars”, or particular objects whose causal powers derive
from their individual properties. The universal properties that natural kinds presuppose
seem to have no place in the causal-realist metaphysics.
This is because, as argued in the previous chapter, a realist view that sees universal
properties as much real as particular properties would result in the well-known problem of
instantiation that has led philosophers either to abandon realism about individual properties
in favour of the view that all properties are categorical, or to adopt a downright Humean
view about the causal irrelevance of individual properties. These are, respectively, the Dretske-
Tooley-Armstrong version of nomonological realism and the anti-realist view of causation.
These have been shown to be utterly incompatible with causal realism, and therefore the
realist solution to the problem of instantiation—which concerns the dubious relation between
individual and universal properties—has proven to be nominalism about universals.
In this way, however, classifications can only be grounded on family resemblances between
particular properties and not on the universal properties that would metaphysically sustain
the existence of natural kinds. Therefore, the formation of scientific typologies, of which
political concept formation is an instance, must be based on metaphysically unwarranted
stipulations about the relevance of family resemblances, which produce divergent but unde-
cidable definitions of political concepts. Moreover, the definition of politics as a scientific
domain has been shown the be the product of such classifications of social objects by way
of political concepts, and therefore the scope of political science remains necessarily—i.e.
metaphysically—indeterminate on the criteria of scientific realism.
The next chapter will outline a possible solution to this problem by comparing the
formation of classificatory concepts to the construction of scientific models. Like scientific
typologies, models can be seen as representations of reality whose validity cannot be estab-
lished by confronting them with any features of the objects they represent. However, the
explanatory purpose of experimental models, like that of scientific classifications, makes them
testable on the way the phenomena they purportedly account for are modelled. Explanatory
classifications, in particular, are constructed on the basis causal models of phenomena—the
models of explanation discussed in the first part of the present work. While classifications
per se cannot be directly judged through the lenses of scientific realism, their explanatory
adequacy can be judged in terms of the degree of causal realism of the model of explanation
they presuppose.
Chapter 5
Modelling politics
“What a useful thing a pocket-map is!” I remarked.
“That’s another thing we’ve learned from your Na-
tion,” said Mein Herr, “map-making. But we’ve
carried it much further than you. What do you con-
sider the largest map that would be really useful?”
“About six inches to the mile.”
“Only six inches!” exclaimed Mein Herr. “We very
soon got to six yards to the mile. Then we tried
a hundred yards to the mile. And then came the
grandest idea of all! We actually made a map of the
country, on the scale of a mile to the mile!”
“Have you used it much?” I enquired.
“It has never been spread out, yet,” said Mein Herr:
“the farmers objected: they said it would cover the
whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we
now use the country itself, as its own map, and I
assure you it does nearly as well.”
Lewis Carroll (1894)
Introduction
This chapter seeks to provide evaluation criteria for conceptualizations of politics. At the be-
ginning of the present work, it has been argued that the concept of politics emerged first and
foremost as a scientific concept that could accommodate the definition of the scope of political
science. Because this goal was achieved on the basis of the demarcationist philosophy of sci-
ence on which the covering-law orientation of early philosophy of science, the realist criticism
to the covering-law model of explanation inevitably extended to the possibility of drawing
just such demarcation of scope. Specifically, causal realism sees explanandum-phenomena as
the outcomes of observable causal processes rather than as primitive components of reality,
and therefore it demands that the goal of scientific explanation is recast from one that allows
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for causal relations to be defined in purely inferential terms to one that sees causal relations
as corresponding to the metaphysical structure of reality. It should not strike one as especially
surprising, thus, that abandoning the demarcationist pretensions of anti-realism leads to the
impossibility of providing a demarcation of the scope of political science that is not based
on actual divisions in social reality. Because such sharp divisions are not available, however,
a metaphysical definition of classificatory concepts is, in realist terms, wishful thinking.
On the other hand, because of the scientific nature of domain-concepts, it seems quite
natural that they still be accounted for in scientific terms. More specifically, the classifi-
catory concepts that serve as definitions of the boundaries of particular fields of scientific
investigation have been shown to be the products of classifications that are built for ex-
planatory purposes, and therefore one may demand that they be assessed on the basis of
their explanatory value. In this chapter, I will show how this can be achieved by considering
those concepts as nothing else than scientific models. While it may seem counterintuitive to
compare theoretical concepts to the representational models of the empirical sciences, the
next two sections will argue that some views of models, particularly some variants of the
so-called “semantic view”, can capture the elusive nature of classifications in terms of the
ineliminably representational aspect of science. In particular, I shall refer to what Ronald
Giere (1999b) has termed “the representational view of models” to show how scientific
models require a definition that involves a stipulation about what they can represent. The
resulting view of models is one that sees them as objects that are able to describe some
aspects of reality not because they represent some features of the world more accurately
than others, but because they can “stand in for” real-world objects by being similar to them
(section 1).1
Because the representational power of models derives entirely from the way they are
defined as well as from stipulations about what they can or cannot represent, their scientific
value rests upon the purpose on which they are defined (section 2). This also means that
the modelling activity of science may result in the production of scientific objects that are
equally valid on the basis of their representational character. The analogy with concept
formation is rather straightforward: like models, classifications are the product of definitions
of classificatory concepts that involve a stipulation about the similarities between particular
properties on the basis of which the objects that possess them are included into class-
concepts. Like models, classifications are built for explanatory purposes, and the multiplicity
of classifications that can be produced correspond to the different ways of defining the
conduct of empirical social science or, in other words, to different models of explanation.
The experimental models of science, however, can be compared to reality by way of
models of data that determine the fit of the model with the world, thus potentially reducing
the pluralism of models. In the final section of this chapter I shall argue that what determines
the fit of classificatory concepts with the world are just the models of explanation on which
1. Of course, the idea that models are (abstract) objects that are devoid of truth value has not gone uncriticized.
Nonetheless, even critics of Giere’s account do not necessarily reject the notion that models have an inherently
representational aspect (see e.g. Mäki, 2011). Moreover, the representational view of models is invoked here
mainly because of the analogy between the function of models and that of political concepts.
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they are constructed and which provide their ultimate anchor to reality. This view thus sees
models of explanation as the testing ground for classificatory concepts and, by extension, for
the ways in which the boundaries of scientific domains are defined. Just like experimental
models determine possible realizations of data and can be discarded by failures of such
realizations, political concepts can be discarded because the models of explanation they
presuppose fail to match the way in which reality ought be metaphysically conceptualized.
1. The representational view of models
The differences in the conceptualizations of politics that result from this process of selection
lie not only in the extension of the concept of politics, but also in the overall image of politics
they yield. Focus on the locus of politics, for instance, allowed Easton to speak of the political
system as a spatially situated arena of decision-making, which for Searle is co-extensive with
government. Dahl’s concern with coercion, on the other hand, implies a more diffuse—or
“pluralist”—conception of politics that includes non-institutional “interest groups” capable
of exerting influence on decision making: what Dahl refers to as “political influence” is
dispersed because coercive power is distributed unequally across all strata of society rather
than concentrated (Dahl, 1961). As Figure 4.1 shows most clearly, these conceptions can be
represented as visual models that reproduce the salient features that have been selected in
the definition of the concepts that such models represent.
Clarke and Primo (2012) argue that models are ubiquitous in political science, though
the models they refer to are issue-specific ones that are use to account for very specific
phemomena. Zupan (1991) resorted for instance to game-theoretic models—specifically,
the Prisoner’s Dilemma—to explain ticket splitting in American elections, i.e. the practice
of casting a ballot for one party when selecting who will represent them in Congress and
a different party when selecting the president. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) also drew on
game theory and utilized the divide-the-dollar game by modelling legislative policy-making
as a bargaining process among legislators interested in maximizing their share. As these
game-theoretic examples show, many social-science models (including political models) draw
on economics, a vastly mathematized science where theoretical and empirical models are
common tools that are used primarily to deal with a highly complex subject matter (Sugden,
2000). In this respect, one should also mention that many fields of physics also employ
models for ease of treatment (Redhead, 1980). As a result, the status of models is a widely
discussed matter in the philosophy of those special sciences, and many conflicting views have
been proposed regarding the status and purpose of models in particular disciplines.
In contrast, it is rather uncommon to characterize whole domains of investigations in
terms of models. What follows is an attempt to do so by selectively identifying some features
that are commonly attributed to models, particularly in Ronald N. Giere’s version of “the
semantic view of theories”. Broadly speaking, this view takes models to be theoretical objects
that are primitively defined and constructed in such a way as to be capable to represent, or
stand for, other objects that occupy a portion of the world. In the remainder, the features
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of models thus understood will be linked to scientific domains understood as higher-order
concepts that include large classes of objects on the basis of similarities between their causal
properties. A tentative answer to the problem of promiscuity will be sketched on the basis of
those very features of models.
Definition
Not unlike Van Fraassen (1980), Giere (1988) argues for instance that models are primarily
characterized by a definition. What Giere has in mind here are physical models like the
harmonic oscillator, which are defined by equations like the force law F = −kl, but the
similarity between the definition of models and the definition of classificatory concepts
is almost trivial: what kind-concepts include is literally defined by the selection family
resemblances between properties. The concept of “government minister”, for instance, is
defined in the abstract by identifying a theoretical cluster of features that affect, among other
things, the duration of the office as well as the political consequences of office termination.
By the same token, insofar as political conceptions can be seen as higher-order concepts
within an ordered typology, their comparison to models simply requires climbing the ladder
of abstraction. Emphasis on the site where binding decisions are made concerning “the
allocation of values for a society”, for instance, allows one to identify a higher-order status
function about the deontic power of a government which in turn rests upon the collective
acceptance of lower-order status functions—the constitutive rules of the institutions that
governments regulate (family, education, money, the economy, private property, the church)
as well as those over which they have monopoly (the police and the military).
Stipulation
Furthermore, to say that models are characterized by a definition implies a stipulation about
the validity of models: as Giere remarked about the harmonic oscillator, “the equations
truly describe the model because the model is defined as something that exactly satisfies the
equations” (Giere, 1988; 79). We have already seen how stipulation is crucial in concept
formation: like the force law, a selection of family resemblances truly describe a kind of
entities because the kind is defined by those family resemblances. Family resemblances, that
is, are identified on the basis of their relevance to constructing explanatory kinds; what
counts as family resemblance, therefore, is determined by a stipulation about what counts as
a member of the kind to be constructed. Early definitions of the political system in terms of
certain functions of social structures, for instance, were meant to displace earlier equations
between politics and the functioning of the state apparatus because of the latter’s principled
exclusion of certain structures that nevertheless could be comparatively found to perform
analogous functions: as Almond ([1960] 2015) wrote, “the articulative, aggregative, and
communicative functions may be performed diffusely within the society or intermittently
though the kinship or lineage structure”. Law-like identification of similar functions across
national contexts thus served the purposes of constructing a concept of the political system
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that “characterize[s] all of these functions and not simply those performed by the specialized
political structures” (Almond, [1960] 2015; 12). Similarly, Easton’s (1957) three-function
model of the political system was premissed on the dismissal of the distinction between
state and non-state as a relevant one for political concept formation: the reason for this,
Easton (1953) writes, resides in the fact that “we are interested in concepts that pick out the
major properties of the concrete political system” (Easton, 1953; 108). The concept of the
state, Easton argues, is inadequate to construct the class of objects that “the political system”
refers to and which must include pre-state societies because of a stipulation about the family
resemblances their functioning bears with that of state societies.
Objects and representation
An interesting consequence of this conception of models is that it makes little sense to speak
of models as true or false. As Suppes (1967) and Van Fraassen (1980) had already noted, a
model is, strictly speaking, neither true nor false: its relationship to the portion of world it
models is, as Giere (1999b) put it, one of similarity rather than true correspondence. This
means that models are objects, and the fact that they are theoretical entities or scientific
objects does not affect the way they relate to other objects, namely, by being similar to
them. This is what Giere (1999b) calls the representational view of models: all models
are representations, and representations are objects that stand in for other objects. As Van
Fraassen put it, “There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used,
made, or taken, to represent some things as thus or so” (Van Fraassen, 2008; 23).
While certain physical models, like the Rutherford-Bohr planetary model of the atom or
electrical circuits, can be clearly considered to be objects in a very lay sense, the notion that
models are objects seems to apply less straightforwardly to non-physical—mathematical or
geometrical—models like the groups of group theory and vector spaces. This is, however,
exactly the core contention of the representational view: any physical or abstract entities
(like numbers or geometrical points and lines) are objects insofar as their definition allows
for them to be interpreted as representations of existing objects. To see how this concept of
an objects can be applied to whole domains of investigation as much as to abstract models,
let us briefly consider Daston’s (2000) concept of a “scientific objects”. Unlike quotidian
objects, Daston argues, scientific objects are not simply “there to be discovered”: they are
real objects because they are the product of historical constructions. Social science objects
like “race” or natural science objects like “quarks”, for instance, can be considered as real
objects because they are constructed—and therefore brought into being—by the decades-long
or even centuries-long history of the sciences themselves.
For Daston, the shaping and molding of whole domains of investigation present the
characteristics of scientific objects in their coming into being (and passing away). As we have
seen in chapter 1, this is the trajectory followed by the division of labour among the social
science disciplines. According to Peter Wagner (2000), for instance, the coming into being of
“society” as a scientific object from the mid-eighteenth century onward was determined by
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“an observable change in the structure of social relations, i.e., in the ways the lives of human
beings are connected to each other” (Wagner, 2000; 134). The idea of society as “neither state
nor household”, in other words, was brought into being through the scientific investigation
of the functioning of the broader social order: “Statistical and demographic research was
said to reveal some solid and lawlike features in the characteristics and movements of a
population and thus to underpin the idea of the existence of ‘society’” (Wagner, 2000; 142,
emphasis in the original). Similarly, the mathematical principles of marginal utility served to
create the new scientific object “economy” as detached from politics, which would at first
remain confined to the ambit of the state. The subsequent broadening of the scope of politics
to the inner logic of an abstract “political system” also amounted to the creation of a new
scientific object on the basis of the lawlike functions that social structures fulfill in societies,
as revealed by a covering law-oriented model of conducting comparative research.
2. The promiscuity of models
That classificatory concepts can be real in the sense that they are social objects has already
been discussed in section 5. Let us now focus on the representational aspect of models.
Where others tend to present the model-world relation in terms of direct representation or
isomorphism (Suppes, 1960; Van Fraassen, 1980), Giere speaks instead of a looser relation
of similarity: while isomorphism entails a perfect correspondence between elements of the
model and the elements of the world, similarity only entails a partial analogy between them.
This is particularly evident in cartographic models, which can serve as the quintessential
epitome of the representational view. Consider Giere’s example of a standard tourist map
of the city of Pavia (Fig. 5.1). Like all cartographic models, this map is partial in that it
represents only some features of the central area of the city (only very few buildings are
included, their difference in height is ignored, etc.), and even the features of Pavia that are
actually included in the map are represented with limited accuracy: relative distances on the
map, for instance, do not correspond exactly to relative distances on the ground.
In what sense, then, does this map represent Pavia? For Giere, the answer is that
this model is spatially similar to what it represents. The lines on the map have similar
spatial orientations to the corresponding streets, the two-dimensional surface of the map
is similar to the two-dimensional surface of the city, and so on (Giere, 1999b; 45). The
difference between representation as isomorphism and representation as similarity can be
compared to the difference between natural kinds and clusters, or more precisely between
the essentiality requirement and the family-resemblance requirement for kind-membership.
Goertz (2006) has operationalized the difference between necessity/sufficiency typologies
and family-resemblance typologies in terms of the different logical operators they adopt. By
applying a two-valued Aristotelian logic with dichotomous variables, the typologies that are
based on necessary and sufficient conditions can be seen as modelled by a conjunction (the
logical operator and) between the variables that interpret the properties that are necessary
and sufficient for kind-membership. Family resemblances, on the other hand, are modelled
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Figure 5.1: Standard tourist map of the central area of Pavia, circa 1998 (Giere, 1999b; 45).
by a disjunction (the logical operator or) in that none of them are necessary and sufficient.
This can also be expressed in set-theoretic terms as an alternative between “intersection” and
“union”, or in fuzzy-logic terms as “minimum” and “maximum”, respectively (Goertz, 2006;
39–44). As one can see, the fact that the essential kinds of the former type of classifications
require a conjunction of properties means that the properties that define a kind-concept
must also be possessed by each and every of its members, thereby resulting in a one-to-one
correspondence (isomorphism) between the type-properties of a kind and the token-properties
of its members. Cluster-kinds, on the other hand, are modelled by a disjunction of properties,
and therefore such one-to-one correspondence does not ensue. In this case, the relation
between the properties of a kind and the properties of its members can be characterized as
one of similarity or, as Wittgenstein characterized family resemblance, “affinity”.
2.1. Purpose-relative models
To be sure, similarity thus defined is a vague notion that makes the representational aspect
of models trivial. Lacking some specification, anything can be said to be similar to anything
else, and even if similarity between two objects involves a selection of what features of those
objects are relevant for relevant, one needs to specify what counts as relevant. In the absence
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of such a criterion, countless legitimate but possibly contradictory models can be defined.
This is the problem of pluralism discussed in section ?? As far as models are concerned, it
is customary to rebut this charge by mentioning the fact that models are purpose-specific,
and therefore similarity need not necessarily be vacuous nor vague: usually, the purpose for
which a model has been designed also determines the respects in which the model needs to
accurately represent reality as well as the accepted degree of similarity. In this sense, the
tourist map in Fig. 5.1 can be said to be accurate for the purpose of directing tourists in that
it accurately represents the orientation of the streets as well as their junctions. Indeed, the
fact that not all buildings are indicated on the map is what makes it useful in identifying
notable monuments for tourism purposes. Subway maps, for instance, are usually less
spatially correct than tourist maps, and therefore they are useless for the purpose of walking
or driving around the city whose subway system they represent even though they spatially
represent subway stations in a way that corresponds to their relative position in the real
world. Even the subway system is usually represented inaccurately on subway maps: this
is because they are designed in order for commuters and tourists to navigate the subway,
and therefore they need to represent intersections more clearly than they need to accurately
represent the distance between subway stations.
Moving now from the cartographic to the political domain, we can see that even the
models of the special sciences that cannot be represented as maps are usually devised for a
purpose. Clarke and Primo (2012), for instance, provide a categorization of the theoretical
models used in political science in terms of their purpose, arguing that they can serve four
different roles: foundational, organizational, exploratory, and predictive. Empirical models,
by contrast, can be used for one or more of the following four purposes: theory testing,
prediction, measurement, and characterization (Clarke and Primo, 2012; ch. 4, sec. 2; ch. 5,
sec. 3; the four roles of empirical models are derived from the four roles of econometrics
as characterized by Hoover, 2006). According to this categorization, Baron and Ferejohn’s
(1989) legislative bargaining model ought be considered a foundational model, insofar as it
constructed a framework that is flexible enough to be adapted to answer different questions
related to weighted voting, government formation in parliamentary democracies, and the
provision of pork-barrel projects versus public goods in legislatures (Clarke and Primo, 2012;
85–86). Identifying a purpose for which whole scientific domains are constructed kinds
and which can serve to assess them as models, however, is far less intuitive, even though
what Clarke and Primo call the organizational and exploratory role of models can indicate
an answer. The organizational role defines a model in terms of a “framework wherein
information may be defined, collected and ordered”, while the exploratory role identifies
the function of a model that is used to “investigate the putative (causal) mechanisms or
motivations underlying phenomena of interest” (Clarke and Primo, 2012; 87, 90; these
definitions are derived from Haggett and Chorley, 1967 and; Little, 1991, respectively).
Interestingly, both the “organizational” and the “exploratory” aspect of models can be
found in Dudley Shapere’s ([1977] 1984) pioneering account of how scattered information
about phenomena come to be unified into bodies of information which he calls “domains”.
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By examining the development of natural-science fields, Shapere concludes that, given an
association based on some relation—one may say, family resemblance—between the items
considered, the unity of a scientific domain results from bodies of information which have
the following characteristics:
(1) The association is based on some relationship between the items.
(2) There is something problematic about the body so related.
(3) That problem is an important one.
(4) Science is “ready” to deal with the problem.
Accordingly, a domain can be defined as the total body of information for which, ideally, an
answer to a problem that has arisen is expected to account (Shapere, [1977] 1984; 279–281).
Lindley Darden (1974, 1976) also emphasized the role that problems posed by facts play in
hypothesis-construction and theory-building in general—although she is less concerned with
how this shapes the unity of entire scientific domains (see e.g. Darden and Maull, 1977).
More intriguingly, Darden stresses the link between problem solving and arguments from
analogy: by generalizing the form of a problem posed by facts, and by identifying similarities
between facts, the solutions of problems in a general form can constitute plausible solutions
for further problems (see e.g. Darden, 1976; 142). If one combines this with Shapere’s
account, one can see how domains can also play a foundational role in Clarke and Primo’s
sense.
One obvious problem with the above accounts is that the vagueness of the way models can
be said to be similar to reality is only shifted one step back. Whether something can be deemed
problematic, whether the problem is important, and whether science is “ready” to deal with
it is an arbitrary matter that can give origin to a virtually indefinite conceptualizations of
the domain. Shapere is aware of this problem when he consider what he calls the different
“lines of research” about the problem regarding the domain:
… there are often alternative lines of reasoning available which lead to different conclusions;
and the issue of which line has the strongest arguments in its favor is not always clear-cut. Thus,
whether a certain body of information constitutes a domain or not; whether a certain item is
or is not a part of a domain (that is, whether or not a theory for that domain is responsible for
accounting for that item); the extent to which a certain problem is important; the extent to which
the state of science is “ready” to investigate a certain problem; the degree of promise of a certain
proposed line of research; whether a certain specific sort of answer to a problem is reasonably
to be expected; whether a certain proposed answer to a problem is adequate—all these can be,
and in any given situation in the history of science are apt to be, debated. (Shapere, [1977] 1984;
293–294)
However, Shapere does not see this as particularly threatening in that the future development
of a domain can be expected to automatically resolve the disagreement (Shapere, [1977]
1984; 295). But while this Whiggish picture may have some currency in those fields of
the natural sciences where new discoveries regularly emerge, its applicability to the social
sciences, and politics in particular, is dubious. More generally, this picture is not compatible
with the view that conceptualizations of domains are models, i.e. representations which the
facts cannot discard as false.
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3. Judging models
Models thus face the same problem of pluralism that results from promiscuous typologies:
which features one selects as relevant is a matter of stipulation about the purpose of models.
A great advantage of models, however, is that this problem is considerably reduced by the
fact that models are not confronted directly with reality, but with other models of reality that
are lower down in the hierarchy of models. Suppes (1962) has introduced this theory with
respect to the formal theories of the natural sciences which are tested experimentally, thus
stressing the fact that the experiments that validate models in turn involve an interpretation
of the data in terms of the parameters of the models, i.e. they involve a model of the data
(Figure 5.2). Physical models, Suppes argues, derive their validity from the fact that their
Theoretical Models
Models of Experiments
Models of Data
Data
Figure 5.2: Patrick Suppes’s (1962) hierarchy of models. (Adapted from Giere, 1999b; 654)
definition also specifies the parameters relative to which they represent they represent reality.
The fit of experimental models with the world, for instance, is inevitably tested on the basis
of assumptions about the sort of data which the model incorporates. For models are defined
in such a way that they specify what aspects of the data they represent, which provides a
model of the data. Experimental models can thus be tested on a possible realization of the
data—i.e. a model of the data: data are thus processed so as to fit into a model of the data.
This can be extended also to the empirical models that are ordinarily used in political
science. The events that political science studies, Clarke and Primo argue, are no less complex
than the data with which physics is concerned. This is the reason why political models cannot
be but purpose-relative: the purposes of experimental models—theory testing, prediction,
measurement, and characterization—specify possible realizations of data, i.e. models of data
which provide the conditions for testing the fit of models with the world. But what about
theoretical models? Clarke and Primo acknowledge that
our refusal to provide “cookbook” answers to theoretical model evaluation runs the risk of
sounding like an “anything goes” approach. If there are no firm metrics for evaluating a model,
how can we assert that one model is superior to another, or that one family of models is superior
to another? We argue that researchers already make such determinations. (Clarke and Primo,
2012; 101)
By devising a theoretical model, the argument goes, researchers also determine its purpose,
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which can be foundational, organizational, exploratory, or predictive. In this respect, the
only difference between theoretical and empirical models is that the latter are usually of
a statistical nature, which means that they should describe accurately the dependencies
within a given data set. More generally, the assumptions of empirical models are subject to a
rigorous testing that establishes the adequacy of the model in a way that remains, at least in
part, beyond the control of the modeller, while the testing of theoretical models relies more
heavily on the internal logic of the model as well as on the scientific interests of the modeller
(Clarke and Primo, 2012; 105–106). Yet both theoretical and empirical models, qua models,
are objects that are neither true nor false, and therefore their adequacy depends on their
representational character. Just like empirical models, theoretical models are partial and
purpose-relative representations whose adequacy relies on the extent to which they fulfil a
foundational, organizational, exploratory, or predictive role.
Theoretical models can thus be judged depending on their usefulness for further model-
building (foundational role), for defining, collecting, and organizing information (organi-
zational role), for investigating un(der)known causal processes (exploratory role), and for
generating hypotheses that can be used in statistical tests on existing data (predictive role).
Just like empirical models are tested, given their purpose, on the basis of their (statistical)
adequacy to data, theoretical models can be tested on the basis of their purpose in terms of
their fecundity—i.e. does the model produce a series of important insights or just one?—and
importance—i.e. does the model yield vapid or insightful results? (Clarke and Primo, 2012;
100-101)
Finally, not unlike the experimental models of physics, the purpose of the theoretical and
empirical models of politics makes their testing based on models of data, and not on the
data themselves. This is because Suppes’s contention that models are never tested on data
but only on models of data derives from a representational view of models: since models are
objects that are neither true nor false, they can only be defined in such a way as to represent
some aspects of the world, and therefore they specify the parameters for which the data are
realized and the fit of the model to the world. Analogously, the purpose of political models
specifies what portion of the world in respect of which their empirical adequacy or their
fecundity and importance can be judged. Depending on the purpose of the model one can
thus present questions to be asked of it in order to judge its fecundity and importance:
Foundational: How flexible is the model? Can it be adapted to many different
situations? Does the model cause scholars to overhaul an existing line of
inquiry or move in entirely new directions?
Organizational: Does the model subsume a large set of models, or a perhaps
smaller set of seminal or important models? Alternatively, does the model
subsume a large set of empirical generalizations or facts, or perhaps unify a
small number of previously puzzling empirical findings? If a classification
system, does the classification system help us better understand how cases
are connected?
Exploratory: Does the model generate a significant number of interesting state-
ments or probe counterfactuals in new ways? Does the model lead the
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researcher to examine data in new ways?2 (Clarke and Primo, 2012; 101)
With respect to political models, Suppes’s hierarchy can thus be redesigned as follows:
Theoretical Empirical
Purpose of Models
(foundational, organizational,
exploratory, predictive)
(theory testing, prediction, mea-
surement, characterization)
Models of Data
(purpose-relative scope on
which the fecundity and im-
portance of models are judged)
(e.g. statistical dependen-
cies within a data set)
Data
(real-world political events)
Models
Figure 5.3: Fit of political models with the world.
One way of transposing the assessment of theoretical models at the level of whole domains
of scientific investigation is to consider the fact that they are the outcomes of classifications
that are constructed for explanatory purposes. The lower-level models which they are
confronted with are, therefore, the models of explanation. Classified objects are real-world
entities endowed with dispositional properties that underwrite the causal powers that entities
have to generate explanandum-events; classifications describe classes of entities that are
defined on the basis of family resemblances between those properties. Their explanatory
value, therefore, depends on the explanatory power of the model of explanation on which they
rely. As repeatedly mentioned, the case for moving away from a state-centred conception of
politics was originally based on epistemological concerns about the possibility of discovering
“political functions” in non-state structures. This contention was in turn based on a covering-
law view of comparative research which prescribed the search for functional regularities
across time and space. It is on this basis that the emphasis on cross-national taxonomies in
concept formation led to the characterization of an overarching “political system” which
was defined in terms of general characteristics about its (institutionally situated) functioning
as well as the outcomes it produced. Traditional conceptions of politics and the model of
reality they resulted in were thus based on a covering-law model of explanation.
2. Although models are often presented with a predictive goal, Clarke and Primo argue that theoretical models
with a mainly predictive role are quite rare to be found in practice. Most purportedly predictive models generally
focus instead on generating new (testable) hypotheses, and therefore fall under one or another of the other three
categories of models. This matches the doubts about the actual role and value of prediction in science that have
been expressed in footnote 1 above.
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Models of Scientific Domains
(e.g. “politics”)
Classifications
(stipulations about relevant
family resemblances between
dispositional properties)
Models of Explanation
(identification of relevant, disposition-
produced causal patterns)
Reality
(Entities and dispositions)
Figure 5.4: Domain-world relationship.
Clarke and Primo argue that because models are purpose-relative there is no firm metrics
for testing them. Indeed, for Clarke and Primo to argue on the contrary is tantamount
to subscribe to a D-N conception of science according to which the purpose of theories
is to generate testable hypotheses that can be validated empirically. This is because, as
they argue, the desire to test theoretical models is concomitant with the desire to choose
between explanations (Clarke and Primo, 2012; 164). Yet models of explanation are not
representational objects that are neither true nor false; even though it may be misplaced,
strictly speaking, to say that a model of explanation is “true” or “false”, their adequacy to
reality can nonetheless be assessed in some other way. The D-N model, for instance, was
fiercely criticized for some of the puzzling features it implied about the confirmation of
scientific hypotheses, which eventually led to its discredit among philosophers of science and
practicing scientists alike.
More generally, it has been argued that recent methodological debates about adequate
explanation in the social sciences in fact belie irreconcilably divergent views about the nature
of causal explanation. The alternative between covering-law and mechanism-based models
of explanations, for instance, can be interpreted in terms of an alternative between different
goals ascribed to causal explanation. In chapter 2, this has been phrased in terms of a
choice between anti-realist eliminativism (which underpins the formulation of covering laws,
and the D-N view of science that was based on it) and realism about causation (which
justifies the search for generative mechanisms). The contrast between causal realism and
anti-realism is particularly relevant in that it implies stipulations about the makeup of the
world in which the explanandum-phenomena take place. The flaws of anti-realist models of
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explanation, it has been argued, cannot but derive from underlying inadequacies about the
way in which they conceptualize the nature of causation. Conversely, a realist perspective
about causal explanation and a productive conception of the metaphysics of causation have
been advocated in the light of correspondence to the way in which phenomena are actually
produced in reality, namely, as materializations of the dispositional properties of entities.
Scientific realism thus demands that such models provide causal explanations in terms of
the causal processes as they have actually occurred in the real world. In this way, scientific
realism provides the missing link between models of explanation and reality that can serve to
judge “higher-order” models such as general conceptions about the boundaries of a specific
domain of reality, which derive from a classification of the actual properties of real-world
entities. Even though “higher-order” models cannot be directly judged by confronting them
with reality, the classificatory concepts they assume can be assessed on the basis of the model
of explanation they correspond to.
Conclusion
Throughout this work, I have argued that the different conceptualizations of the nature of
politics that characterize different political theories can be related to the purpose of guiding
scientific explanation. This is because, as an analytical construct, the very idea of politics
has been shaped by the progressive compartmentalization of social knowledge into separate
disciplines. Politics thus denotes the scope of political science, and therefore I have referred
to the sphere of phenomena it refers to as a “scientific object”. It has been further argued
that this object is constructed by means of a classificatory practice. Insofar as a scientific
object denotes a class of empirical phenomena whose causes can be identified by means
of the explanatory apparatus of a given science—i.e. its model of explanation—, those
phenomena make for a unified scientific object because they are included into a class that is
amenable to a homogeneous causal treatment through the chosen model of explanation. The
causes of political phenomena, it has been argued, ought to be identified with the particular
dispositional properties of individual entities that interact to produce certain outcomes, and
therefore each phenomenon is produced, strictly speaking, by a particular cause—or set
thereof. The only way in which the particular causes of phenomena can be homogenized into
a unified class is through the recognition of some similarity between those causes that holds
over and above their specificities. However, such similarity only exists, as it were, in the
mind of the beholder: it is the purpose of the classification that determines the classificatory
criteria, and therefore the way in which different phenomena are included into a single class
depends on what the inquirer considers to be relevant similarities for classificatory purposes.
These aspects are in fact implicit in the idea of “ideal-type” that has been influentially
developed by Max Weber. As Weber defines it,
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by
the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental
construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. (Weber, [1904] 1949;
90, emphasis in the original)
ForWeber, the elaboration of ideal types into unified analytical constructs is an important part
of theory-building, in that it allows for the inquirer to go beyond the mere reconstruction
of particular phenomena and establish their interconnectedness and relations. Mental
constructs like the idea of “the church” or the idea of “the state”—and, one may add, the
idea of “politics”—have no immediate empirical counterpart in reality, where only concrete
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and particular phenomena exist. Yet they are of great heuristic value in that they offer
guidance to the construction of explanatory hypotheses concerning individual concrete
patterns that are significant in their uniqueness, e.g. by revealing familiar but unapparent
characteristics in the Christian church or in the German and the American states. This, as we
have seen, is precisely the function of scientific models. As Clarke and Primo (2012) argue, all
representational models, particularly the models of political science, are purpose-relative; the
purposes of theoretical models, in particular, can be variously characterized as foundational,
organizational, or exploratory depending on whether they are capable of being adapted to
a variety of contexts, can organize empirical items of knowledge in an orderly fashion, or
allow to uncover previously undiscovered causal processes. Despite these internal differences,
however, it is clear that all purposes of theoretical models as identified by Clarke and Primo
can be characterized as “heuristic” in Weber’s sense, in that they all purport, so to speak, to
reduce the unfamiliar to the familiar. As a model that represents the objects that fall within
the scope of political science, the political sphere is a prime example of an ideal type: its aim
is to show that the great diversity of phenomena it encompasses can be explained in their
uniqueness by means of a similar methodological treatment.
This also makes it important to stress that these mental constructs are radically different
from real-world objects, and that they ought not be confused with them. In this respect,
Weber revealingly emphasizes that the relationship between ideal types and reality can be
generally considered to be a relationship between a class-concept and the members of that
class. However, it is clear fromWeber’s conception of ideal types that such class-concepts
cannot be taken to describe what I have referred to as “natural kinds”: insofar as the
construction of an ideal type is determined by the arrangement of concrete phenomena into
a purely theoretical construct, ideal types are mind-dependent rather than “natural”. As
Weber put it, “A ‘definition’ of such synthetic historical terms according to the scheme of
genus proximum and differentia specifica is naturally nonsense” (Weber, [1904] 1949; 93):
the meaning of those terms is instead the outcome of a stipulation, which for Weber depends
on the one-sided accentuation of the viewpoint of the particular inquirer. Ideal types are thus
cluster-concepts of the kind that, I have argued, lies at the basis of any conceptualization of
the political domain.
The similarities between ideal types and the dynamics of political concept-formation
have not gone unacknowledged; Burger ([1976] 1987), for instance, emphasizes that Weber’s
theory of ideal types accounts for the formation of the general concepts of social science
in a way that utterly conflicts with the classical understanding of the value and nature of
typology-building in the social sciences, while Collier and Mahon Jr. (1993) explicitly relate
this particular understanding of political science concepts to the procedures for making
generalizations with “family resemblances” and “radial categories”. There are, however,
important differences between the account of political concepts that I have proposed and
the theory of ideal types.
Weberian ideal types are, ultimately, value-concepts. Weber argues that the one-sided
accentuation of a certain viewpoint, which lies at the basis of the ideal-typical reliance on
116
analytical constructs, arises from the cultural significance that the inquirer attributes to the
particular events under consideration. Such significance is not to be found in any concrete
features of the particular phenomena, not even in the way these are theoretically arranged
in the abstract form of ideal types. The significance that is attributed to the phenomena
on which ideal types are constructed is instead presupposed on the idea that they can be
related to social and economic problems, and that the theorization of ideal types through
the application of the analytical methods of social science can determine more precisely
those problematical questions. With reference to the work featured in his own Archiv
für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, the journal in which his discussion of ideal types
appeared,Weber writes for instance that the emergence of the question of labour conditions
in Germany and its inclusion in public and legislative discussion in the 1880s led social
researchers to shift the accent of their work to the analysis of more universal dimensions of
the problem. The economic focus of the journal thus expanded from the study of individual
motives behind economic exchange to the overall economic conditioning of the conditions
of all social classes in all modern states. As with the case of “politics” as a scientific object,
the construction of an ideal type is thus capable of determining the boundaries of a field
which a particular empirical science investigates.
The meaningfulness of ideal types, however, is rooted in a dimension of scientific relevance
which is exogenous to their scientific investigation as such. Ideal types, writes Weber, are
valuable concepts “only because and only insofar as their existence and the form which
they historically assume touch directly or indirectly on our cultural interests and arouse our
striving for knowledge concerning problems brought into focus by the evaluative ideas which
give significance to the fragment of reality analyzed by those concepts” (Weber, [1904] 1949;
81, emphasis in the original). For this reason, “the significance of cultural events presupposes
a value-orientation towards these events”:
The concept of culture is a value-concept. Empirical reality becomes “culture” to us because and
insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments and only those segments of reality
which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance. Only a small portion of
existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us.
It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to us due to their connection
with our values. Only because and to the extent that this is the case is it worthwhile for us to
know it in its individual features. We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means
of a “presuppositionless” investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness
to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation. (Weber, [1904] 1949; 76,
emphasis in the original)
I have argued instead that the one-sided representation of whole domains of phenomena
through abstract class-concepts is internal rather than external to the logic of science. To be
sure, the conceptual typologies of science must follow a family-resemblance logic that makes
them based on a more or less arbitrary stipulation about the purpose and validity of those
classifications. Political concepts, I have argued, can only be based on family resemblances
between the particular entities they stand in for, which in turn depend on their relevance
for the purpose of the classification. For this reason, the logic of classification-building is
similar to the one-sided accentuation of the viewpoints that leads to the formation of ideal
117
types: the purposes for which classifications can be constructed are as many as the points of
view on what particular phenomena are problematically significant and worthy of typization.
The result of this variety of purposes is what I have referred to, following Dupré (1993),
as the “promiscuity” of classifications: like ideal types, no classification can be said to be
unequivocally valid on the basis of scientific criteria; in fact, all conceptualizations have an
equal claim to validity insofar as they all stress some equally valid similarity between the
real-world causes of phenomena. Nonetheless, I have characterized the purposes of political
concept-formation as explanatory rather than based on its extra-scientific cultural interest.
Insofar as political concepts are meant to denote causal similarities between the processes
that produce the phenomena of interest, their purpose is to define the applicability of a given
model of explanation. Conceptualizations of the political sphere thus acquire significance
from the model of explanation that they assume, and not from the value-orientation of the
theorist. Unlike ideal types, the meaningfulness of scientific objects is best characterized as
explanatory, and not as evaluative. It is for this reason that the concept of a representational
model has been introduced: all models, it can be argued, are purpose-relative; yet their use
is first and foremost scientific, and therefore their purpose can be subsumed under what a
scientific theory can explanatorily account for.
Not all scientific models, of course, have an explanatory purpose that can be directly
related to the model of explanation they implicitly adopt. Even though the theoretical
models of political science may all have a heuristic purpose that orients the explanatory
theories of political science, this cannot always be measured in purely explanatory terms.
Foundational models, for instance, may achieve their purpose because they prove fruitful in
further model-building, or because they reveal the previously unacknowledged importance of
the aspects they model. Clarke and Primo argue for instance that Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989)
model of legislative bargaining has provided fruitful insights on the bargaining dynamics of
international negotiations, which has led international relations scholars to study and model
the conditions for international bargaining (Clarke and Primo, 2012; 85–87). Similarly,
models can meet the purpose of organizing knowledge in a non-explanatory way, i.e. by
generalizing an existing set of models. Exploratory models, too, can be positively judged
in non-explanatory terms, even though their primary use is in investigating explanatory
mechanisms. This is because models can shed light on the relevance of certain causal factors
without implying anything as to how these are to be scientifically explained. Romer and
Rosenthal (1978), for instance, reveal a puzzling feature of political voting on tax expenditure
that arises from the way in which voters’ preferences can be modelled in relation to the tax-
expenditure decision. The agenda setter proposing a budget, in particular, can be modelled
as a budget-maximizing bureaucrat who requires voter approval to impose some tax, while
the voter’s behaviour is modelled according to choice theory. Romer and Rosenthal show
that agenda setters can exert a monopoly power that depends on facing voters with a “take-
it-or-leave-it choice”, and that is greater the worse the status quo is. However this monopoly
power is causally explained, this model reveals an existing feature of decision-making on tax
expenditure that depends on the relative position of voters vis-à-vis agenda setters and which
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the models uncovers thanks to its simplification of the behaviour of the relevant actors.
Unlike the theoretical models of political science, however, the conceptualizations of
“politics” as a scientific object have a quintessentially explanatory purpose that depends on
the model of explanation they presuppose. The scientific object they refer to, it has been
shown, is constructed on the basis of a pre-existing assumption of what political science can
explain. As a class-concept, what “politics” includes is determined by the boundaries of the
domain of phenomena that constitutes the field of investigation of political science. That
such boundaries do not mirror any real-world divisions between different social phenomena
has been shown to be an implicit assumption of much empirical research, and I have tried
to account for it in metaphysical terms by referring to the dispositional properties that
constitute the building blocks of the empirical world. From a realist point of view, the
causal structure of phenomenal reality is determined by the “activation” of the particular
causal properties of entities, and therefore to explain a phenomenon is to identify the way
entities causally interact in virtue of their properties. This also reveals a further, more
fundamental difference between the theory of ideal types and the model theory of scientific
objects. The scientific relevance of ideal types lies in the fact that the arrangement of concrete
phenomena into analytical constructs allows for causal relations to be established. Without
the help of mental constructs, Weber argues, the causal explanation of an individual event is
impossible: since the number of causes that influence any given event are always infinite,
their construct-free investigation can only yield “a chaos of ‘existential judgments’ about
countless individual events” (Weber, [1904] 1949; 78). In contrast, ideal types set apart
only the particular aspects of this complexity to which we collectively attribute cultural
significance and therefore allow us to put into less chaotic causal relations those objects
that we deem worthwhile knowing. This is not, however, a practical solution to a merely
epistemic limitation of the inquirers with respect to the causal complexity of the world. As
Weber carefully specifies, “an exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomena
in its full reality is not only practically impossible—it is simply nonsense” (Weber, [1904]
1949; 78, emphasis in the original). The relata of causal relations can only be the “essential”
features of events that we extract from concrete reality in virtue of judgements that are
related to our cultural values; causal connections as such only exist in the interconnected
arrangement of the empirical material into theoretical constructs. Even as far as individual
phenomena are concerned, causal explanation is, as Weber put it, a matter of theory-laden
“imputation” as a consequence of their ideal-typical arrangement.
A realist account of causation, on the other hand, allows us not only to explicate the way
in which “politics” as a class-concept can play a distinctively scientific role. It also helps us
to account for the plurality of conceptualizations of the political sphere as representational
models. As detailed in the first part of this work, the anti-realist view of scientific explanation
implicit in the covering-law model was presupposed on a foundationalist approach to science.
By defining causation in terms of inferential subsumption under covering laws, traditional
political science adopted an anti-realist approach to causal explanation: what counts as a
valid explanation is defined on the basis of logical criteria of inferential validity regardless
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of whether the causal relations thus established correspond to the actual structure of the
factual world. As I have argued, this anti-realist approach depended on the foundationalist
approach that political science methodology shared with the philosophy of science of logical
empiricism. Logical empiricists insisted that the distinctive character of scientific claims lies
in their truth or falsity—as opposed to the downright “meaninglessness” of metaphysical
statements. From an anti-realist standpoint, the truth or falsity of empirical statements,
particularly statements about the causal relation between empirical phenomena, can only be
established by appealing to criteria of inferential validity. The claim that causal links are
established by subsumption under covering laws rather than found in the actual structure
of phenomena implies that causal statements organize unrelated empirical phenomena into
a causal connection whose validity is secured by the confirmation of laws. Insofar as laws
are well-confirmed, the truth-preserving nature of inferential logic implies the validity of
empirical claims about causal relations that can be inferred from those laws. As discussed at
length in chapters 1 and 2, traditional approaches to political explanation relied heavily on
a covering-law understanding of causal explanation—typically in the form of comparative
analysis as a means to empirically arrive at general laws, or by relying on correlational
analysis for their confirmation.
The foundationalist presuppositions of the anti-realist approach to causal explanation,
however, conflict with a pluralistic view of the way in which the political domain can
be conceptualized. The logical foundation of science implies a fundamental demarcation
between the valid claims of science and invalid claims or, more generally, between whatever
empirical phenomena can be subsumed under covering laws and what lies outside their
scope. As I have aimed at showing, the traditional demarcation of the political domain by
means of the abstract concept of “the political system” rests upon a covering-law definition
of the relationship between the empirical phenomena that political science investigates and
the functions that they perform. As a scientific object, the political system is constructed
through the investigation of covering laws that describe the general form of the phenomena
that different social objects can produce in different contexts. Insofar as the explanatory
validity of covering laws is rooted in their capacity to inferentially yield valid empirical claims,
however, the political system has no representational value beyond what covering laws are
said to describe: the object of politics is entirely exhausted by the logical criteria on which
the validity of covering laws is claimed to rest. This also means that, on this view, the scope
of political science—and therefore the definition of what politics is—must be unequivocally
defined on the basis of logicist criteria rather than in accordance with realist principles. This
is the sense in which, I have claimed, realism can be said to provide the tools for judging
the validity of models on the basis of the logic of explanation they presuppose. Realism per
se does not favour any specific model of the political domain—in fact, I have claimed that
realism can account for the scientific pluralism of models by ascribing a representational
instead of a foundational value to the demarcation of a domain of phenomena. The reason
for this is the same reason why anti-realism does favour a distinct, law-based definition of
the political sphere. For anti-realists, scientific validity lies in the logical structure of scientific
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theory, and therefore whatever can be subsumed under the covering laws that constitute
it—the scope of the scientific theory—is also determined by that structure. Realism, on the
other hand, is a theory about the causal structure of the world. Explanation is, in this view,
piecemeal and corresponds to the particular causal processes that generate the phenomena
to explained. The way these phenomena are bound together is a matter of representation,
which can only be partial and open to pluralism.
For this very reason, however, realism demands that we do away with the idea that
any particular conceptualization of politics can make an exclusive claim to validity. More
importantly, realism demands for conceptualizations of politics to not be based on a covering-
law understanding of the political sphere. This conclusion is particularly relevant here, since
definitions of politics are uncritically passed on from one generation to the other political
scholars. Indeed, the covering-law model of explanation itself is still considered by many
political scientists as the royal road to political explanation despite the general discredit
in which it has fallen in the philosophy of science. Clarke and Primo (2007) report for
instance the results of a survey of the three leading generalist journals in political science: the
American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal
of Politics. 10 percent of the 738 articles published in these journals between 2001 and
2005 were randomly sampled, and using very conservative coding rules, nearly half of them
were identified as using or promoting a variant of the covering-law model of explanation.
Far from being rare, Clarke and Primo argue, this model is “practiced in all subfields, with
the exception of political philosophy, and … is often seen as the gold standard of political
science research” (Clarke and Primo, 2007; 746). Because of the “promiscuity” that arises
from the realist view of models as representational objects, no unequivocal prescriptions
can be derived from realism as to what an adequate model of political objects would look
like. In fact, from a realist point of view all models are, strictly speaking, redundant for
the purpose of causal explanation—safe for heuristic or communicative purposes. For this
reason, however, realism does yield prescriptions as to how explanation can be produced.
As I have argued, the debate on mechanism-based explanation vis-à-vis covering laws can be
read through the lenses of a realist opposition to an anti-realist understanding of explanation
in political science.
Let us conclude with a note on the place of generalizations within the causal-realist
framework that I have defended throughout this work. That realist explanation must
reconstruct the causes of specific phenomena in terms of the manifestation of the dispositional
properties of “powerful particulars” seems to imply that causal explanation ultimately comes
down to a “historical” or etiological or even “phenomenal” reconstruction of the causes
of particular events, albeit with reference to the dispositional properties of the entities
involved in the causal process in question. This conclusion would appear to be problematic,
in that it conflicts with the common-sense understanding of what science—and therefore
explanation—is: as mentioned in the introduction, a basic feature of scientific explanation is
that it is capable of “explaining much by little”, or at least by isolating the relevant factors,
instead of providing detailed descriptions of just what happened. Thus understood, the
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tension between dispositional explanation and generalization would appear to escalate to an
unmanageable conflict between different scientific goals that trade off—as expressed e.g. in
the traditional distinction between an “idiographic” and a “nomothetic” explanation. On
the one hand, causal processes involve the activation of the particular generative properties
of individual entities that are capable of bringing about specific events—the explananda of
science. On the other hand, we wish to generalize those causal processes beyond the specific
context in which they occurred in order for explanation to be of any relevance to scientific
explanation; if only intuitively, scientific relevance has to do with the regularity or generality
with which a certain causal pattern occurs.
The problem, however, lies with the understanding of what generalities are, and therefore
what type of “generalization” can be set as a desirable goal for scientific explanation. Realist
criticism to the covering-lawmodel of explanation, it has been argued, involves a fundamental
distinction between a causal and an inferential understanding of explanation. While the
former implies a commitment to the assumption that causal processes are “out there” to
be discovered, the latter is implicitly based on the idea that causal relations are ultimately
logical relations, and therefore they only exist, strictly speaking, in the mind of the inquirer.
In this sense, the search for logically established generalizations of the links between causal
variables cannot obliterate, from a realist point of view, the way in which those very causal
factors actually combine—in a mechanistic fashion—to produce specific outcomes. But
while it is certainly true that the way in which entities combine into mechanisms is highly
contextual and therefore its reconstruction can only be generalized across different contexts
to the detriment of causal realism, this is no a priori case against regularities. As Bhaskar
put it, regularities may well be given in experience and mechanisms required to explain
them. Thus, regularities may actually occur, and mechanism-based variation in how entities
causally interact can provide a causal account of how similar outcomes obtain under different
conditions.
Moreover, dispositional explanation is not necessarily conducive to etiological expla-
nation. One way of appreciating this is to contrast two different ways of providing causal
explanations that are in line with a dispositional realism. In his seminal defence of causal
realism, for instance, Salmon (1984), clearly equates explanation with the etiological re-
description of the process at stake: in this way, the antecedent causes that produce the
explanandum-phenomenon can be fully revealed and therefore an adequate explanation is
provided. On the other hand, causal explanation may aim at describing the dispositional
properties in virtue of which a mechanism will generate the explanandum-phenomenon
(instead of a different phenomenon). For want of a better term, such explanation can be
called, following Craver and Kaplan (forthcoming), constitutive rather than etiological. As
opposed to etiological explanation, constitutive explanation aims at revealing the features
of the mechanism for a phenomenon, i.e. the properties of the entities that constitute the
mechanisms and that interact so as to produce the phenomenon to be explained. In fact,
mechanism-based explanation as described in this work is synonymous with constitutive
explanation thus conceived: qua causal properties, dispositions alone can be taken to be the
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genuine components of the generative mechanism which explanation mirrors.
Notice that this defeats the notion that causal explanation is automatically improved by
providing more detail and that dispositional explanation accordingly comes down to the
idiographic description of particular causal events. On the contrary, only a few properties of
the entities involved in the process at stake can typically be considered relevant to the causal
production of the explanandum-phenomenon. It follows that explanatory power does not lie
with detailed description, or merely “phenomenal” accuracy. Mechanism-based explanations
do map onto the ontic—i.e. worldly—causal processes that generate the effects that are
of interest to scientific explanation, as per causal realism. Yet they do so precisely because
they are capable of abstracting from detail and single out the genuine factors involved in
causal production—namely, the dispositional properties of the relevant entities in which
the mechanism consists. Abstraction thus plays a role within the framework of a realist
approach to causal explanation, and indeed a crucial one insofar as abstraction in the above
sense is the core of mechanism-based explanation—it is the bearer of explanatory power, as
it were.
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